COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

Evening Star, Issue 23770, 28 December 1940, Page 9

COMMENT and REFLECTIONS

The affectation of nonchalance with which the dictators have dismissed the Albanian and Libyan reverses as trivial and evanescent is so ill-assumed as to savour of the ridiculous, and, indeed, there has been a note of discord sounded in their several excuses. Lor while Italy's leader proclaimed it only a lucky prelude, an. attack which was already being stemmed and presently would be turned back upon itself, the German War Lord dismissed the whole affair as trivial—a battle between pigmies, since the German giant was not engaged and the war could be neither won nor lost where he teas not embattled. This sorely piqued the Italian Press, for ivhile it is true that Albania and Egypt are only one front, it is equally true that Libya is the kernel of Italian power in Africa, and that this power is tottering under the unexpected weight of Wavail's onset. The Italian version that Britain had assembled nearly half a million men for the venture lakes no account of the fact that such a force had to be got to the spot in the teeth of their invincible (and invisible) navy in the mare nostrum of their boast; but so sorely discomfited an adversary may be pardoned for just doubling the numbers of Britons engaged. Facts that betray the uneasiness these reverses have created among the enemy leaders are that Germany, according to report, has provided a great fleet of transport planes (the sea is too slow or too unsafe for II Dace’s guerre mobile) to convey heavy reinforcements to the frontier zone some miles from Bardiq, with its wire defences and anti-tank traps which Wavell is preparing to storm; and that Hitler has entrained through Rumania and Hungary a mechanised and infantry force, presumably to take the weight of the Greek attack off Italy. These facts ill consort with the enemy attempt to belittle the Brilish-Grcco offensive, and moreover are very suggestive of a compulsion to act hurriedly, since recent diplomatic data imply that the Fuhrer has been loth to chance his hand in the Balkans, ivith Turco-Russian policy undisclosed. In fact, though it goes perhaps only a little way to determine the ultimate issue, the whole situation has changed uneasily for the Axis, and the change has a psychological os well as a physical significance. The pious belief in the invincibility of the Axis arms has become tainted ivith suspicion in neutral countries that can still hear the story, and that is the psychological factor; the physical, of course, is that it is no longer the Nile, but Libya that is under threat, and that from within (by the savage Abyssinians) and from without, Italy is beginning to feel the approach of Nemesis. And so Hitler finds himself on the horns of a dilemma a three-horned dilemma, if such can exist. First, he has failed to soften the British Isles to such an extent as to render invasion better than an extreme hazard; second, his partners ill-timed and probably unauthorised attack on Greece has made Italian arms ridiculous; and third, the jointly-planned attack on Egypt ' entrusted to Mussolini has become a reverse blitzkrieg, with the Italians on the move tvest instead of cast. In fact, the dictators, if they are any longer on top of the world, are perched precariously, and apt to topple off. Their fall, urgently wished, ivill be ruthlessly expedited, as Churchill stated, if and token the chance comes. That is not to say that the tear has been toon, or nearly won in these two campaigns. But it is something big to know that ivhile heretofore the enemy has been moving with method as . and when he willed, now ho is put out of his stride, and compelled for the nonce to dance to our tune. There has begun to creep into the Fuhrer’s speech, notably in the address to munition workers, a note of doubt and uncertainty. He can even say “ if toe should lose this tear,” though, to be sure, his underlings are. still blatantly avowing that Britain will be taken as easily as France when the Fuhrer wills it. He should surely be ivilling it noto—this long stalemate must be infecting even his docile people with doubts unhealthy to his regime. On the other hand, Churchill's speech, to the Italians, so confident, at once conciliatory and minatory, a reproach as well as an appeal, furnished something as close to a testament to posterity as oral delivery is capable of. Like his earlier broadcast to Frenchmen it was hopelessly “ jammed ” on the Continent, and heard probably by just a few thousands. It would not have been comfortable, nevertheless, in the light of current events for the Italian and German leaders or the Vichy defeatists to hear that the British Empire, ivith the sponsorship of the United States, feels able to solemnly vow itself to the task of cleansing Europe once and for all of the Nazi pestilence —Hitler and his gangsters, Mussolini and his satellites. The speech to the French people was assuredly, moreover, an indication that Britain icas aware that the Vichy puppets were on the. eve of active junction with Hitler, and its delivery was at once challenge, learning, and appeal. , What will be Germany’s next move in the vital sector of the tear, the British Isles? We know now that she is using fighter machines regularly for the smash-and-dash bombing of London and other centres, that is doing so much indiscriminate damage. These machines, ivhile they cannot carry the big bomb-load that a bomber docs, possess the compensatory value of high speed and smaller target surface, and it must be evident to all who read the cables intelligently that they are frequently able to elude all our defences. It is saddening to reflect that these tactics are made possible only by the close proximity to England of their taking-off points in France and Belgium. Had France not collapsed the big advantage of short-range bombing would have rested with us, not the enemy. Summing up the situation as it appears to us in this brief pause in the operations, it is seen that there arc ponderable factors on the credit as well as on the debit side of our ledger. Thanks to Mussolini’s impetuosity and the Italian soldier's pusillanimity (or distaste) we have reversed the initiative in the East, and compelled Hitler to make an intervention foreign to his designs; thanks to the fortitude of the people of the British Isles, Hitler has made no such impression on the nation’s morale as predicates easy invasion; and thanks to the American people rvc have a covenant, a guarantee of aid that should ensure, if only tve can survive the assaults o f the next few months, a predominance in the air that must, within a year, see the totalitarian dream of world conquest vanish into thin air. But, on the other side of the ledger, the crucial test has yet to come —we have to survive, if not invasion, a sea blockade that already has us in trouble, and that, unless checked by American aid, may prove even fatal. It is no use surrendering to undue optimism because our Mediterranean victories have been to dale so signal. The crux lies in our power to survive in Britain. The Germans arc now marshalling a winter and spring attack upon the sea —by aeroplane, submarine, and raider—upon a scale hitherto unconceived. If tve can survive, it will only be by the summoning of all our powers as an Empire, used every hour of every day by every citizen. When Wellington teas asked before the Waterloo campaign tvhat he thought of the chances, he said, with characteristic blunt ness: “ By God, I believe Blucher and I can do it.” And he added, pointing to a redcoat on duty outside: “ It all depends upon that fellow.” In this latest war each of us wears the redcoat, citizen as well ns soldier, and if tve all make it a red badge of courage in our daily jobs and in the deprivations that will inevitably increase during the year, we, too, can do ji “ By God!”