WAR AND THE PEACE

Evening Star, Issue 23136, 9 December 1938, Page 2

WAR AND THE PEACE

THE ROLE OF WILSON LORD ESHER’S OPINIONS DIARIES PUBLISHED During the first part of the time covered by the fourth volume of his papers, 1916-30, Lord Esher was in Paris acting as an unofficial ambassador between the English and the French and between the Army and the Government, writes J. L. Hammond, in the ‘ Manchester Guardian.’ The men ho liked and trusted most were Haig, Kitchener, and Grey, but though ho inclined to the side of the soldier in the sharp controversies of the time, ho was able to see the good points oven in men with whom ho disagreed. He felt strongly for Kitchener, who, he thought, was unjustly treated by tho politicians. Li January, 1916, he said: “ There are three essential things required to win tho war, so far as our Ministers arc concerned. National unity, for which Asquith has done and can do so much. Dogged pertinacity, that even his enemies cannot deny Kitchener possesses. Stainless diplomacy, for which no one stands in Europe upon tho level from which Grey has never moved a fraction of an inch. I cannot myself see Lloyd Georgo fulfilling any one of these conditions, although, like Winston, ho is brilliant and imaginative.” LLOYD GEORGE’S GIFTS. After tho failure to carry through the Irish compromise in tho summer Esher began to take rather a different view of Lloyd George’s usefulness. Incidentally, his diary shows that Haig showed a fine and impersonal spirit in discussing Lloyd George with Robertson :

“ G.H.Q., July 26, 1916.—1 should not bo surprised if Asquith had to go and if little L.G. reigned in his stead. This Irish business lias been so badly handled. Fancy getting an agreement between Redmond and Carson and then losing it. The agreement itself was a miracle. Of course, the Irish are an impossible people, but still, in the middle of a war like this, it is criminal to go dabbling in. Irish rows. Either martial law or a compromise. And here we arc, landed in the old quarrels and ‘ scenes in the House.’ I don’t think Asquith will get through this time short of a miracle.

“ Beauquesne, October 26, 1916. Robertson came here after the meeting ami spoke with energy and discontent of Lloyd George. D.H. very truly pointed out to him that Lloyd George can do very little harm if the soldiers stick together and a great deal of good owing to his eloquence and freedom from red tape. He should therefore be humoured. But Robertson is, I am sure, too near him to be able to take this detached view.

“ Paris, November 28, 1916.—Mr Lloyd Georgo possesses two** essential qualities in a Secretary of State for War at such a crisis as . that through which we are now passing. He has the invaluable gift of concentrating the attention of his fellow-countrymen upon any issue vital at the moment. And. secondly, he is an administrator in the sense that he can get things done where other people cannot. NOT THE ORDINARY KIND. “ His gifts as an administrator are not of the ordinary peace kind. He does not attempt to exercise minute supervision over detail. He is not content to apply with added force the principles of sanction and careful audit that ever since tho days of Sir Robert Peel have rightly obtained throughout our administrative system. Ho has adopted with marked success the plan of cutting away red tape and of placing reliance upon personal responsibility by bestowing extended powers upon individuals selected for their capacity, vigour, and courage. This is the only method in war time that is conducive to success.”

In June, 1916, Esher informed Asquith of the first German overture: “Paris, June 23, 1916.—A curious episode has happened within the last few days. The French desire it to he kept a profound secret, so that I doubt whether you will hear of it from any other source. An emissary has been employed by the Germans to sound the French and to_ try and discover the terms upon which an armistice might be granted, with a view of subsequently discussing terms of peace. WITHDRAWAL INSISTED ON. “ The answer that was given was that no proposition for an armistice would be considered unless it was accompanied by an offer to restore all French, British, and Russian prisoners before hostilities were suspended. Nothing more was said. The French, however, are determined that in the event of an armistice being granted at any time they would refuse to extend it or seriously to discuss terms of pence unless the German armies were withdrawn from Franco and Belgian soil. That would be a sine qua non. .If at a subsequent date the Germans desired to continue serious negotiations for peace the French would stipulate that thev should be conducted in Paris, and that the Gorman Emperor and the Grown Prince should bo present during the negotiations.” Elsewhere Esher gives the account given to him bv Briand of the German overture of September. 1917, which Briand himself was inclined to follow up. His story was that Ribot, the Foreign Minister, instead of sending the British Government Briand’s statement of what had happened, sent a truncated account together with a warning that the overture might be a German trap. Balfour replied that this was the view of the British Government and House’s reference to the incident suggests that Lansing shared it. THE PEACE CONFERENCE. Esher saw in good time the dangers of the Peace Conference, though he seems to have been a Diehard about the colonies. He shared at first the illusions of others about Wilson’s power:

