COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

Evening Star, Issue 24007, 4 October 1941, Page 9

COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

The Premier's mid-tveek war review had all the clarity, eloquence, and graphic realism one expects in any Churchill deliverance, its general conclusion being that the time is still over the horizon when choice of the next move will rest tvith us. One important and rather amazing passage was that in which he averred it within the power of Hitler, after consolidating his Russian gains and standing on the defensive there, to undertake, not singly, mark, but “all together” three such hazardous major campaigns as — (l) turning his vast army southward towards the Valley of the Nile; (2) making his way through Spain into northwest Africa; and (3) launching an invasion upon the British Isles. In the face of Churchill’s simultaneous statement that Germany is already experiencing a shortage of air effectives, it is difficult to conceive that even Hitler, with his faculty of manoeuvring events and iveaving them into the pattern of his designs, could seriously contemplate simultaneous committal of his forces to three hazards involving such multiplication of air strength as we cannot believe within scope of German war production. The semiofficial British estimate of Germany’s air losses to mid-July was about 7,500 machines, over 6,000 of which had fallen to British arms; and since in the interval to early October the Luftwaffe has had rough handling from the Soviet air force, a conservatively low estimate of the enemy’s air losses is 10,000 planes, and probably more than 20,000 trained airmen—an even more serious loss since he has not got our all-the-year training facilities for air cadres across the Atlantic. Germany’s mass production system was at one time reputed to be turning out 350 machines a week, but it is very doubtful if that output still continues in face of possible shortage of raw materials, and the havoc wrought by the R.A.F. raids upon industrial centres; and, presuming the approximate accuracy of the quoted figures, the Prime Minister’s envisagement of a triple enterprise against us on a gigantic scale does seem to credit the enemy with a quite impossible dynamic of expansion. Still, Churchill ought to know, and he has never shown any proneness either to understatement of our chances or overstatement of our perils. Another passage in the speech, of the greatest import since its implications have bearing upon likely delay in Britain equipping herself for an all-out offensive, was the teaming that extensive sacrifices of our own war potential will be necessary to enable the Soviet, with its large loss of productive power, still to remain in the field as a first class war machine. There can be no doubting the complete validity of this warning, for the already great impairment of Russia’s heavy industries will be followed by their almost complete disintegration if the German drives north to Leningrad and south to the Donetz Basin and the Crimea should succeed. Running with the problem, and indeed furnishing its crux, is the finding of reasonably safe methods and ports for the conveyance of the material of war which we are undoubtedly able to supply. Easiest access is by way of the Persian Gulf since the railways of Iran are now in the Allies’ hands and furnish a clear route to Batum, the chief Russian oil harbour on the Black Sea, safe so long as Marshal Budenny’s armies can defend the Ukraine line from Kharkov to Rostov, at which the Germans are hurling their divisions as fiercely as against the Crimea. It is in this Donetz Basin campaign that allied supplies to Russia will become most urgently necessary, and it is in this sector, also, if in any, that actual Allied troops could intervene. It may well be, of course, that Germany is also poised for a combined air and sea attack from Constanta and Varna upon Sebastopol (midway the Black Sea), this to be one arm, and a land attack through Turkey the other, of a pincers drive for Batum, the terminal of the pipeline from Russia’s most productive oilfields around Baku. It has to be remembered, however, that this area has become much less vulnerable since the British coups in Syria, Iraq, and Iran interposed flanking bases from which a German advance through Turkey would be constantly endangered. Our almost costless Syrian campaign is like to prove of the greatest strategic importance in the Mediterranean struggle that now impends. If need should presently arise we shall be in position to give strong support to the Turks and to ensure them the supplies of which they ivould he much in need if attacked. Not only that, Syria secures our position in Cyprus, tightens our grip on the Eastern Mediterranean, and removes from Egypt the possible threat of being taken in rear when the great drive on Libya eventuates. All portents are that this will be almost immediately. It would require not only the very closest attention to the details of the cables, but an astuteness almost magical in reconciling their extraordinary discrepancies to make any accurate assessment of Russia’s situation, which, so far as the north and south sectors (the vital ones) are concerned, is best summed up in yesterday’s cable flash that “silence in the news sense largely covers the tremendous commotion between the Gomel region and the Crimea, while the Murmansk and the Karelian fronts are similarly blanketed.” Generally speaking, it would appear that in the southern area the whole series of smaller German moves that seemed puzzlingly confused and unrelated are resolving themselves into a co-ordinated greater move that has already divided and isolated the central and southern defending armies, and notv threatens complete isolation of the all-important south. In the central (Smolensk) sector, on the other hand, the Russian counter-attacks seem to have attained sufficient momentum to wrest the initiative (temporarily at any rate) from the invader, hut it does not appear, unfortunately, that they can restore the situation to the south ; on the contrary, it is claimed in to-day’s cables that a great German attack from that arc of the front is pending to renew the drive on Moscow. Nevertheless, Russia’s central forces undoubtedly have the edge on the opposing German armies at present, and their success has diverted much of the pressure from Leningrad. Indeed, if capable of extension, their cbunler-offensive could threaten the flanks and communications of von Leeh’s armies in the north. At any rate it has lent new vigour to the defence of the city—to such degree, indeed, that its defenders have in the past fetv days monopolised the initiative with great tank attacks in the Kolpino district, which is just within the inner (TrotskTosno)’ line of defence south of Leningrad, The battle is undecided, though it must be confessed that the odds against Russia lengthen. Nevertheless, Ivan has proved himself a really tough fellow, and if the snows fly with him still resistant it will be difficult to discern who is the real victor. Germany talks of a great iron ring round Europe to protect what she has ivdn, but ivithin that ring are included the nations which have suffered economic despoilment, political serfdom, and brutal suppression, and whose resentment is becoming daily more violent and ungovernable. All the elements of rebellion are potential within that iron ring that Hitler has decreed for the winter—for the long, dark tcinter when deprivations tvill worsen to starvation, and the unrelaxing blockade, Britain’s outer ring to the German inner ring, will close inexorably upon the wicked and the unfortunate alike. Hitler’s successes are desperate successes, with triumph and disaster running side by side. All his achievements, all the achievements of his regime have been expressed in physical violence; in physical violence he and his regime will collapse.