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THE MUNICH PACT

ON GODESBERG LINES FRONTIERS MUCH THE SAME WORK OF COMMISSION In the speech with which he opened the debate on the crisis, said the ‘ Manchester Guardian ’ editorial on October 11, Mr Chamberlain compared at some length the terms which Herr Hitler had demanded at Godesberg with the terms which were included in the agreement signed at Munich because “on the difference between those two documents will depend the judgment as to whether we were successful in what we set out to do—namely, to find an orderly instead of a violent method of carrying out an agreed decision.” The comparison, however, was unfair, for, while the Godesberg ultimatum was full and detailed, the Munich Agreement was vague and incomplete. With few exceptions, every difficult question was left for the International Commission to decide; and now, after the 10 days’ “ grace ” has elapsed, we can see more clearly that what was demanded at’ Godesberg, rejected in Prague, and modified at Munich has, after all, been granted in Berlin. THE NEW FRONTIERS. We may consider first the frontiers of the new State. Mr Chamberlain claimed as a concession wrung from Herr Hitler that the line up to which German troops would enter into occupation would not be the line drawn in the Godesberg map but a line fixed by the_ International Commission. But this difference which then seemed so weighty appears less so now whe’n it is apparent that the _ line fixed by the International Commission is (to all intents and purposes) that drawn in the Godesberg map. This is all the more curious since the criterion by which the commission was to judge was “ the predominantly German character of the area,” the interpretation of the phrase being left to the commission. This, said Mr Chamberlain, was another gain, “ since I am hound ■to say that the German line, the line laid down in the map. did take in a number of areas which could not be called predominantly German in character.” Mr Chamberlain, of course, made much play with the (act that by the Munich Agreement the plebiscite areas would be defined by the International Commission instead of by Germany, and would be “ occupied at once by an international force.” So far no plebiscite areas have been defined, no international force has been sent, and there is some doubt whether a plebiscite will be held at all. (It has been decided not to hold a plebiscite.) VALUE NO GREATER. This will not necessarily work to the disadvantage of the Czechs, but it hardly increases the value of the Munich agreement. One may say, in fact, that everything of substance demanded in the Godesberg ultimatum and omitted from the Munich agreement has now been granted to Germany in spite of or, perhaps, with "the help of the International Commission. For instance, Herr_ Hitler demanded that only those residing in the areas in question before 1918 should have the right to vote in the plebiscite. The International Commission therefore took the census of 1910 instead of the more recent one in 1930 as the basis on which to work, though this meant handing over to the Third Reich about 500,000 more Czechs. There is not room to discuss here the final justice of the frontiers so drawn. (On another page of the ‘ Manchester Guardian ’ appeared an article pointing out the havoc caused to the. economic structure of the State, the railways cut, the coal mines lost, the trade interrupted.) It may also seem strange that a nation so concerned with the principle of self-determination and the solidarity of the German race should swallow at one gulp a minority of 800,000 Czechs. “ ORDERLY METHODS.” Nor can this subject be properly considered until it is known how _ many Slovaks and Ruthenians are going to be annexed by Magyars and Poles in the sacred (but slightly dishonoured) name ot self-determination. But there is one point in the settlement between Germans and Czechs which cannot be omitted. The great advantage of the, Munich agreement, we were told, was that it provided for “ orderly ” methods. There would be time for refugees to escape; there would be plebiscites controlled by an international force; and there would be the right of option into or out of the ceded territories. in practice the methods have not been quite so “ orderly.” Since in several areas the inhabitants did not know what was to be handed over refugees had not 10 days to escape, but two or one or none. When they reached the frontiers of the new State many Czechs were turned back by a distressed Government because it did not wish the Czech vote to be diminished in the plebiscite areas, and many Germans, because it naturally did not wish to be responsible for yet another German minority. In any case, the Czech Government could not have dealt with the tremendous flood, of refugees. LEFT IN NAZI POWER. Thousands of Czech Nationalists and German Socialists, Catholics, Liberals, and Protestants have therefore been left in the power of the Nazi conquerors. But, it may be said, they still have the right to opt out of the German areas. So, indeed, it was thought, but now fresh doubt has arisen. Will the right of option be granted to people of both nationalities or oply to Czechs in German areas and Germans in Czech areas? Germany, it is reported, is “ not prepared to renounce her claims to any Germans ”; not only will she refuse to permit Germans to opt out of German areas, but she is actually demanding that German Socialists and Communists who have already fled shall be compelled to return. This at least is a demand which should be resisted by the International Commission and, if necessary, by the British and French .Governments. We have not yet reached the point when we need admit the right of a nation to persecute its own people without protest. If Czechoslovakia cannot and dare not take in the wretched German refugees for fear of provoking Germany, then the great democracies should see to it that they are granted asylum in another land.. To refuse them all means of escape or to force their return when they have escaped would be an act of intolerable cruelty.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD19381202.2.163

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 23130, 2 December 1938, Page 12

Word Count
1,042

THE MUNICH PACT Evening Star, Issue 23130, 2 December 1938, Page 12

THE MUNICH PACT Evening Star, Issue 23130, 2 December 1938, Page 12