PACIFIC BASES.

Evening Star, Issue 23817, 22 February 1941, Page 10

PACIFIC BASES.

Im the years preceding the outbreak of the present war American defence policy in some respects was similar to that of Great Britain. Both countries wore handicapped in this matter by the fact that they were democracies, having no acquisitive territorial designs and desiring to live in peace with the work?. The aim was to avoid acts that might be construed as provocative, and as a result defence preparations were not given the conspicuous place in the national policies that subsequent events showed to be necessary. To-day Singapore is vital to the defence of the Empire, yet when Labour was in power in Britain work on the base was actually suspended. Tho same trend of thought existed in America. In 1938 the Navy Board was anxious to fortify Guam as a powerful air, submarine, and destroyer base, and a Bill was inf reduced into Congress providing five million dollars for the defence of that island, which is an important strategic point lying to tho east of tho Philippines and on the direct route between Japan and Australia. The House of Representatives refused to pass tho vote on tho ground that the fortification of Guam would, if carried out, bo provocative to Japan. It appears from events today that Japan did not need any provoking to encourage her in her aggressive acts. Wo now see tho sequel, tile House of Representatives having approved of large authorisations for naval construction in Guam and Samoa. Admiral Stark was definite in his ad-

vice to Congress. This bluff sailor told that body that it should pay no attention to Japanese objections to the expansion of the United States naval’base at Guam.

In its report to the Washington Administration three years ago it was recommended that twenty-live air bases should bo constructed. They included Pearl Harbour at Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam, and other Pacific islands which are intimately connected with the American air services. Guam is the largest of the Ladrone or Marianne Islands in the North Pacific, and the naval report pointed out that if the island existed as a strong air and submarine base, hostile operations against the Philippines would bo a precarious undertaking. To an even greater extent Guam fortified would impede, if not actually prevent, extensive naval operations to the southward, and in the event of Anglo-American co-operation would, in conjunction with Singapore, be an effective help in protecting Malaya, New Guinea, and Australia, and also the Dutch East Indies from hostile forces. Admiral Hepburn, president of the American Naval Board, said the conversion of Guam into a wellequipped baso would settle the whole question of America’s position in the Pacific and would have a groat influence in maintaining peace in that area. It will thus be seen that the United States naval authorities wore well aware oTt'he potential dangers, but President Roosevelt’s hand was stayed by political considerations. White House hoped that Japan’s policy would be guided by friendly negotiation with Britain and America. It is declared from Tokiq to-day that the AngloAmerican plans are designed to intimidate Japan. There will be no question of intimidation if her statesmen abandon their present aggressive and acquisitive plans. The issue lies with them.