Must March to End

Evening Star, Issue 25673, 22 December 1945, Page 8

Must March to End

H/t/er-Musso/ini Letters—No. / 2

Duce's Advice on War-winning SUGGESTS DEAL WITH RUSSIA Almost from the outset of their association, Mussolini had urged upon Hitler the necessity for armed assault against Soviet Russia. But in March, 1943, with his own star in decline and the Axis firmly set on the road to destruction, he was suggesting to Hitler that it might be best to make some sort of deal with the Russians.

ROME, March, 1943. " FUHRER,— "Fiist of all I wish to thank you most cordially for the letter you sent me through the (Foreign) Minister (Joachim) von IRibbentrop, with, whom the recent talks in Rome—l discussed some of the important points raised in that letter. I nevertheless deem it expedient to set forth in these pages the considerations and conclusions prompted by a general review of the situation. Allow me to take the subjects in the order in which they are mentioned in your letter. " (1) TUNISIA: I am glad to see that you, too, Oh Fuhrer, regard Tunisia as an essential factor of the overall strategic situation. "The inference is clear: We must hold on to Tunisia—at all costs; we must in any case hold as long as possible, for this will mar and perhaps definitely upset the Anglo-Saxon plans decided upon at Casablanca. "To hold Tunisia we must extend our landing head, not decrease, as proposed by (Field-Mar-shal Erwin) Rommel. "The latter's suggestion would mean being crushed and very soon pushed toward the sea. There would be no way out, for the enemy would achieve superiority' by the junction of his armies and-the possibdity of using all the airfields abandoned by us in Tunisia. " 1 am convinced that we ought to resist on the Mareth Line. But in order to resist and, if possible, coun-ter-attaek, our forces must be replenished; thev must, above all, have guns, tanks, and fuel; transport must be ensured across the short but unavoidable stretch of the Sicilian Canal. "To achieve all this, Oh Fuhrer, I shall never weary with repetition. Axis air strength .in the Sardinia, Sicily, and Tunisia area must be at least equal to the enemy strengths \\ e failed to conquer Egypt because of our inferiority in the air. We shall lose Tunisia if this fundamental requirement is nbt fulfilled. BALKANS MISCARRIAGE " (2) BALKANS: As regards action in Croatia, during the first phase of the Weiss Plan, I consider that the results, if not decisive, were at any rate satisfactory. ""As for the action undertaken by the Italian Fifth Army Corps, which y»u mention,' Fuhrer, my supreme command points out that the plan drawn up by General Loehr envisaged the engagement and destruction of rebel I forces by a rapid advance of German swift columns on Bihac, Bos Petrovac, Kliuc. These places should have been reached on the first day—viz., January 20, by the S.S. Division Pnnz Eugen (Bihac-Bos Petrovac) and by the 71<th Division (Kliuc) respectively. " The task assigned to the Italian j troops of the Fifth Corps was a methodical advance from west to eas..: they were to mop up as they proceeded, and were to take Slunj, Bihac, Koieniea, Udbina. " The manoeuvre miscarried. The Germans failed to carry out their swift penetration, and the objectives which should have been reached between January 20 and 21 were not so reached till January 28 and February 3. "In spite of the serious handicap of mountainous country, deep snow and fierce rebel resistance, the Fifth Corps troops, who were to carry out methodical mopping-up operations, succeeded in reaching the objectives which had been assigned, Slunj on January 25, Korenico February 2, Udbina February 4. . "As for the second phase of the operation, as has been agreed upon with General Warlimont, the Italian Command will give the utmost support to secure the flank of the German divisions operating towards LivnoGlamoc .and tp close the Partisans' escape routes southwards. "The Minister Ribbentrop has probably informed you, Fuhrer, that the Partisan-Chetnik matter has been discussed at some length. We entirely agree that Chetniks and Partisans are enemies of the Axis, and would be ready, particularly in the event of a landing, to make common cause against us, in which case they would place us in a very difficult position. " To meet the demands of guerrilla warfare—-for which the Chetniks. like all Balkans, are particularly suitedsome thousands of Chetniks were locally armed by the Italian Command. These Chetniks'have up to now fought the Partisans very vigorously. "Under the circumstances, therefore. I called Generals Roatta and Bir-zio-Piroli to Rome and have given them the following orders: — " (a) No further delivery of arms to the Chetniks. " (b) Their disarmament as soon as the Partisans no longer constitute a dangerous armed movement. (Brigandage of % more or less political complexion will always linger on as a chronic feature of those regions.) "(c) Army General Birzio-Piroh is instructed to contact O.K.W. (Oberkommand Wehrmacht—the German High Command) with a view to coordinating further action in respect of the movement of General Mihailovic, who, though described as a traitor in the Partisan radio broadcasts, is nevertheless our enemy, since he is the War Minister of the Yugoslav Government in London. "I am not unaware of the projects entertained by this gentleman in respect of territorial revision at Italy s expense. I have just this moment received a report to the effect that Ger-

