THE DEFENCE FORCES

Evening Star, Issue 22686, 28 June 1937, Page 13

THE DEFENCE FORCES

HEWS AND NOTES [By Sam Browne.] NAVAL RESERVES LARGE ATTENDANCES. Tho Otago Division, R.N.V.R., assembled on Tuesday and Wednesday of last week. The attendance was the highest of any corresponding • month in previous years, over 100 officers and men being present. The visual signalling and junior wireless ratings contined instruction in practical signalling by flashing and semaphore, and reading the Morse code by buzzer. Signal exercise B, conducted by H.M.S. Philomel last month was won by the Otago Division, making two wins in four exercises. The Wellington division is leading by a few points and the other two divisions are close behind the Otago division. The seaman ratings and the senior wireless ratings assembled on Wednesday and received instruction as follows: Minesweeping ratings, cables and cableholders, navigation lights. Ordinary seamen stripped the 4in breech loading gun for the first part of tho session and had drill for misfires at the 4in quickfiring' gun during the second session. Gunnery ratings were lectured on mines and depth _ charges, _ while the senior wireless ratings continued practical wireless communication with H.M.S. Philomel and other R.N.V.R. divisions. The division will assemble as usual on Tuesday and Wednesday. The class for the rating of leading seamen will be continued to-night. Instruction m visual and wireless signalling will also be given. SMALL-BORE SHOOTING. There was a good attendance on Monday last when the preliminary practice for the selection of tho teams to compete in the Palmer Trophy competition was proceeded with. The range will be available to-night, when the preliminary selection of ratings from each subdivision for jnterdivisional competition during the last week of July will bo made. Tho recruits are progressing favourably in this phase of instruction and recreation, and it is anticipated that several will be in the teams when finally selected.

THE OTAGO REGIMENT

MINIATURE RIFLE SHOOTING. Last Wednesday the B grade team met Railway I. at the Drill Hall, the match resulting in a win for Ist Otago by 3 points. The individual scores were:—

Ist Otago.—Capt. P. Spiers 76, Lt. A. Fitchett 78, Lt. E. Cooper 76, Cpl.

J. Hay 74, Cpl. C. Naismith 78, Cpl. J. Baker 74, Pvt. D. Haig 78. Total, 534. Railway I.—A. Begg 77, L. Johnston 77, F. Godfrey 74, H. Malthus 75, H. Milne 76, 11. Peat 76, E. Adams 76. Total, 531. Tho scores for the weekly badges wore;—Sgt. R. Hay 76—1—77, Cpl. J. Baker 742—76, Cpl. A. Broadfoot 72 —3—75, Cpl. J. Hay 74—1—75, Cpl. C. Naismith 78—3—80, Pvt. D. Haig 78— 1 —79; Pvt. M'Lenaghin 76—4—80, Pvt. J. Walker 75—5—80. In tho shoot-off Pvt. Haig secured the championship and Pvt. M’Lenaghin the handicap event. The trip round the South Island will be continued next week. The O grade team to meet Ross and Glendining next Wednesday will be: Sgt. R. Hay, Pvt. Burnard, Pvt. R, Burgess, Pvt. J. Gallagher, Pvt. M‘Lenaghin, Pvt. J. Walker, Pvt. Kerr, Pvt. Bed, Pvt. Gilchrist.

AIMS OF THE ARMY

IMPORTANT CHANGES. ' The Times,’ in a leading article, recently made a comprehensive survey of the Army’s role in war. “ The aims of expansion of the Royal Air Force are fairly clear,” the paper states, “ although it is not at all clear how tho Air Force and Navy will function together. There are so many points in narrow waters where aircraft based on tho coast may bo more effective than or ■ a necessary supplement to aircraft operating from ships. While the object of the Navy is.clear, its ways of fulfilling it are less clear, especially regarding tho problem of maintaining the flow of traffic on tho Mediterranean route, which is a greater problem than that of maintaining warships in the Mediterranean.

“ The aims of the Army aro least clear of all. Up to the present the official conception of tho Army’s role does not appear to differ materially from that prevailing before 1914, yet even if conditions had not undergone a serious change, tho value of repetition should come into question. Pending a new Locarno treaty, with whatever modifications may he required by tho growth of air armaments and possibly by tho new Belgian attitude, the treaty gap in tho West is covered by the standing half of the Locarno commitments and the age-old doctrine that unprovoked aggression in Western, Europe will encounter instantly British opposition. Therefore, with or without a new Locarno, it is the business of tho Government to reckon on tho contingency that Britain may once again be forced to intervene on the Continent. -

“In the present day are the precedents of 1914 binding? Before the despatch of a field force is contemplated various facts and hypotheses demand study. If Belgian territory, which stretches for more than 250 miles east of the Channel, were to escape invasion in another war, would

a British field force still be sent right across, say, to the eastern frontier of France. On military as well as political grounds such avoidance of Belgium must be regarded as quit« possible. It is even probable in the view of a considerable section of French military opinion. Estimating from the enemy’s viewpoint the loss of time and increase of risks involved in a detour, they are more concerned with the dangers of a sharp attack on their own frontier.

“ In the supposed case of a German attack on France, it is quite conceivable that all parties might find predominant advantages in the exclusion of Belgian territory from the conflict. Even apart from this possibility, the tendency of Belgian policy (towards an armed neutrality) should make Britain ponder on the new problems which would arise in employing a field force on the Continent in a war in which the Belgian territory flanking British communications had been spared and was yet liable at any moment to be crossed by an invader.

“ The new risks to such a British force under modern conditions have also to bo weighed. The risks in 1914 were much less than to-day. There is

reason to ask whether the complexity of the problem is fully recognised by the authorities. “ Before the idea of intervention by land is "“accepted as politically indispensahle, there should be a full acknowledgment of its unstablf military, foundations. It should also bo made clear to anv nation looking for British aid, firstly, that they may get more value from increased air assist* ance, which would naturally become effective sooner, in place of a field force, and, secondly, that the despatch of a field force cannot imply a willingness to reinforce it : without limit, and to expend the man-power of the nation, • fully engaged as it must bo by sea and in air and in factory and on farm.

“ Broken communications are bad enough when an army is in its own territory or in one where it has complete control. In the face of air attack it is impossible to ignore the risk* of a, field force being stranded, with no prospect either of reaching tho front or maintaining itself. In such a plight it could do little in the defence of British interests, and it would be more of a nuisance than a help to m ally.”-