JAPAN’S NAVAL POLICY.

Evening Star, Issue 22882, 14 February 1938, Page 10

JAPAN’S NAVAL POLICY.

Japan refuses to explain her naval proposals to Britain, America, and France. Her replies to three Powers are emphatic ; indeed, they might be called defiant. They are certainly not convincing, It is. stated, for instance, that Japan has no intention of possessing a navy that will menace other countries. If that is the case it is difficult to understand why she should be so secretive about her building plans. In later years she has expressed deep resentment over the 5-5-3 ratio, and it was the cause of her leaving the London Conference at the end of 1935. Lnder the Washington agreement of 1920 she accepted that arrangement, which meant that she was allowed nine capi-

tal ships, as against fifteen each for Great Britain ami the United States. This allocation was considered fair at the time by all the parties concerned, for it was based on relative obligations. Britain has a widely-scattered Empire to protect, and tho United States has two great oceans containing various possessions to patrol. Japan, on the other hand, has a comparatively small sea area to guard. Notwithstanding, she will be satisfied now with nothing less than a common upper limit, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and it has been announced that she would consider joining a future conference on that basis alone. It was naively stated that tho policy was one of “ non-menace and non-aggression,” and that Japan had no idea of starting a building race, yet by her present attitude that appears to be exactly what she is doing. Further, it should be obvious to the statesmen in Tokio that in such an event they would be at an immense disadvantage against the infinitely greater resources of Britain and the United States.

What can be said without equivocation is that neither of these two countries has expansionist or aggressive designs of any kind. The ardent desire of their Governments is to achieve world peace. Japan has not convinced the world in the last few years that her ambitions run in the same direction. With the idea of mastery in the Far East in her mind, it is recognised that one of her major aims would be to Mock off the China Sea. The views of the British and American Governments run on similar lines, and they are explained in the words peace and security. Their communications to Japan have been friendly and conciliatory. The British Note said that if Japan intended construction outside the treaty limits and immediately gave the required informa--tion Britain was prepared to discuss the tonnages and gun calibres to be adhered to in the future. Mr Cordell Hull, in a dispassionate statement from Washington, follows the same line of thought when he says that conversations with Japan will lead nowhere while she maintains that she must be guaranteed naval parity or build without restriction to suit her own ends. Mr Hull says that America and Britain might be prepared to agree in principle to a common upper limit if they were assured that it did not mean in practice that the Japanese would build new battleships feverishly while the other two constructed nothing. From Tokio, however, no assurance of any kind can be expected, judging from what has occurred siiico the Naval Conference began its sittings just over two years ago. Complete secrecy is regarded as an essential element of Japanese policy. The idea underlying this attitude is that any Power would hesitate before committing itself to measures whereby it might have-to send its ships many thousands of mi'.es to fight a fleet of unknown composition. Japan’s refusal to bo open and frank about her naval policy is foolish and short-sighted. It naturally intensifies the suspicions about her intentions,.and creates determination elsewhere that she shall not he permitted to achieve a naval position that will allow her to pursue an isolationist policy in disregard of the rights of other nations and be an added threat to the peace, order, and security of the world. In Mr Hull’s view, America, Britain, and France are now faced with a common problem, and the first step is to see whether London and Paris consider, as Washington undoubtedly does, • that the situation justifies the invocation of the escalator clause. The position that has arisen is deplorable, but it has to be faced. 1