VIEWS ON CHINA

Evening Star, Issue 19764, 14 January 1928, Page 22

VIEWS ON CHINA

NEWCOMER'S ENQUIRIES POLICY OF THE POWERS STUDENTS’ LETTERS. Last month the London ‘ Times ’ published some interesting extracts from private letters written by Mr F. B. Riley, the paper’s special correspondent, who was murdered by troops of the “Christian General.” Mr Riley was a young man, an ex-Rhodes scholar from Australia, who had served ‘ The Times’ in Iraq and New York. He had made a special study of Eastern policy, and was sent by ‘ The Times ’ to China to conduct a new investigation of affairs there. His work was cut short by his death at the hands of Feng’s soldiers. Riley was always an enthusiast—determined to dig to the bottom of every problem for himself and to explore as many opinions upon it as possible (wrote ‘The Times,’ in publishing extracts from his private letters); but his published despatches to ‘ The Times,’ which appeared regularly during May, June, and July, were marked by irreproachable caution. The more controversial views which he was gradually forming were reserved for his private letters, and no doubt also for his conversation, for ho loved argument, and was fond of assuming an attitude merely for the sake of getting at the tacts. It is not altogether surprising, perhaps, that some of those with whom lie camo in contact in Shanghai should have regarded him at the time as a dangerous newcomer with revolutionary notions of their old familiar situation. It will be still more surprising if his deas and suggestions, poured out in these private letters without any thought of publication, do not become accepted platitudes in years to come. Thus he wrote towards the end of May, soon after his arrival;—“l would express a conviction that any effort to set up a single Government for such a huge country must fail,’ except on a basis of dictatorship. Communications are much too poor; public opinion, if it exists, is virtually negative only, so one hears on all hands; no strong man in sight to be dictator; and the Kuomintang, even if they roach Peking, likely to split up worse than ever. To wait for China to have a strong central Government, a la policy, means waiting for the Greek Kalends. Better to recognise the facts of size and nebulosity; and, as some diplomats believe, negotiate with authority, _ as and when found, in province or region.

Hero again, written at about the samo time, is a suggestion which Riley felt himself still too inexpert to advance in print;—“lt is, so I was told, and could perhaps sense it even in a few days myself—it is very noticeable that the moderates, the ‘ haves 1 of the intellectual world, are concerned over the spread of Bolshie doctrine, and perhaps somewhat less alarmed about ‘ Western Imperialism.’' If so, then a time may come in the near future when we could again go a long way towards meeting their aspirations in reasonable negotiation, sans loss of ‘ face ’ in a blank capitulation such as occurred at Hankow. If the time should come, surely a vigorous and public drive by the British to get tariff autonomy immediately, and not wait till 1929, would bo a wise move. This appeals^to me as the big thing to do. . A NARROW VISION.

