NAVAL STRENGTHS.

Evening Star, Issue 21890, 29 November 1934, Page 10

NAVAL STRENGTHS.

A natural question would be whether the preliminary discussions on naval limitation between Great Britain, the United States, and Japan have reached agreement 'on anything during all the weeks that they' have been in progress. 'Apparently the delegates have agreed that, there is no u6ed for their differences to disturb happy relations at the present time. They can go on discussing them amiably, and meet one another at social engagements with every appearance of enjoying the meetings whether or not they are really bored, but all that his little to do with the actual object of the conferences. If that , has progressed one step it has not been disclosed. The discussions are important, because the Washington Treaty, limiting certain classes of armaments, will go on indefinitely if,, and only, if, no Power that is a party to it gives notice of a desire to terminate it before the end of this year. If such notice is given a naval conference must be held next year to determine with what modifications it is to continue, if it is to continue at all, after 1936. At that time the London Treaty, making other limitations, will automatically expire if it is not renewed, and, as part of the treaty-itself, a conference is required to be held next year to consider. terms of its .renewal. Present, discussions have been preparatory to (hat congress. . The obstacle to agreement has been Japan, who has never been satisfied With the five-five-three ratio of naval strength, agreed to at Washington, which puts her in an inferior position as regards both Britain and America. The distinction, in the first place, chafes her pride. That is not surprising. As a late arrival in international first circles, the pride,of Japan has been always sensitive. - “Blessed 'are the meek” -is -tfie- text perhaps - least regarded, most incomprehensible of all texts in the Bible at this stage of the nations’- progress, and Japan has less cause than others to feel bound by.it, not professing to be a Christian nation. The Americans chafed that sensibility of pride quite unnecessarily when they fixed their control of Oriental immigration into their country on a special and discriminatory basis, instead of including it in the quota system applied! to • others, which would have served the same end without offence. • A commission set up by President Roosevelt has just advised, among other wise recommendations, that that mistake in methods should be amended, and action on those lines would most certainly be grateful to Japan. But the Japanese objections to naval ratios rest on more than abstract grounds. What difference in needs, it is virtually argued, requires that Japan should have a smaller navy than America P An. answer to that question might be difficult to supply, except that America has two coasts, wide apart, which she might need to defend, hut there are two reasons making it difficult to concede equality. First, the effect of that would be equality with Britain, and Great Britain has undoubtedly larger naval needs than either America or Japan. Also, America seems determined not to agree to it. The Japanese argument for equality, even with America, has been put at times in a most maladroit way. Mr Hirosi Saito, Japanese Ambassador to Washington, recently quoted the contention that, with her ratio.

Japan had equality of defence in her own waters. “ That presupposed,” he said, “ that the American Navy would fight in the Western Pacific [rather it makes the best of all reasons why it should not], but that the Japanese would never fight in the Eastern Pacific.” Why should the Japanese want to fight in the Eastern Pacific? They could do no real damage, at that distance, to the United States’ vast bulk. Even the distance from Japan to Hawaii is half as far again as from Hawaii to San Francisco. What Japan wants is a free sea passage between her islands and Manchuria, and she has that across the Sea of Japan. No one is going to interfere with her in those confined waters, however her Manchurian policy may develop. She has not parity there, but preponderant power. War between her and America should be too foolish a matter for discussion. The programme of Japan, shown in its best light, should not be prohibitive of a formula for agreement. Instead of ratios, what it provides for is a common upper limit for total tonage, to which she would not necessarily build up. Apparently she would be willing to include sharp limitation of “ offensive ” units. For those objects, almost certainly, she will terminate the Washington agreement. But Americans will not hear of Japanese equality with their own navy. In a free competition Japan could never obtain it, since she is a poor nation—poorer even than America. But the free competition which would mean a new armaments race is what the whole world wishes to avoid.