PRE-WAR POLITICS

Evening Star, Issue 22516, 8 December 1936, Page 7

PRE-WAR POLITICS

BACK IN THE PACIFIC SECURITY PACT DENIED SANCTIONS BARRIER The totality of the discussions of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Yosemite made it clear that the Pacific area is now quite free from all the restraints which the post-war ideal of “ collective security ” was supposed to impose upon the nations, says a writer in the ‘ Winnipeg Free Press. 11ns area—one-third of the whole world is now definitly pre-war in the relations of the nations to one another and the moral attitudes —if any—which govern these relations. The exhibit is extensive and complete; and the student or the statesman can now examine it to discover for himself whether the disorganisation so thoroughly displayed is —or is not-I—better 1 —better than the attempted post-war system, which has now been laughed out of court as too absurdly idealistic for this generation of mankind. , „ • Every community, large or small, in the whole Pacific area is in a commotion—here shown openly, there kept in decent reserve—over a few related questions: What will Japan do. Hon will her action affect us? II hat can we do to protect ourselves _ against possible aggression? It _ might be pointed out and the fact might he kept in mind as the examination proceeds, but none of these questions could be asked it the nations that signed the Covenant and the Pact of Paris had made them operative (as they had the power to do, given the will). JAPAN’S POSITION. The war left Japan the only firstclass Power in the western area of the Pacific. That fact was recognised and conceded by the other major Pacific Powers in the Naval Limitation Treaty of 1921—the very treaty which Japan has torn up because it reflects _ upon her prestige! A ratio of five ships to three gave Japan unquestioned supremacy in the Pacific while the ratio continued ; whereas the right to parity which she has now obtained on demand gives her no assurance that she can in future hold even the ratio she now eiijoys. The ratio which insured her supremacy was handed to her on a platter; but parity is only hers by her own exertions and will probably prove quite unattainable. This agreement by the United States and Great Britain in 1921 was an unavoidable concession; but it was made palatable to these Great Powers by the engagements entered into by Japan under the Four-power Treaty and the Nine-power Treaty ; and in the case of Great Britain there was the further protection of the Covenant of the League. In 1928 Japan signed the Pact of Paris, which, further underwrote all these engagements. • ' j The situation in the Pacific seven years ago was that there was no menace to any other interest (except possibly to Russia, which at that time was an outlaw nation) .from Japan’s predominance of power in the Pacific. She. it was, believed, exercised this power subject to the limitations of the Washington. treaties,- the Covenant of the League, an(d the Pact of Paris. FREE FROM WORRIES. Canada in those days did not give a thought ; to her coast defences; the United States had no incentive or excuse to increase her navy; to Australia and New Zealand their isolated position ; brought no worries; and China felt free to continue her internal disturbances and petty civil wars. To-day—as. the discussions at Yosemite revealed most plainly—There is a situation completely at variance with this. Everywhere there is fear of what the future may bring forth and a searching after, possibilities of defence if the storm breaks. The transformation js complete. It represents a shift from the post-war to the pre-war age—from the conception of collective defence against aggression to the age-old philosophy of war as a proper instrument of policy to be employed at the will of its wielder. The first scene in the transformation act toook place at Mukden September, 1931, and following hard after that there was a succession of developments which has now destroyed all prospect of “ collective security ” in the Pacific area for the time being. This was one of the issues particularly stressed in the I.P.R. Conference —in the preparatory papers and in the discussion. QUESTIONS POSED. In considering the final topic, “ The Changing Balance of Forces in Hie Pacific Area and the Possibilities of Peaceful Adjustment.” the round tallies were advised to seek answers to certain questions outlined in the agenda, among them these: — “ What are the possibilities of establishing an effective system of collective security in the Pacific? What attitude would be taken by each of the Powers with. respect to such a system ? To what extent could special regional machinery for the organisation of peace in the Pacific avoid the weaknesses of collective action under League of Nations auspices?” ' ■ • It fell to the writer as the presiding officer at one of the round tables to put these questions forward for discussion; and to discourage the resort to vague sentimentalities he tried to define in the starkest and most realistic terms what they implied in the way of policy and of machinery to make it effective. He spoke in some such terms as these; “It is necessary in these discussions to have a clear idea of what the words ‘ collective security ’ really mean. The term involves the renunciation by those agreeing to a pact of collective security of all reservations justifying individual action—such as questions of national honour, vital interests, and the waging of war for defensive purposes, so-called. No nation can he the final judge of its case in these matters. Further, when the principles of the pact are challenged their vindication is a vital interest of every signatory, and each must make its proper contribution to this vindication.” PACT IMPRACTICABLE. Held strictly to this realistic definition, the members of the round table were in agreement that a security pact embracing all the Pacific nations was not practicable. The Americans were sure that the United States was not prepared to make any engagement beyond a general assurance that when a crisis arose they would decide what it was best for them to do, and proceed to do it. Japanese delegates said very plainly that Japan would agree to no understanding which might involve the application of sanctions. No member of any national delegation would say that his country would agree to accept the obligations accompanying a real security pact. A quite definite answer was tligs given to the,

question whether a purely Pacific organisation of States for mutual protection in that area could be brought into existence. The discussion then moved on to a consideration of the possibility of forming a regional Pacific pact within the membership of the League and the stipulations of the Covenant. Here the finding was almost equally, adverse*