man forces which contacted Chetnik formations in the" Upper Narenta Valley are alleged to have agreed on collaboration, and to have handed over cartridges and hand grenades to the Chetniks. POSSIBLE ALLIED LANDIHGS " (3) .Landings and second front. It goes without saying that the Allies must attempt to set up a second front in Europe. Russia's requirements brook no delay. When—as I firmly believe— Russian initiative has come to a standstill, the Anglo-Saxons will have to honour their commitments and land in some part of Europe. I believe it is well to distinguish between trial landings, of which there may 'be manv, with the object of confusing us and, if possible, dispersing our forces, and the actual invasion. " Were Tunisia to be definitely lost, I foresee the following action against Italy:—(a) Massive bombardments of the Northern and Southern regions; (b) Commando and parachute landings in Sicily and Sardinia, for the purpose of improving the Allies' maritime situation. An actual invasion of the Peninsula is an undertaking which the Anglo-Saxons cannot seriously envisage. " Faced with these eventualities, our defensive plans for the two islands have been speeded up. Information on the subject will be made available to you by a commission of your officers who visited the fortification system of Sardinia. , . " There are at present four divisions in Sardinia. A fifth will be sent within the month. I am informed that the defence of the island will be perfected with the arrival of a German regiment equipped with the arms we lack. For our drama, oh Fuhrer, consists in the fact that we are compelled to wage a ' proletarian' war with the arms left over from the 1915-1918 war. Only in the course of this year shall we begin to have those modern arms without which no stand can be made against the onrush of masses amply supplied with up-to-date equipment, as the An-glo-Saxons are. Apart from surprise action, I believe that any attempt at landing in our islands is doomed to failure. SPAIH STILL A CARD " (4) SPAIN: I have handed your Minister, von Ribbentrop, a copy of the letter sent me by Generalissimo (Francisco) Franco through the new Ambassador, and a copy of my reply. I helieve, Oh Fuhrer, that you werp wise in helping to build up the efficiency of the Spanish armed forces. " Spain is still a card in our game —notwithstanding the oscillations of Franco's policy—and I believe we could play it most advantageously should the day come when it would enable us. to cross his territory and take the whole North African deployment of the ■ Anglo-Americans in the rear. I understand that our enemies are extremely apprehensive over a move of this description. " (5) RUSSIAN FRONT. You may well imagine, Fuhrer, how attentively and passionately I have followed the latest developments on the eastern front. The doubt never crossed my mind—for a single moment—that the armed forces of your (Reich would have re-established the situation. " The heroism of your soldiers, which you bring home to me by a description of the losses suffered by the S.S. divisions, has been universally acknowledged. The effort which Germany is about to put forth—in response to your appeal—is unparalleled in the nistory of any people. " I therefore feel convinced that, at a given moment, the Bolshevists will find their path barred by an unscalable wall. But on the day when you, Oh Fuhrer, with your men and material, will have achieved the Eastern wall, an exhausted Russia will no longer represent the mortal enemy of two years ago. THE RUSSIA RISK

" Unless you are absolutely certain of destroying her strength once and for all, I ask myself whether it is not risking too much. It means repeating the struggle against infinite, elusive, and practically unattainable space of Russia, while the Anglo-Saxon peril grows in the-west. " Once Russia is eliminated or neutralised, one way or the other, victory will be ours. But I. look forward to discuss this matter thoroughly with you when I shall have the pleasure of seeing you. " (6) ITALIAN ARMY CORPS. Italy cannot be absent from the Russian front, hence the second army corps will remain in Russia. It must be reorganised and re-equipped with efficient arms. " With a deployment in length, such as the Eighth Army had on the Don, without reserves and with obsolete arms, things could not be expected to go otherwise than they did, notwithstanding the undeniable tenacious resistance of our units. But allow me t/> say that I should like the Italian Army Corps to be used in the fighting area, not in service of supply. " Lastly, allow me, Oh Fuhrer, to thank you for your kind inquiries after my health. I have not yet recovered entirely, but I am better, and believe that the crisis is over. I think the whole thing is due to the nervous tension of this latter period. " One cannot be in politics for 43 years without some part of one's body being affected by it. As a matter of fact, I feel no concern. The thing that matters is to fight and win. Small personal ailments are trifling episodes in comparison with the infinities Demo-Plutocracy

fin the next interchange, to be published on Monday (Tuesday being Christmas Day), Hitler discusses the revamping of the North African campaign and the reason for his dismissal of Rommel from the Supreme Command.] (World Rights Reserved.)

and Jewry have inflicted on mankind—infirmities which fire and sword will heal. " The review of other less urgent questions I defer to our meeting, which I hope will be at an early date. " In the meantime I wish to reiterate to you that my decision to march with you to the very end is as unfaltering as ever. And I wish to add that responsible Italians are fully convinced that to the end we must march, come what may. " Accept. Fuhrer, my ever more iomradely and cordial regards. " MUSSOLINI."