LAST YEAR OF WAR

Evening Star, Issue 22540, 7 January 1937, Page 14

LAST YEAR OF WAR

GERMAN NAVAL RAID BALKED BY CARELESSNESS A CHANGE LET SLIP In April, 1918, the German High Seas Fleet planned a lightning raid on neutral shipping carrying food to England, says a writer in the ‘ Cape Times.’ The attack would have coincided with the German “push” in France, and its demoralising effect on the Allies at this stage of hostilities can be well imagined. In an article in the ‘ Capa Times,’ prepared with the assistance of an intelligence expert, Patrick Clifford states that the German fleet went out to destroy the convoy, but the careless reading of a wireless message resulted in the raid being completely -unsuccessful. The German wireless experts, he says, had not checked messages and the convoy left port exactly a day ‘ earlier than the Germans had calculated. The world is now more or less familiar with the operations of those war-; time services charged with the decoding ■ and interception of wireless messages on either side, writes Patrick Clifford. In the case of Great Britain the Admiralty controlled the service from the famous Room 40 0.8., while the German High Command maintained a central secret station at Neumunster. Valuable work was performed by both organisations, but the chief praise must go to the British experts. In fact, I have no hesitation in saying that had the Germans shown the same efficiency the final issue would have been decided in their favour. THEIR FATAL BLUNDER. As it was, however, \they made the fatal blunder of under-estimating the capacity of their opponents, and consistently refused to believe that the British were as clever in their work as they were. The consequence was that right up to 1918 the Germans did not pay that attention to changing their secret codes and signals that they should have done. Also, I am bound to admit that for so thorough a race the German High Command were criminally careless on at least one occasion—and that occasion, I am prepared to state, cost them ultimate victory. _ . Anyone familiar with the conditions in England and France during the last great German push of 1918 realises the, appalling effect a successful German naval victory would have had at that time. Admiral von Scheer thought the same way, for early in April, 1918, he planned a dramatic raid by the German High Seas Fleet on the Scandinavian convoys bringing badly-needed food supplies to Britain. Von Scheer was especially concerned for the carrying out of his plans that no hint of the projected movements of the High Seas Fleet should reach ths British Admiralty. On this occasion von _ Scheer sent orders to the ships of his fleet desiring them to assemble in Heligoland Bight on the evening of April 23, under the pretext of carrying out battle evolutions. Used to the more voluminous messages which invariably preceded active movements, the British experts who intercepted the orders assumed that only an “ airing ” for the ships was intended. The fact that no hint of the movements of the ships towards the north was received by the British Admiralty shows how well von Scheer’s orders were kept. A COINCIDENCE. By a remarkable coincidence the Zeebrugge raiders left Dover precisely at the same time as the German ships sailed into the Bight. Further to the north, the Harwich Force under Admiral Tyrwhitt was patrolling between Brom Ridge and) the Dutch coast, while the Scandinavian convoy of 34 ships had just sailed from Selbjourns Fiord, covered by British cruisers and light cruisers. Despite all this movement, however, neither side had an inkling of the other’s activity. For once the aerial listeners of Intelligence had) been outwittedl. This fact is all the more remarkable when one considers that "the Allies were particularly fearful, of _ a big German naval onslaught to coincide with the land offensive. On the evening of April 23, Admiral Beatty was informed that all was quiet, no signals intercepted having revealed the whereabouts of the Germans. As a matter of fact, none were sent, von Scheer having decreed complete silence as the only way to circumvent the enemy. Yet the North Sea that night was never so thick with craft of war, and one single message might have precipitated) a greater battle than Jutland. This remargable fact is all the more apparent when it is recalled that the British submarine J. 6. sighted the German cruisers at 8 p.m. in a quarter of the Heligoland Bight where our vessels kept constant vigilance. The commander reported them as British, however, and Admiral von Scheer accomplished the brilliant feat of running the blockade and at daylight on the following morning he was within 60 miles of his quarry—or where he imagined his quarry to be. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY. But all von Scheer’s efforts, and his amazing good fortune, had been in vain, and all because the 'German wireless experts had not checked messages correctly. The convoy had left Slottero on April 22 and Methil on April 24, exactly a day earlier than the German Admiral had calculated'. In the main, it seems that von Scheer was merely careless, and as a consequence he missed a great opportunity of striking a decisive naval blow, and endangered his fleet without just cause. Von Scheer had just begun to realise that something was amiss, when the cruiser Moltke suddenly reported a serious accident in her engine room. She had lost a propeller, and the racing engines had caused serious damage before they could be stopped. It was necessary for her to report this by wireless and the first signal sent away broke the self-imposed silence since the Germans left port. The signals exchanged were instantly caught by British Directional stations, and with scarcely any delay the Admiralty knew for the first time of the presence of a strong German fleet off the south-western coast of Norway. The Grand Fleet instantly received orders to sail from Rosyth, thus revealing the second of von Scheer’s blunders. He had acted on information which led him to believe that Beatty’s headquarters were at Scapa Flow, a further grave reflection on intelligence. He succeeded in eluding, the Grand Fleet, however, although the margin was a narrow one, and hampered by the disabled Moltke, the High Seas Fleet returned from llieir silent journey.