The Evening Star MONDAY, MAY 8, 1944. WAR AGAINST THE LUFTWAFFE.

Evening Star, Issue 25169, 8 May 1944, Page 2

The Evening Star MONDAY, MAY 8, 1944. WAR AGAINST THE LUFTWAFFE.

Dr Goefobels, in his Latest dose of ersatz soothing syrup handed to the German people through the medium of ' Das Reich,' sees in the invasion threat nothing to make the Germans nervous. That the article, in ' Das Reich ' itself indicates that someone, if only Dr Goebbels himself, is suffering from a pronounced knocking at the knees, is not meant to transcend the soporific nature of the Proipaganda Minister's outpourings. While not disputing Anglo-American air superiority,, Dr Goebbels belittles the effects of Allied bombings, and casts a sneer at hopes held of knocking out the Luftwaffe's fighter strength and aircraft production plants. Whether the Allied bomibing policy can achievo these ends remains one of the greatest unanswered questions of the war. A close examination of the matter from all angles suggests that a complete knockout is impossible, but considerable success can be obtained in reducing production and strength. That some success is already (being obtained is apparent in the decreasing numbers of fighters that meet thu invading bombers; they may be numerous over certain targets, but ovel others they are few, and, quite often, non-existent. The Germans claim that production has been affected only JO per cent, by Allied mass bombings, hut even those who may be disposed to give Rome respect to German claims couldnot accept this figure, for there is plenty of evidence to prove it to ba much higher.

When the Germans launched the Battle of Britain, not all their efforts could knock out British production. When there appeared some likelihood lit' this, Britain at once dispersed -het lilaaie production to such an extent that parts of fighter aircraft were raadu in numerous small works, and even iu garages. To have smashed all 'these targets, had they known of them, would have taken the Germans years, allowing for weather and other factors that prevent a sustained offensive. Germany is a much bigger country'than Britain, and can " decentralise " to a greater extent, so that, even operating with larger squadrons, the British and American air forces could hardlv expect to reduce the period of time necessary for the total destruction oi industry. Moreover, Germany has factories in the occupied areas more distant from Britain, and against these;, nven with the use of .Italian bases, it is not practicable to carry out the continuous raids necessary to destroy completely even one target. Germany, like Britain, has found one reply to the bomb menace by going underground, and reports coming through neutral sources suggest that Germany is going underground in a big way. While thw transformation is taking place, there must be some decline in industrial production, and a claim that here is to be found one explanation of the " temporary '' fall in German aircraft production may have something in it. If Germany were left long enough, by establishing these underground factories—it has to be realised they have helped Britain to step up productionshe might in time he in a position to rebuild a formidable Luftwaffe. Meantime the assault continues, and it has to he tested to its conclusion. Hamlsomo dividends have already been paid, and the fact that long-distance daylight raids against such strongly-defended targets as Berlin can now be made in the strength formerly associated only with night raids, and without a loss that can be considered uneconomic, proves that the air policy has been substantially justified. Germany's vaunts that her air strength has not been materially affected must be considered in conjunction with the fact that she cannot adequately defend by fighters the majority of targets now iattacked.