NEXT GREAT WAR

Evening Star, Issue 22366, 16 June 1936, Page 7

NEXT GREAT WAR

CONFLICT WITHOUT LIMITS LUDENDORFF'S OUTLINE General Ludendorff, who as Quarter-master-General, was German Chief of Staff in the Great War, has published a book entitled ‘ The Totalitarian War,’ says a writer in the ‘ Manchester Guardian.’ This book merits attention, not only because Ludendorff is a master of military science, but also because he has been restored to favour in Germany and again has a great influence. His military doctrines are much the same as those that are officially held and encouraged in Germany. His book is being' widely read, and, so far, no disagreement with its main thesis appears to have been expressed. According to General Ludendorff the conceptions of Clausewitz, based as they were on the lessons of the Frederican and Napoleonic campaigns, are out of date. War in those days was a struggle between armies rather than between nations. Clausewitz did conceive of the “ totalitarian war,” but rather as an abstraction or as an ideal, and not as something that would ever be a practical reality. He regarded war as an .instrument of policy—he demanded that, although foreign policy must to some extent adapt itself to military necessities, war must remain subordinate to policy as a whole. Ludendorff argues that this doctrine was fatal to Germany in the Great War because it led to constant friction between the political leaders and the High Command, and by promoting the supremacy of the former paralysed the latter. He gives the submarine campaign as an example. Had it, so he argues, been conducted as the High Command wished, the delays and hesitations of the civilian; would have been avoided and the campaign would have been successful. AN END IN ITSELF. Ludendorff regards war not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself—as the supreme act of national selfassertion —not as a method, but rather as a biological phenomenon necessary for the conservation of the “ race.” He accepts the Nazi “ racial ” doctrine, and speaks of the next war as the “ racial war ” —“ der volkiscbe Kricg. Such a war knows no limited aims; it is a life and death struggle. It does not consist merely of actual hostilities between armies—the “theatre of operations ” extends to the entire territories of all the belligerents. The fight is waged against the souls as well as against the bodies of the whole population of the enemy’s country, propaganda playing as big a part as poison <ras. War is the consummation of all national endeavour, and absorbs all the material resources and all the physical and mental energies of a people. _ War, according to Ludendorff, is the supreme reality in the life of a nation. All else, even in times of peace—which arc but a preparation for times of warmust be subordinated to this reality. War is not an instrument of policy; policy is an instrument of war. A nation’s primary need is internal cohesion, for without it the arnix, which is an organic part of the nation, is without cohesion. This cohesion requires a fundamental ■conformity ol beliefs. These convictions must have a religious character, but they must not be Christian. According to Ludendorff Christianity is an imported product “ alien to the German race and a source of weakness.” He regards Shintoism as greatly superior to Christianity, and demands that Germany should

adopt a “ religion of the German race (which, in fact, is what the Nazi dictatorship is trying to impose). Ludendorff approves of coercive measures to secure conformity, and the extermination of all political and religious nonconformity that he demands is actually being carried out by the dictatorship. He has no Use for religion except in so far as it promotes warlike qualities. MILITARY NEEDS ALONE. The political, economic, financial, and religious structure of a nation must be determined by military needs alone. Stocks of such raw materials as can be obtained only abroad must be accumulated in peace time, so that enough may be available for war. He believes in big armies—an army can never be numerically strong enough.” All men who are physically fit must be available for active service at the outbreak of war. He thinks that recruits can be taught the use or modern weapons in one year. He demands that the spirit of subordination should he promoted, together with initiative and strength of character. He condemns declaration of war not only as superfluous, but as prejudicial to victory. It was, he says, “a bad mistake ” to declare war on Russia and France in 1914. As soon as a State has decided to go to war it must at once secure the command of the air, so as to hinder the concentration of hostile armies. The industrial centres of the enemy must he bombed. But the air arm is not decisive. Only a vigorous offensive of the land forces can decide a war. In case of invasion by the enemy tha civilian population must take part in. the fighting and harass the enemy's rear. It is the comraander-in-cluef who must decide general policy, both at homo and abroad in war time. Ho must also be in control of the economic resources of the nation. The German law of Mav 21, 1935, confers upon the Minister of'War the powers which Ludendorff demands. “A nation, when if ’-i-_ i‘ - "H to live by waging a totalitarian war,” he writes. “ it is not worthy of a meat commander unless it places itself entirely at his disposal.”