“ Paris, February 7. 1917.—America drifts nearer to war. If she comes in she will claim to have won the war. Wilson will dominate the Peace Congress! On the other hand, we shall get the use of America’s wealth, credit, interned German ships, American destroyers, and ultimately men, if they are required. The balance is on our side. This was always Kitchener’s view. If Franco and America get most of the kudos —the one because she bore the brunt of the worst attacks, the other because she came and at the finish delivered the coup de grace—Republics will take the front seat. “ I suspect that Wilson is one of the big war figures; a dreamer who knows also how to act. If Rousseau had possessed Danton’s power! That is the figure; a combination rare at any time —perhaps uncharacteristic of Wilson. We shall see. “ Paris, April 9, 1917.—1 hope that the Prime Minister will presently grasp tlie change that is coming over the French people. The centrifugal force of

America is drawing the French into a transatlantic sympathy and reliance that is slowly windening a fissure between England and France. If we follow the French in future instead of forcing them to follow us. we shall fiml ourselves trailing in the wake of the United States. lam sure that General Smuts, who is remarkably intelligent, has grasped the situation.

“ Ono of these days America and France will ask England to use the captured colonies as counters in the o-amo of bargain. If she refuses she breaks- the Entente. If she agrees she breaks up the Empire. It is as well, in dealing with the French, to keep this dilemma in view. France is the most feminine of nations. The qualities in a man that capture a woman s affections are precisely those that are required to dominate the drench, it never appears to me that our people understand this, whether statesmen or journalists.” - , ESHER’S MISSIVINGS. “The Roman Camp, December 8. 2918. . . . It is impossible to look forward to tho proceedings at the Conference without misgivings. Unwisely we pledged ourselves, far too hurriedly, to accept Wilson’s fourteen points. Since then it is clear that we have entered into cabal with France and Italy in order to counter the policy of the United States. It is obvious that this assumption, coupled with a repudiation of tho message sent to Wilson from Versailles in which we agreed to his terms, might produce a situation of great danger to tho solidarity of the Allies. Americans, like ourselves, will criticise their own President, but I doubt their standing,, as we certainly should not, the criticism of others. ’ There seems to he something un-English, too, in going back upon vour rational word, even if you have pledged it in error. The hope is that Wilson may prove amenable. • “As to the future, it is surely a questionable policy to allow the formation of a great united German State in Europe, especially in the form of a federal republic, if at the same time you allow a Power like Italy to deprive that State of an outlet to the southern waters of Europe. To do this and then to talk of tho 1 end of all wars ’ seems the height of folly.” “ The Roman Camp, June 16, 1919. — France, in spite of her losses and her supposed had finance, will recuperate sooner than wc shall. The people who arc in the inner ring tell me that Wilson is a hopeless failure in council. His own people—or some of them —who came over with him and aro on their way home say that ho has ‘ sold the pass.’ It is not his fault, poor devil. He was ‘ done in ’ tho moment he quitted tho temple of Buddha. Of course, he had no conception of the strength or trend of the forces ho would have to contend with in Paris. His philosophic head must be by this timo in such a whirl that it will be a marvel if when he gets back he does not see tho White House pea-green, FOOD FOR THE GERMANS. “ Meanwhile old Wully (Robertson) has been clamouring for ‘food for tho Roche ’ —on the ground that the morale of our armies suffers at seeing the Boche unfed. Curiously vindictive and blood-thirsty hruto is the British Tommy! ...” He was one of the first to predict the break-up of the Coalition. On August 4, 1920, he wrote: “ A party must be cemented together by a principle. The Prime Minister’s active mind, corrupted by the war and the subtle poison of European politics, has forgotten his truism, and he has lost count of the English temperament. The English have never, cared for games. What they love is a match. Eliminate the Eton v. Harrow and they soon tire of cricket. , Eliminate England and America, and who cares' whether Shamrock heats Resolute? So ‘ Party ’ is inherent in the English political nature —and nothing was over more truly said than that England hates coalitions. My deduction is that the Government will break up.” He also predicted, in October, 1922, the coming of the Labour Government, describing the Boliar Law Government as “ a second eleven.”