BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Evening Star, Issue 22261, 12 February 1936, Page 13

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

JELLIGOE’S MUOH-OISGUSSED TAGTIGS SGAPA SURRENDER THE REAL PROOF “ There is an old British saying that he wins who can keep the sea—Jellicoe kept the sea,” declared Vice-admiral J. E. T, Harper, at the conclusion of his address on the Battle of Jutland in the Town Hall last evening. Although the British Navy suffered a material defeat in the first phase of that historic action, the real proof of Jutland was the eventual surrender of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow. From Jutland onward the enemy fleet was not prepared to risk another decisive encounter, and this, said Admiral Harper, must be regarded as constituting the real test of the engagement. Admiral Harper is at present engaged on a lecture tour, of the Dominion, under the auspices of the Navy League. As lie is acknowledged to be the foremost authority on that muchdiscussed action at Jutland on May 31. 1916, his address last evening was heard with particular interest by an audience of well over two thousand people. It was a lucid and dispassionate story of the manoeuvring, skirmishing. _ and battle, illustrated throughout with _ a highly interesting series of granhic pictures of the engagement and diagrams setting out the relative positions and strength of the two naval forces. Ever since the battle, the merit of Admiral Jellicoe’s tactics has been warmly debated, hut Admiral Harnor firmly maintains that his late cldef took the only course possible under the circumstances, and made the best of an extremely difficult and awkward situation. NAVY A PEACE MACHINE. Admiral Harper stated at the outset that he wished to impress _ upon his audience the fact that the British Navy has never been used for purposes of aggression. “ The policy of its leaders has always been based on the essential needs of the Empire,” he said. “It has a high value as a peace machine, but it loses that value if it is reduced in strength. It only functions as a war machine when fforced by necessity, and then, of course, it does its best. And of all the maritime nations of the world, none of which is so largely dependent on the sea for its security and, indeed, its existence, as ourselves, we have been the only one to reduce maritime forces.” ERRONEOUS INFORMATION. The British naval policy in the Great War continued Admiral Harper, was primarily a defensive one in ensuring that there should be an uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs to the Homeland, and in providing for the safe transport of troops overseas. The German policy, in the first instance, was one of aggression in challenging the supremacy of the British fleet. With one exception (Coromandel) that policy failed. Admiral Hanper went on to detail the German High Command’s carefullylaid plans to draw a portion of the British fleet away from its base, which was the result of Admiral Von Scheer’s chafing against inactivity. He pointed out the initial disadvantage under which Lord Jellicoe laboured through an erroneous report from the Admiralty that the German fleet was still at its base at the month of the River Jade on that fateful morning. “ That message was a complete mistake, and should never have been sent,” said Admiral Harper. “As a result, the first stage of the engagement could he described as a material defeat for the British.” MOMENTOUS DECISION. When Lord Jellicoe brought his battleships in within striking distance of the enemy, it was after 6 o’clock in the evening, and a thick haze and the fast-approaching darkness greatly handicapped him. When the two fleets came together he was faced with a 'mo mentous decision as to the direction of his deployment, a manoeuvre of vital importance in naval warfare. After two urgent requests to 'Lord Beatty (who was in command of the squadron of battle-cruisers which had previously given battle to the enemy) for the location of the German fleet, he was at last given part of the desired information as to the direction in which the High Seas fleet lay, and within OOsec gave his order for a movement from his left wing. This great decision, so often censured, had, in the official German staff history, been apolauded as the sound one. It resulted in the enemy’s desperate efforts to avoid battle, and thick weather and the darkness enabled them to escape round the stern of the British Fleet to their mine-protected base. IMPOSSIBLE CONDITIONS. “ The visibility was hopeless,” continued Admiral Harper. “At no time could more than three enemy vessels be seen at one time. A night attack under those conditions was out of the question, and by daylight the enemy ships had regained the shelter of their minefields. Once again Lord Jellicoe was hampered by inadequate and tardy advice from the Admiralty as to the enemy’s movements, and by the fact that the enemy had a choice of several channels through the minefields. Had the battle been fought as far from the German base as it was from ours, their losses would have undoubtedly been far greater. As it was, several shins were able to return home, although in a sinking condition.” Admiral Harper, was accorded an ovation at the conclusion of his address and an enthusiastic vote of thanks on the motion of Air W. J. Morrell. Mr .1. Sutherland Ross, president of the local branch of the Navy League, was the chairman.