GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

Evening Star, Issue 22619, 10 April 1937, Page 16

GOVERNMENT IN INDIA.

The new Constitution in India cannot be said to have been inaugurated under the happiest auspices. The National Congress contested the elections nob for the sake of working hut of obstructing it, and the Congress secured majorities in six of the eleven provinces. The question now is, how far is obstruction to be carried ? Congress before the election could not decide whether, if its candidates obtained a majority in particular provinces, they should form Ministries to carry on the government. If obstruction was its main object, the logical thing to do was to refuse to form ministries, but the principle of obstruction vas accompanied by promises to the electors of material benefits to be gained from Congress control of Legislatures which in that case could not be realised. The Congress has desired, therefore, to form Ministries on its own terms. Its leaders have sought assurances that, if they accepted office, Governors would not employ their power, in certain circumstances, to reject their advice and take other measures. It was even contended by Mr Gandhi, who has chosen this time for resuming his old role of a troublemaker, that a promise to this effect had been given by British Ministers, but Lord Zetland, the Secretary for India, has explained why they did not and could not give any undertaking of the kind. Laws proposed by a Hindu majority might be coercive of Moslems, and Governors are required by the new Constitution to protect Moslems and all other minorities. The Governors could not refrain from using their reserve powers under the Act if conditions were brought about which required these as a safeguard. The occasions for the employment of reserve powers, however, were made as few as possible by the Constitution, r.nd Governors have been advised to give the freest hand to Legislatures that is consistent with the provisions of the Act.

If co-operation was the policy of the Congress there would be nothing for it to take umbrage at in this position. The reserve powers would never need to be invoked. If the Congress ever rules an India from which every British administrator will have departed respect will have to be shown by it for minorities, the same as is required by to-day’s Constitution, unless pandemonium in India is to be let loose. The Congress desires to obstruct, but its members may conclude, on more mature reflection, that they have nothing to gain and a great deal to risk by playing sulks. If, in any province, they set out to bring administration to a standstill, the Governor, after exhausting the possibilities of rule by other parties, can declare a constitutional breakdown and take over the administration himself. That might be delightful to the extreme Nationalists as fulfilling one object for which they were elected. But that first state would be unlikely to last long. The next step of the Governor would be to dissolve the Legislature. New elections would follow, at which the Congress members would be asked by their constituents what had happened to the promises—very lavish promises—of benefits to be won for them by their parliamentary control. The leaders of Congress so far have not been responsible to any constituents. Henceforth they must be subject to a direct pressure of electoral opinion, which is likely to be more practical than the National body’s extreme policy, especially if the Constitution which they denounce is seen to be working advantageously in provinces where the Congress has not a majority. The Congress, moreover, as a central body, may be expected to find increasing difficulties when it works in provinces. The natural development will be for new parties to emerge, who will be more reasonable than Pandit Nehru, and Mr Gandhi. Already the National Liberal Federation, without being satisfied with the new Constitution, takes a far more reasonable view of it than the extreme Nationalist .body. Its president has expressed the opinion that “ given men with wide sympathies and common sense, with which the British nation has been amply endowed, and given Ministers who will not seek deadlocks, the Constitution should be given a fair trial. Its success must ultimately lead to a vast expansion of powers, equal to those enjoyed by the dominions.”