MUSSOLINI’S ROLE

Evening Star, Issue 23129, 1 December 1938, Page 21

MUSSOLINI’S ROLE

IN THE REGENT CRISIS THE SPEECH AT TRIESTE “ Trieste knows,” said Mussolini, in a recent speech, 11 that geography is not au opinion, and that it takes its revenge in the long run on those who consider it as such,” writes Anne O’Hare M'Cormick, m the New xork Times.’ While in this sententious statement he summed up the whole argument of the Czechs against dismemberment, in the next breath he made the counter-statement that for the pro elem now agitating Europe “ the solution has only one nameplebiscite. Plebiscites for all nationalities which request them.” The conflict between geography ana ethnography arises on nearly every European border. The Brenner, for instance, is a geographical frontier like the Sudeten Mountains, and although it is foolish to compare a spill-over of 250,000 Germans in Italy with a great block of 3,500,000 Germans m CzechoSlovakia, it is equally foolish to deny that the same principle is involved. Everybody who knows Central Europe knows that all the racial boundaries are blurred. Mon, the most migratorv of -animals, has always climbed back and forth across the natural fences.

THE POINT OF EQUILIBRIUM. Certainly the map-makers of Versailles did not carve up the _ AustroHungarian Empire on principles of abstract justice. They were rewarding the victors and punishing the vanquished in a war; that is the reason Italy got the Upper Adige. Like ail punitive dictators they forgot that the victims of mistakes are not the only ones to suffer the consequences. Austria was the point of European equilibrium. To make this keystone of the arch so weak that it could not stand by itself was the central and fatal error. Though they did not know it, Czechoslovakia and Hungary leaned on Austria. We see to-day the whole mosaic of Central Europe was balanced around this crumbling stone. Nevertheless, the architects of the new structure did follow some principles. Mussolini refers to Czechoslovakia as “ mosaic number two,” and it is in fact almost the Austrian Empire in miniature. But it was constructed and bounded on geographic lines, and geography, as Mussolini asserts, is not a matter of opinion. Neither is it a principle of justice. In this case it was adopted to make Czechoslovakia just what the dismembered Austria was not—strategically strong and economically independent. And because the point of European equilibrium shifted from Austria to Czechoslovakia, it is important for Europe not to repeat the mistake of 1919, even though the Czechs were a party to it. To whittle down Czechoslovakia into another Austria would only make a bad situation worse. Trieste itself is on one of the blurred boundaries. This once Austrian port at the head of the Adriatic is a mosaic, too, though there is no doubt that under the dominant Hungarian, German, and Slav the Italian stock and tradition were always strong. It is not strange that Mussolini went to Trieste to make his first official statement on the Czechoslovak crisis. Trieste is the best place to see what a buffer Italy lost when Austria fell. It is very close to the German border, too close for Italian comfort, too close not to be as vulnerable as it is desirable to on the march. Perhaps he chose Trieste as a rostrum for a grave and measured speech, full of loopholes, to remind his countrymen of the salient reason why they dare not now antagonise their new neighbour. Since the Fascist Partv claims that it is always “ sampling ” public opinion, Mussolini must know, as every casual traveller knows, that the RomeBerlin axis is universally unpopular in Italy, so unpopular that the street crowds could not he forced to cheer for Hitler, and Italian officers hinted that it would be dangerous even for Mussolini to order the Italian rank and file to fight with the Gormans. IS MUSSOLINI STRADDLING? Tills doesn’t mean much, because soldiers have no choice when war Is

declared. German and Hungarian conscripts in Czechoslovakia would have to fight for their country just as the Czechs had to fight for Austria._ But the feeling in Italy, as well as its interests, may explain why the Fascist leader was so slow in striking an attitude on the Sudeten question. Until late he did not intervene in the peace moves or the war moves. He neither mobilised nor sought to restrain his partner in forcing the issue. Then he came out flatly for a plebiscite as the only solution. This decision, he said, was dictated hy the polcy of the RomeBcrlin axis, but when he refers to Italian friend shin for Poles. Magyars.

and other nationalities, and speaks of plebiscites for them, too, one question* whether the object is to break up Czechoslovakia or to suggest that the method won’t work..

“ If a universal line-up for or agains* Prague takes place, ’’ltaly has already, taken her side,” Mussolini declares. The clear implication is that this i* the end of indecision, and no doubt the reason may be found in what is taking place in London. If Hitler has gained his main point, Mussolini>looking north from Trieste and thinking of the future, may wish to share the credit for bringing about this “ vie*