WHEN WRONG IS RIGHT

Evening Star, Issue 20310, 19 October 1929, Page 3

WHEN WRONG IS RIGHT

A MOTORING DECISION [Feb United Press Association.} WELLINGTON, October 18. The question whether a motorist who finds himself in imminent danger of a is justified in going on to his wrong side of the road was discussed by Mr Justice Blair in a reserved decision delivered in the Supremo Court, to-day. His Honour’s decision was that it was tho duty of the driver to go to the wrong side if by doing so he would avoid an accident. The judgment was in connection with appeals against the finding of Mr T. B. McNeil, S.M., in a recent collision case. The case arose from a collision at 1 a.m. on May 2. The respondent approached a blind corner at a bridge on his wrong aide and collided with appellant’s car. The magistrate found that respondent approached the bridge on tho wrong side, but further found that appellant should, instead of swerving over to his wrong ski-:, have remained on his proper side and applied his brake. The magistrate considered also that appellant had the last opportunity of avoiding the accident. In cross-examination appellant had admitted that he noticed the respondent making to his left, but was not sure whether he would continue to do so. Tho magistrate considered that tho appellant was nob justified in assuming that tho respondent might not go to his proper side. “ I think,” said His Honour, “that the magistrate on the facts as he lias found them has misconceived their legal effect in the situation known to drivers as a ‘ blind corner,’ inasmuch as one cannot see round it. The respondent, on the magistrate’s finding, deliberately disregarded a very obvious an ! proper driving rule. He cut the corner, and from the point of view of the appellant the position as it appeared to him must have been that he suddenly found himself with two headlight® bearing down on him some three lengths away." The appellant could not escape by going further to his loft, as there was no room. He had to make n,p his mind what to do in a space of not more than a quarter of a second, and ho decided wrongly, as it eventuated, to swerve sharply' to his wrong side to avoid*what ho thought was a certain collision. At such moments as these a driver must act instinctively, although as events turned out it did not happen to be tho correct instinct, for the simple reason that tho respondent’s instincts led him to the same spot. Tho crisis was created by the respondent’s i gross neglect of a rudimentary_driving 'rule. It is the right,- and, in fact. • the duty of a driver on his proper side of the Voad to go to his wrong_ side, if by so doing he can avoid an accident. There was, therefore, nothing improper m appellant, in tho stress of moment, caused by respondent's improper action, electing to go to his wrong side. In my opinion, the fact that appellant did so’ is, in the circumstances, no evidence of negligence against him. lam unable to follow tho magistrate when he apparently places on the appellant after tho crisis arose the whole duty of selecting the best means of avoiding a collision. Tho respondent had as good a view of the appellant as the latter had of tho respondent. It was as easy, indeed easier, on account of upgrade, for the respondent himself to have done what he claims appellant should have done, viz., apply tlie brakes and stop. The rule is well established that a wrong manoeuvre made under stress of danger created by another cannot be availed of by that other as evidence of negligence. Where a person is suddenly put in a position of imminent personal danger by the wrongful act of another it is°sufficient if he shows as much judgment and self-control in attempting to avoid that danger as may reasonably be expected of him in tho circumstances.” Tho appeal was allowed.