JAPS. HAD ALL KEYS

Evening Star, Issue 24103, 26 January 1942, Page 5

JAPS. HAD ALL KEYS

A COMPLETE SURPRISE SUPINE COMMANDERS (Rec. 9 a.m.) NEW YORK, January 25. The Pearl Harbour report declared that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant-general Short failed to confer with each other about the warnings and the appropriate measures of defence required by the imminence of hostilities. It was apparent that the Japanese had obtained complete information and knew that there’was no naval force anywhere in the north-east and north-west sector of the Hawaiian island. The Japanese apparently knew that no distant aeroplane reconnaissance was maintained on any sector, and up to December 6, no inshore air patrol was maintained around Oahu Island. The Japanese knew the exact location of the airfields and where the important warships were berthed. The Japanese flyers had the most

detailed maps, courses, and bear- » ings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field. Each flyer seems to have been given a specified mission.

The board absolved from responsibility the Secretaries of War, Navy, and State, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. TO CONFER.

The report said the responsible commanders at Hawaii had plans in their possession which would have prevented the disaster, but they failed to confer respecting warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and did not use the existing plans to meet the emergency. Had tho warnings and orders been complied with on December 7 the army’s air draft warning system should have been operating. Among contributory causes to the cuscess of the attack were the restrictions, such as those on wire tapping, which prevented counter-espionage. A further contributory cause was the failure of the War Department to reply to a message relating to the anti-sabotage measures taken by Short and the non-re-ceipt by the commanders in Halvah prior to the attack of the warning mes-

sage sent shortly before hostilities began.

The failure of Kimmel and Short to prepare adequately for attack resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent In diplomatic, military, and naval circles and the public Press that any immediate Japanese attack would occur in the Far East. However, the attitude of each commander demonstrated lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in him. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to both commanders, who failed to make suitable dispositions to meet the attack, and failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes of the success of the attack. UNREPORTED INCIDENT. Tho Pearl y Harbour report revealed that the United States fired the first shots of the war when a destroyer patrol plane sank a small Japanese submarine just outside Pearl Harbour an hour before the attack. Although this incident was reported to the naval base no “ alert ” orders were issued. A non-commissioned officer operating a sound detector located a large flight of planes north-east of Oahu, 130 miles distant, 45 minutes before the attack. The officer reported the discovery to an inexperienced lieutenant, who took no action because he believed they were friendly planes. The information indicates that the Japanese used four aircraft carriers and between 150 and 200 planes, unnumbered supporting surface craft, and a few small submarines. WARNING SYSTEM INCOMPLETE. On the morning of the attack the army’s permanent air raid warning had not been completed. Only mobile locator equipment had been installed on temporary locations, which operated for only three hours daily between 0400 and 0700. The Japanese attacked at 0745. The army aircraft were bunched in the airport in order to guard against sabotage instead of being dispersed, which resulted in such heavy destruction that only a few fighters' were able to take off after the Japanese attacked. Tho report said that Colonel Knox warned Mr Stimson (Secretary for War) by letter in these terms: “ If war eventuates with Japan it is believed possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base of Pearl Harbour.” Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenantgeneral Short received copies of the letter.