INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Evening Star, Issue 20023, 14 November 1928, Page 6

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MR BALDWIN’S COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW GOVERNMENT POLICIES DEFENDED MUTUAL UHOERSTAKCINC SOUGHT (British Official Wireless.) Press Association —By Telegraph—Copyright. RUGBY, November 13. (Received November 14, at 11.19 a.m.) Air Baldwin, tho Prime Minister, made a statement in the House of Commons to-day on the Anglo-French compromise. it was iu reply to Air Lloyd George, tho Liberal Leader, who had moved as an amendment to the Ad-drcss-in-lleply to the King’s Speech that the House considered that tho compromise had endangered the prospects of peace in Europe and the good relations | with tho United States, regretted the abandonment of the principle of tho limitation of small submarines and cruisers, and considered that the basis of naval discussion should be an extension of the Washington Treaty to all classes of combatant ships, and that the exclusion of reservists from the computation of French military strength was contrary to the spirit both of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty. Air Baldwin said that the compro- I inisc was no more than a perfectly ] honest and straightforward attempt 'to get out of the deadlock which had occurred at Geneva. The Government had been strongly criticised on the ground that they had made concessions to Franco and conferred some immunities Upon her. Ho pointed out that Franco remained a conscript country', as she always had been. Franco regarded conscription as an essential part of the doctrine of democracy. Conscription in Franco dated from the, revolution. It was not only' on the grounds of national security against external enemies that the French had had conscription, and tho existence of a conscript army did not necessarily make a country militant. In Franco they held tho view that if every man had to go and fight when war began the masses of people would be loss inclined to think about war, and statesmen would think twice before they ordered them to go and fight. Regarding the criticism that the compromise was directed against other countries, especially the United States, Mr Baldwin pointed out that the telegram despatolled to the United Slates Secretary of State at tho beginning of ■ August emphasised that the agreement was not a treaty, and that it was being submitted to the United States in order that tho Administration should consider its terms and give its considered observations and any suggestions. A similar message was sent to Italy, and later to Germany. Continuing, Air Baldwin referred to the question of the Rhineland. He said that tho Government’s attitude had always’ been the same. It wanted to see the evacuation of tho Rhineland, but it could not compel evacuation, and if Britain walked out of the Rhineland how would it advance that object by one step? ft might cause greater difficulties. He thought that there was real hope that before long this matter might be settled by committees that were now being set up. The early stages of the negotiations and discussions between the Powers on this subject had beer, opened in a reasonable spirit and with a desire lo settle, which, he hoped and believed, would lead to the liquidation of the lasi troublesome remnant of wav tune in the Rhineland Dealing with the relations with France, the Prime Minister spoke of Mr Ramsay MacDonald’s policy in 1921 regarding disarmament, when he wrote that it was a policy which could only' ho initiated if France and England were agreed. When Air MacDonald was in office he never wavered in the application of that method of dealing with, the European situation, ami his efforts were successful. The present Government did not mean to deviato from the policy which it had tried to pursue cvei since it had been in office, which, so fains its cordial understanding with tho French was concerned, was the fame as had been pursued h.v Air MacDonald. Jt. was not an exclusive policy, and was not directed against anyone. It was a policy of working in close co-opera-tion, not only with France, but also_ in co-opcration with all other countries. This policy had been felt in the remotest corners of Europe, and find, contributed tp the settlement of disputes which might in times past have led to very serious troubles. Our one desire in our foreign policy’ is the desire to heal tho wpunds caused by the war. and see tho peace of Europe, coi solidatod for tho benefit of our friends and Into enemies alike.” Air Baldwin concluded with a reference to tho statement made by President Cooiidgc that it was always plain that Europe and the United States lacked mutual understanding. Ho thought President Cooiidgc was right. He regretted it profoundly, and it was very difficult to find why- it was so, but he had noticed one thing during his term of office which was worth considering. European .statesmen had got into the habit of meeting at Geneva, and there they learned, not only each other’s point of view, but what was very important—each other’s idiosyncrasies as individuals. He thought that there was among the European statesmen a desire in the negotiations to see the other viewpoints and to compromise, if something could bo effected by that compromise. This state of affairs existed far more than before tho war, American statesmen, however, did not know the European statesmen, nor did the European statesmen know the American statesmen. There wa.s no personal intercourse, the only intercourse being written despatches sent across 3,000 miles of water. In these circumstances it was far more difficult to got mutual understanding. So far as the House of Commons was concerned, he pointed out that it was important to all who spoke on America or on Britain’s relations with America to study and understand the political system of the United States. It was so different from any r of tho European systems, and on these differences relations had been wrecked more than once. It is most important for the avoidance of future shipwrecks that we should be familiar on ibis side with the difference in the systems of the two countries.

Sixty-five years ago, when America was not tho great Power she was today, when tho Union was split apparently beyond hope, of redemption, and when the workmen of Lancashire were starving, the Lancashire men, to their credit, wrote to Abraham Lincoln and said; “Carry on.” Lincoln, in reply’, finished his letter with these words: “]. regard this interchange of sentiment as an augury that, whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship _ which now exist between the two nations will be as it should lie—perpetual.” Tho Prime Minister concluded amid the cheers of the House.

LLOYD GEORGE’S CONTENTIONS

Press Association—By Telegraph—Copyright.

LONDON, November Li. (Received November It, at 12.30 rail) Mr Lloyd George said that the basis of the British foreign policy should lie friendship and co-operation between all nations on the basis of the League Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, 'ilie real test of Locarno was the progress of disarmament. On this point the Anglo-French agreement was a sinister comment. He had been told that it had all boon dropped, but surely the House had something to say! Ho had a suspicion that America was eliminated. Anyone imagining so had better read Mr Coolidge’s speech. His announcement of the building ol lilteen cruisers was one effect of the Anglo-French agreement. France was clearly under that impression. We wore bound by the principles of the Kellogg Pact. Mr Baldwin bad declared that the Pact was the keystone of Locarno, but the keystone there was the refusal to evacuate Rhineland, although they were bound to do that the moment Germany was fulfilling her obligations, On the contrary, the signatory Powers had increased their armaments. He thought he could demonstrate that Britain’s armaments had increased. (Ministerial cries: “No!” and “Prove it!”L The Air Force figures had certainly increased. A good understanding with America was more important than with almost any other country’, because the peace of the world denponded on it. Anyone assuming that an Anglo-American conflict was possible should be treated # as a dangerous lunatic. The only thing to do was to get back to Lord Balfour’s Washington policy. Mr Baldwin should make it clear that lie had abandoned the Anglo-French Pact, both in letter and spirit. The Russian disarmament proposition should not have been treated as a laughing matter. “ When she economically recovers Russia will be a formidable' factor, with almost limitless man power. There will he no peace in Europe until the Allies carry out their disarmament obligations.”— Australian Press Association.