A COSTLY POLICY

Evening Star, Issue 22804, 12 November 1937, Page 10

A COSTLY POLICY

FAILING IN OBJECT THE MATH-WE ST FRONTIER Tribal disturbances on tbo Northwest Frontier requiring h&rvy and costly reinforcement of Briton garrisons have focused attention on the whole question of British frontier policy. A committee at Simla has been reviewing the situation. In an article in the f. Daily Telegraph/ Major-general A. U Temperley expresses the hehof that the ■work of the punitive expedition is nearing a conclusion, and discusses some or the difficulties which from time to tune precipitate hostilities under the method of administration at present m force. At a time when some 30,000 British and Indian troops have been locked up in Waziristan since November, 193 b, g" have suffered considerable casual-tbei-e must be some heart searehi not only on the part of the Uovarnment of India, hut also among taxpayers,- regarding the soundness or the present frontier policy, writes Majorgeneral Temperley. This large force is, of course, only a f temporary measure required to deal Si the existing unrest. Already there are signs that the trouble is dying down, and it is hoped that by the autumn the Waziristan garrison may be reduced to its normal size of two brigades. . . Bn* the present campaign is said to be costing £B,OOO a day, and even as oji emergency expenditure this is no light matter. The present poKcy has not kept the border quiet. IN “NO-MAN’S LAND.’I We have in the North-west of Lidia wha* amounts to two frontiers. There is. first, the actual frontier between India and Afghanistan, commonly called tbo Durand line; and, secondly, the administrative border which is drawn to the east and south of tho political frontier. Between these two lanes Ire* a “ no-man’s land ” of varying width, belonging to the British Crown arid inhabited by some 3,000,000 tribesmen, over whom we exercise some small degree «f control. In the extreme south Sir Robert Sandeanan, by forming a tribal militia, succeeded in carrying our administrative frontier right up to the Durand line; since then Baluchistan has been uniformly peaceful. Further north, in Waziristan, the Tirah, the Mohmand country, and Bajaur, we have left the tribesmen to their own devices and have endeavoured to keep them quiet by a system Of subsidies and, in some cases, by employing them in a miHtia or in • making roads. the success of the Sandeman policy in Baluchistan, it does not necessarily follow that it would be workable elsewhere. The control of the North-west Frontier has been the main military problem of India ever since we conquered the Punjab. The tribesmen are extremely brave, most skilful fighters, and all of them are armed with modern rifles. Their main trouble is economic, because they cannot grow enough food tp live on in that hare, mountainous country. . It is this that drives _ them to raiding into the rich and highly-culti-vated India on the other side of the administrative border. Occasionally they may be swept by fanaticism, while the mullahs preach “ glory for all and heaven for those that bleed, ” and the whole border may be ablaze in a very short time, A COVERING FORCE. To cope with all these possibilities there is a strong covering force stretching from the Malakand through Peshawar right dawn to the Baluchistan border, which is ready to move at the shortest notice. Behind it are echeloned four divisions for more serious eventualities. Broadly speaking, there are three possible methods of dealing with the situation. First, there is the so-called “ Forward ” policy which means the occupation of tribal territory right up to the Durand line. It represents _an aspiration rather than a practical scheme, as the difficulties are formidable. The tribesmen are suspicious and independent and would resist to the utmost any attempt to occupy their territory permanently. It is largely because we have not entered the Tirah for so long that it has been comparatively peaceful. Apart from the brief Zakka Khel expedition in 1908 we have not -been there since 1897, and our exit from it was by no means dignified. To take and hold the territory up to the Durand line would require a very large army, which might be locked up in tribal territory for years. ' We could not afford to take such a risk. In the last Afghan War wo had to employ between 200,000 and 300,000 men. The second possibility is the “ Close Border ” policy which _ has many friends amongst Indian political officers. It undoubtedly has certain merits. If a strong barbed wire fence supported by block houses were constructed along the administrative border, would this be an effective “ cordon sanitaire,” which would confine the tribes to their own inhospitable hills and bring peace in,the frontier provinces? Do we want to give the tribes their independence? Is it safe to do so P Would not Afghan influences tend to increase to an undesirable degree amongst the tribesmen if we withdrew entirely?, “TIME FOR WITHDRAWAL”. Those in favour of the “ dose Border ” policy say that we have spent millions of pounds in Waziristan and have reaped no economic advantages whatsoever. They suggest that the time has come when we ought to withdraw as soon as we can without loss of prestige. It is true, they say, that raiding cannot be prevented entirely and that expeditions will have to go in, as they have done in the past, to inflict punishment. - But they argue that the cost of the present policy has been enormous and it is time to cut our losses. The criticism of this view is that it does not get rid of the “ burn and scuttle ” policy, as expeditions will still be necessary.

This brings us to the third plan of action, the “ Half Forward ” policy, in which Lord Bawlinson and his successor,. Sir Philip Chetwode, were firm believers. So far it has only been tried in Waziristan, though the recent construction of a road in Mohmand territory indicates the possibility of further extension. Briefly, this policy is one of dominating a portion of tribal territory by the construction of roadg and the establishment of strong posts, such as Bazmak and Wana, which will overawe the tribes and he an effective deterrent to unrest.

This -was begun in 1922, and it took something like two years and a very lasige expenditure of public money to complete. A circular road now runs from Tank through Mahsud and Wazin country via Razmak to the Toqhi ValIw, where it links up with Bannu. It was hoped that the employment of these turbulent tribes on roadmakiug and as Khassadara Ipqmgd protect

tion would ease tho economic situation and so turn them to. the paths of peace. For 15 years it has succeeded fairly well. TEN-YEARLY TROUBLES, But long experience of the frontier proves that each decade there is liable to be some biggish upheaval on the frontier, whatever the policy may he. Tho tribes are kept peaceful _by the payment of considerable subsidies to the elders or maliks for distribution. Control is exorcised by fining the tribe or refusing to pay the subsidy. It is naturally to the interest of the maliks, who get most of the cash, to hold tho tribes in hand, and they can do so hj warning them, that if they go too far there will bo another punitive expedition.

The advocates of the “ Half Forward ” policy can point to a very large decrease in raiding into Indian territory since it was introduced, and they are inclined to suggest that the chief reason why it has not been fully effective is tho lack of sufficient firmness on the political side.