MUSSOLINI’S POLICIES.

Evening Star, Issue 21722, 17 May 1934, Page 8

MUSSOLINI’S POLICIES.

Mussolini’s ideas of au Italian naval policy cannot be called extravagant. If they are applied as moderately as they have been in the past the world should hfive no cause to be disturbed by them. The Fascists point out that Italy is practically an island and dependent on shipping for her supplies. That is undoubtedly true, and, in proportion to area, she has a long double coast to be defended. The claim that, is made for equality with France in any agreement for naval limitation does not seem likely to be conceded by the latter country, but, while pressing that claim, Italy has shown no desire for starting an armaments race. No Italian submarines, it is recalled, have been laid down since 1931, and no capital ships have been started since the war. In view of her growing population, we are told, Italy must seek colonies in Asia and Africa, but she is not considering territorial conquests. She has colonies already in North Africa whose development is only now in its first stages. ,It is not plain where she is to find them in Asia. But Europe, which a few years ago feared Mussolini as a strident sword-rattler, has come very generally to trust him as a man of peace. No one knows better than he, it has been said, that the most important thing for Europe and for the world is to avoid a new war. The FourPower Pact which he formed last year was a contribution to the peace cause, and the treaties entered into a few weeks ago between Italy, Austria, and Hungary have been widely welcomed as promising the same influence. The treaties provide for closer political cooperation between the three States, and look towards the establishment of better commercial relations not only among- these three countries, but between them and other nations in Europe. Mr Nicholas Roosevelt, former American Minister to Hungary, writing on the agreements, finds no reason to believe that they are in any way directed against Franco or the Little Entente. They do involve Mussolini’s determination to prevent Austria from joining Germany, and this, we are told, is now one of the cardinal principles of Italian foreign policy. The treaties have been favourably re-: ceived in France, but two statements made by II Duco on the day following their publication were much less to French liking. They were an expression of sympathy with Hungary’s aspirations for territorial revision, and an acceptance of Germany’s aspirations to rearm. The first statement has been viewed as mainly diplomatic by most political observers in Europe. The question of treaty revision is not likely to be seriously pressed by Italy while thousands of former Austrian subjects live under Italian rule. It was easy to accept the prospect of Germany’s rearming when nothing which the great Powers are willing to do can stop it. All that remains in that connection is for the best influence to be used so that the rearming shall be done by agreement, under limitation and supervision, and not “ regardless.” Observers in Britain welcomed the Danubian pacts. An American correspondent in London describes them as “ a development which convinced Whitehall that the Continental balance of power stood in no immediate danger of unsettlement. . . . While the present British. Government has no desire to see Austria swallowed by Nazi Germany. it certainly would not be prepared to go to any great length to prevent such a condition. Therefore Italy’s more or less sudden emergence as the protector of small, weak nations evokes no jealousy here.” The Germans were not pleased by the pacts which promise to preserve Austria as a buffer State, under Italy’s protection, between Italy and Germany. They regarded them as the worst reverse received by their plans since Hitler became Chancellor, and were not appeased by the sop thrown in of agreement with their rearmament aspiration.