MARSHAL JOFFRE'S MEMOIRS

Evening Star, Issue 21216, 24 September 1932, Page 2

MARSHAL JOFFRE'S MEMOIRS

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY A few instalments from the memoirs of Marshal Joffre, published in a Paris review, ‘ The Revue des Deux-Mondes,’ describe the way in which the possibility of a German invasion of France was discussed by the French military and political authorities in 1912, soon after tho writer had been appointed Chief of the General Staff. He throws a good deal of new light on the military preparations on the side of the future Allies and tho problem of Belgian neutrality. There existed already in 1911 a French plan—No. XVl.—prepared before Marshal Joffre took charge of the General Staff. In his opinion, this plan was inadequate, and ho lost no time in drawing up another. The most urgent problem was how to parry a possible violation of Belgian neutrality by the Gorman army. The French General Staff, Marshal Joffre writes, was driven to suppose that that neutrality was going to be violated by its study of the extraordinary development by the Germans of defensive works in Alsace and Lorraine, which could only suggest an intention to establish a purely defensive zone in that area. The French General Staff was therefore obliged to take account of the possibility that the main weight of the German invasion might be pressed through Belgium. In. the words of Marshal Joffre, ‘‘not only were we not unaware of this threat, as has too often been stated, but it seemed to us so probable that we came to an agreement with the Government as to our right to enter Belgian territory the moment it was violated by our enemies.” A SECRET MEETING.

On February 21, 1912, at a secret meeting attended by the Prime Minister (M. Poincare) and the Ministers of War and Marine at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. General Joffre informed his colleagues that the land forces to be supplied by Great Britain had been provisionally estimated at six infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and two mounted brigades, a total of 125,000 combatants, and that the plans which had already been drawn up made it possible for the British Forces to go into action on the fifteenth day after the French mobilisation. Marshal Joffre is careful t° ppt Q this point, and it is a characteristic feature of his diary that military plans, as ho reveals them, are based entirely on calculations of time, effectives, and fho strength of fortified areas, not at all on the more spectacular elements of warfare. “From the purely military point of view,” writes the Marshal, “ I pointed out that if we could make our offensive through Belgium, presuming that no other consideration prevented it and the Belgian Government had no objection, our problem would be much simpler and our chances of victory would be increased. This chance of success, I said, lay in, a vigorous offensive which would break up the organised forces of the enemy at one stroke.” On the FrancoGerman frontier French action would be limited everywhere by natural barriers, but in the north they would be able to turn tho frontier fortifications and to make better use of tho British forces which would give them a “ marked numerical superiority ” over the enemy. It was, therefore, in their interest to throw the French forces into Belgian territory, and that not only after the Germans had violated it, as they probably would. “I suggested,” Marshal Joffre writes, “ that it might he possible to choose the solution which seemed most advantageous to us, and to the British and Belgian Governments.” In this suggestion he was supported by M. Millerand and M. Delcasse so far as the military results to bo expected were concerned. But M. Poincare pointed out that tho passage of French troops through Belgium might create difficulties not only with Europe in general, but with the Belgians themselves, whom the French had found difficult to agree with in advance; it therefore seemed necessary that their entry into Belgium should at least be justified by a previous and positive threat of German invasion. “ It was moreover the danger of a German invasion of Belgium which had been the first cause of our military agreements with Britain, and we had to be sure that a plan based on our own invasion of Belgium would not lead to the withdrawal of British support.” BRITISH ADVICE. The February conference, Marshal Joffre concludes, did not solve the strategic problems as it left the “ positive menace ” of a German invasion of Belgium undefined. In 1906, when the military provisions of the FrancoBritish entente had first been discussed, the French firmly promised to respect Belgian neutrality, and about the same time “an authorised voice”—that of Colonel Repington—warned them not to allow themselves to be led into a trap by the Germans. In 1911 Lord Esher gave them similar warning. “ But,” says Marshal Joffre, “ I believe that on the initiative of M. Poincare British diplomacy studied the question which I had raisnd. I learned that the British military attache in Brussels during 1912 tried to begin conversations with General Jungbluth, of the Belgian staff, but the exchange of views got no farther than the_ prejudicial question what common action could be taken in case of a violation of Belgian territory by Germany, and even so, no result was obtained.” On November 27, 1912, however. Major-general (afterwards Field-Marshal Sir Henry) Wilson, “ with tho consent of Sir Edward Grey ” told the French General Staff that the Foreign Office staff “ believed Belgium to be hesitant as to the side she would take in case of a Franco-Germau conflict, and inclined rather towards that of Germany.” If Franco were the first to violate Belgium neutrality the Belgian army would certainly march with the Germans, and the British Government might be summoned to insist on the respect of neutrality. “It would then be in a very embarrassing position.” There was, therefore, General AVilson concluded, nothing to be gained for the French Army by tho violation of Belgian neutrality. “ This communication,” says Marshal Joffre, “ was of tho highest importance since it obliged us definitely to give up any idea of moving a priori through Belgium.” As if to confirm the decision of the French General Staff that the violation of Belgian neutrality would not pay iu tho military sense, Si. de Brocqueville, the Belgian Prime Minister, announced in Parliament in 1913 that the reorganised Belgian army was intended “to turn the scale in favour of whichever Power was not_ the first to violate Belgian neutrality.”