THE NEW OUTLOOK

Evening Star, Issue 22067, 28 June 1935, Page 11

THE NEW OUTLOOK

GERMAN NAVAL CLAIMS No phase of German rearmament is likely to have such far-reaching repercussions as the recent announcement that Germany would rebuild a fleet up to 35 per cent, of British naval strength. Germany’s new conscript army and rapidly-expanding air force have caused serious alarm in Europe, but they do not affect countries whose geographical remoteness renders them immune from military or aerial attack (says the ‘ Sydney Morning Herald ’). The implications of German naval policy affect the world, because any developments producing a naval race in Europe would upset the naval ratios established by the London and Washington Treaties, and would probably encourage the United States and Japan to make substantial additions to their fleets. Since Japan denounced the naval treaties, and both Britain and United States were convinced that they had prejudiced their interests in accepting them, the renewal of the treaties in the near future is highly improbable. This, however, would not necessarily involve any great increase in naval armaments unless one of the countries concerned upset the ratios by excessive building to assert supremacy. This was improbable because of the enormous cost of modern navies, and building programmes would probably have been confined to the replacement of obsolete ships, rather than to the increase of total strength.

POSITION, RADICALLY CHANGED. With Germany’s decision to adopt an active naval policy, the whole position is radically changed. Herr Hitler has stated that Germany has no intention of challenging Britain on the seas, but this is hard to reconcile with Germany’s expressed intention of building up to 35 per cent, of British naval strength. The British fleet is not only for the defence of homo waters. It has to British possessions and patrol trade routes in all parts of the world. The more ships that have to bo retained in borne waters, the fewer will be available for patrol and convoy work further afield, and the cruiser strength is already considered inadequate for these purposes. Germany’s pocket battleships have already upset strategic calculations because they are more powerful than cruisers, and . faster than most ships of heavier armament. Germany had also several very modern light cruisers, and if these are reinforced with battleships the total strength would present a formidable factor in European waters. Such a fleet would certainly involve the concentration of a much larger proportion of the British fleet in home waters than is now necessary, and Britain would bo obliged to build extensively to provide for the adequate defence of trade- routes and possessions abroad. Such an increase in British naval strength would probably lead to counter moves by the United States and Japan, which regard parity as a question or prestige, and the ultimate result would be vast additions to the

navies of the world. The policy of moderation inspired by the naval treaties would bo abandoned, not from choice but from ■ necessity. In this way the building of only a few ships by Germany would work mischief entirely out of proportion to their actual menace to other countries’ naval security. THE BALTIC.

Another serious issue raised by the German decision is the possiblity of a naval race in the Baltic. A powerful German battle fleet could not only close the ports of the Baltic States, and cut off their trade with, the outside world, but could effectually bombard these ports, or cover an invasion from the sea. To this danger the smaller States could make no effective reply, but the Soviet has demonstrated its determination not to accept any inferiority in armaments that might endanger its security. The Soviet would almost inevitably create a powerful fleet in the Baltic to' resist the menace of a German fleet to Petrograd, and, faced with a naval race for supremacy in the Baltic, Germany might soon find it inexpedient or impossible to confine her' naval building to the desired 35 per cent, of British strength. Germany has no special need of a larger fleet than she now has for defensive purposes. She has no possessions abroad to protect, and there is no fleet in the Baltic to menace the Gorman seaboard. Her action is doubly unfortunate in that it is unnecessary, and because it threatens to destroy disarmament in the sphere where the greatest success has been achieved. However, Herr Hitler has shown in his pronouncements on the subject that he is reluctant to antagonise Britain by an excessive naval programme, and it will be no fault of Britain’s if the Anglo-German naval discussions do not produce an abandonment or reduction of the German claims. Britain has no illusions about the extravagant cost of building and maintaining modern ships, and though some measure of naval rearmament now seems necessary to maintain Britain’s naval security, there is no desire to build beyond the essential minimum. Tho negotiations will, therefore, be an illuminating test or the sincerity of Germany’s expressed desire to pursue a pacific policy. She can abandon her naval claims without any loss of real security. By persisting in them she may provoke a costly and dangerous naval race between all the leading maritime powers, and incite the Soviet, which has no naval pretensions to-day, to build a powerful Baltic fleet.