FRENCH POPULAR FRONT

Evening Star, Issue 23175, 26 January 1939, Page 3

FRENCH POPULAR FRONT

WHY IT FAILED "HEW AND APPARENTLY USELESS EXPENDITURES " STRAIN ON THE FRANC An absorbing question of the day is what happened to the coalition of French Radical and Liberal blocs known as the Popular Front, since it represented a technique that had possibilities of becoming wide-spread. M. Marjolin, in the Christina Science Monitor, presents one view of the reasons behind the defeat of the Popular Front. France’s Popular Front has come to an end, receiving its quietus at the recent convention of the Radical Party in Marseilles, and its final conge with the failure of the national strike. At the convention the Radicals—who in France constitute the most moderate of the parties of the Left—decided definitely and almost unanimously to break with the Communists. This decision was later translated into action in the form of a strongly worded letter stating that the Radicals “ refuse to sit at the same tabic any longer with the Communists.”

Thus came to a full stop what, 1 believe, was the greatest progressive movement France has known since the beginning of the Third Republic. Its disappearance leaves in many hearts as much regret as its appearance bad provoked enthusiasm. How is this conelusion of an experiment which in the beginning was hailed as a triumph of liberty and justice to be explained? As an enthusiastic adherent of tbo Popular Front from the beginning, and, in fact, as one who from June, 1936, to June, 1937, was in a position to watch its workings from the inside, I shall attempt to analyze objectively the principal factors within the movement which led to its collapse. The simple truth is that, if the Popular Front finally expired at Marseilles, it had really been moribund for a long time. Only during the first three or four months of the original Blum Government, in fact, did it exist in the fullness of its force. 'By the autumn of 1936 economic difficulties were beginning to accumulate. Against its own will the Government was forced to devaluate the franc. In March, 1937, it became necessary to call in several orthodox financial experts to avert a monetary catastrophe. Finally, the fall of the first Blum Cabinet in June, 1937, marks the end of the active period of the Popular Front. Since then there has been a series of Radical Governments not differing very nri ,h in essentials from the Cabinets tiiat were in power before May, 1936. M. Blum’s second Cabinet, early in 1935, was so short-lived it need not be taken into consideration. It is necessary to recall that the Popular Front drew its life and strength from two principal factors which had contributed to its formation:—

1. The popular reaction against the Fascist peril within France, against the violation of Republican legality of which the leagues of the Right were guilty in February, 1934; 2. The refusal to accept as indispensable the deflation policy practised by the Laval in 1935, and the will to find a solution to France’s social, economic, and financial difficulties without having recourse either to the compression of incomes or to devaluation.

Now, the elections of _ May, 1930, registered not only the triumph of the Socialists and Communists, but at the same time .the defeat and virtual disappearance of.the Right as a political [lower. The real reason for the disappearance of the Popular Front must be sought in the failure of its economic policy. Not only does the present franc represent a bare 40 per cent, of the franc of 1936, but even at this low level, at the end of November, when this was written, it is constantly menaced. The deficit of the nation’s Budget has grown continuously It may bo expected to read 53,000,000,000 francs in 1939, out of a total estimated expenditure of 102,000,000,OCX) francs. AVe must keep in miud these two characteristic traits of the Popular Front: 1. !t was a spontaneous movement of the French masses, without any really precise programme, and without any positively determined will. The Popular Front Governments, and particularly the Government of M. Leon Blum, never freed themselves, even m the technical part of their work, from this domination of the masses. Ihey followed much more than they led. 2. The ideology of this mass movement took form eventually in opposition to any slightest notion of sacrifice or constraint. Its profound psychological root was a sentiment of generosity; its dominating idea, that of abundance. I should like to survey briefly the three essential points where mistakes were made* devaluation, hours of work, the unbalanced Budget. First, 1 believe, every informed person. in May, 1936, was convinced of the necessity of devaluing the franc. YeT the Popular Front Government put on devaluation until nearly four months after it took office. Why? Simply because none of the political parties, and especially none of the parties of the Left that constituted the Popular Front, had the courage to say to the public—still obsessed by the memory of the inflation of post-war years—-that devaluation was indispensable. I do not contest the rightness of most of the social reforms of the Popular Front; the paid holidays, most necessary of all the reforms, which was carried out without difficulty ; the guarantees and collective bargaining rights accorded to the workers within the tactories. which gave to the workers a proper sense of their own dignity. Nor do I protest against the salary increases in themselves. They were necessary, for the level of pay in certain industries and in certain regions of France was intolerably low. But the great fault of the Blum Government was to raise vyages without having first devalued the franc. Now for the 40-hour week. In Trance in 1936 the Blum Government found itself in this situation:

1. The Popular Front had promised its electors —and its electors were demanding imperatively—an immediate increase in income—that is to say, also an increase in the production of merchandise of all sorts destined for the consumer.

2. The international situation_ made a massive armament effort unavoidable. This meant an ever-increasing quantity of labour must be devoted to the production of guns, ammunition, airplanes, etc. 3 Unemployment in France was relatively slight. Less than half a million people in all wore without jobs. Those who had jobs were working an average of 41 hours a week, though the legal maximum was 4S hours.

4. Ihe active population of France Is constantly declining. It dropped by more than a million between 1931 and 1936.

5. Immigration of foreign labour, so important during post-war years, had

ceased. On the contrary, 150,000 foreign workers left France during the crisis. 6. French industry in equipment was 10 to 15 years behind the best-equipped industries of other European countries. in these circumstances it is easy to understand that the sudden reduction of working hours from 48 to 40 a week was a grave error which had to be paid for dearly, it was paid for by the failure of France to experience any standard economic recovery, because of labour shortage.

As for the last (point, the state of public finances: a Budgetary deficit is not necessarily an evil in itself. It can be borne without danger when the public debt has not reached an unbearable total, and when confidence in the nation’s currency has not been shaken. But despite this situation, the Blmn Government let loose a flood of new and apparently useless expenditures The result was the continuous depreciation of the franc.

It is because 1 ardently wished for the success of the Popular Eront that

I now allow myself to say that, the men who were responsible did not display the necessary competence. They per. mitted themselves to become the playthings of mass movements which they had helped to unleash but did not know how to direct and control.