And here is another—not very original, perhaps, but not without significance;—“ It would pay the big linns to get, say, ten young men a year, lor the first live years, Blues of the I.C.S. type from Oxford and Cambridgewell paid, ample leave—to bo drafted into the Shanghai, Tientsin, and Hongkong firms, and nursed for leadership. They'd learn Chinese, and, with a larger outlook, get tilings on to a better basis in course of a few years. At present too narrow a vision! The F.O. might take steps to ensure that its Consular staff is all of' the first rank, and to insist that Chamberlain’s policy he backed up, in private conversation, by all officials of H.M.G., even if ncss world continue abusive. Team work needed!” POLICY AND PRACTICE. In mid-June he was writing The main issue is friendship with the New China, in order that trade mainly, and the other phases of our civilisation also, such as education and health, etc., may continue on a basiS of mutual goodwill and co-operation. That’s the declared policy of H.M.G. 1 have in front of me a quotation from Balfour’s speech, 11/11/26, in the Lords: ‘The policy of Great Britain has been uniformly in the direction of removing every legitimate grievance of which China could complain, and doing our beat to meet every legitimate demand which Chinese patriots might reasonably make.’ That may be the policy, but it is certainly not the actuality; and there are men here, in Shanghai, doing a great deal passively in certain official circles, actively among some business men. to put obstacles in the way of that policy. At every turn here, as one delves into the Shanghai puzzle, one finds all kinds of things that belie Balfour’s statement. I take it the key to better relations in China is better relations in Shanghai, the commercial pulse. There are groups of Englishmen and Americans in touch with the Chinese, but there aro large numbers who are not. The reasonable people are the people who believe in Chamberlain’s policy, though criticising the details. The die-hards, who believe in force ‘as the only way to deal with the Chinese,’ will not accept either Chamberlain or Lampson or ‘/The Times ’ as being definite in mantaining that there s no intention to ‘ intervene.’ “The British taxpayers have provided troops (£1,500,000 or more invested)—and must also provide finance (several millions may be on loan), invested in Shanghai. In return the British taxpayer is entitled to demand that Shanghai bo cleaned up—physically and morally. iVs 1 see it, tlie way out | of the rut is to try and get British, | Americans, and Chinese working ■> on . plans for constructive action in the! future —town planning, health, education, parks, roads, etc.—for Greater Shanghai of the future. Get them busy on studying problems together, and j they will cease to abuse each other at a distance, begin to co-operate, begin I to crystallise a public opinion on positive lines—at present it’s all negative—and that should pave the way for fair Chinese representation on the Council. . . . Please do not think all this overlooks the shortcomings of the Chinese. They’re all that the Arab is ,and worse besides, with their opium, etc. But if we’re to work for friendship we must begin here in Shanghai and concentrate on it, despite the difficutlies our Celestial friends set up. For, in the meantime, the Germans arc quietly going ahead, full steam. Lampson made an excellent impression upon the young Chinese down here, and they "hope to be able to work with him.” AN EXAMPLE NEEDED. A month later, on July 5, Riley was returning to what had now become his settled conviction that, if Chinese incapacity for government was to be thoroughly understood, the foreign settlements must set a conspicuous example of progressive administration. “Working round amongst the business leaders, trying to get their point of view and to urge them not to delay ad infinitum in dealing with the problem, I discovered that many, if nor most of them, are ' not free agents. They have to take account of the opinions and decisions of their head offices, in London or New York. These

head offices aro. mainly concerned, it would seem, with their security values, investments in Shanghai, real estate, and municipal debentures. To the London offices, that security seems to rest upon maintaining ‘ control ’ of the settlement. But of what value to Britain is a stand pat attitude on their part, if it results in a continued boycott of British goods and continued agitation against the foreigner ‘ Imperialist.’? On tho other hand, is it not possible that an improvement in SinoForeign relations at Shanghai, being tangible evidence of foreign goodwill, may result in improved relations throughout the area held by the Kunmintang? It may be a bad guess, bin, when every other step is barred, why not trp this step? It involves negotiating with the Chinese ratepayers of Shanghai, who were certainly not to blame for the Nanking incident! It means making certain changes which most foreign journalists believe ought to bo made—viz., adequate Chinese representation on the Council, opening the parks, tackling the child labor problem, doing more for education, and generally trying to treat iho Chinese as equals, not ns inferiors. I emphasise the point that, in my opinion, the Chinese leaders arc being encouraged to agitato, because American journalists openly express .sympathy with their demands. They aro closely watching foreign Press opinions, and will certainly go ahead, up to the point at which that opinion turns against them. In other words, should not not bo our objective, by conceding their justifiable demands, and at tho samo time putting forward counter-demands—c.g., for reform of tho Provisional Court, and for a townplanning scheme for Greater Shanghai—to push ahead to the point at which Chinese ineptitude, incapacity, and want of common sense becomes more prominent, in the public eye, than tho delinquencies of the foreigners? Moreover, to reach an agreement at Shanghai .should strengthen the eredit of flic Knornintang with the people and so make it easier for them to reach a reasonable settlement and resume trade and . political relations with ns. The wiser heads feel they can’t fight civil war and tackle the foreign problem all at once. They want support, dislike Russian Communism, fear Jap. domination even more, and admit the Anglo-Saxons have no territorial interests in China. Cannot we feel our way forward towards co-operating with them, even if wo know thy’re going to trick ns at every turn?” It is one of the bitterest ironies of fate that a man so determined to understand the Chinese mind, and so courageous in exploring it, should have fallen a victim to the savagery of the people whom ho most desired to help.