THE RUSSO=GERMAN TREATY

Evening Star, Issue 19274, 12 June 1926, Page 11

THE RUSSO=GERMAN TREATY

Danger to Locarno Agreements [By the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, 0.M., M.F., former Prime Minister of Great Britain.] Exclusive to the * Evening Star.’ (Copyright by United Press Association of America; reproduction in full or in part prohibited.) XIII. The Russo-Germanic Treaty is causing much fluster and a little alarm amongst the Locarnist nations. There is no use disguising the fact that it is a formidable document. Its actual phrasing is more ominous than the various disarming communiques issued from Berlin before its publication would have led us to expect. lor instance, there is a sentence at the beginning which dominates the agreement and indicates its spirit. It is the preamble which declares that the parties are inspired ‘‘by. the conviction that the interest of the Gorman people, and of the people of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, demands that co-operation between them shall be con= tinupus and mutually trusting.” This is repeated and emphasised in Article 1 by an agreement to ” remain in friendly touch with one another in order to promote an understanding,” etc. r ihe words are startling in their significance. No wonder eyebrows arc lifted pretty high and that shoulders are being jerked up violently. The foolish manoeuvres which brought the League of Nations into such contempt at the last meeting of its Assembly are directly responsible for the conclusion of this momentous Treaty. Negotiations had been dawdling along in leisurely fashion for many months between Moscow and Berlin. But the more eager the former wore for an arrangement, the more apathetic find indifferent became the latter. Locarno turned the face of Germany towards the "West. Geneva swung it round sharply to the East. Tchicherin is an able diplomat of the old school. What his views may be on economic questions I cannot tell. He never discusses them, presumably he is a revolutionary. But on foreign affairs he is a product of the old Tsarist regime. He has not only the training, the skill, and the subtlety of the old Russian diplomacy, but he has also its traditions. He was not the man to miss the opportunity, opened by the follies of Geneva, to inflict a diplomatic defeat, on the enemies of the Soviet Government in Central and Western Europe. When Germany was naturally sore with the insulting treatment accorded to her by the Allied Powers, M. Tchicherin revived the languishing Treaty negotiations, and he has scored a great triumph at a time when both Russia and Germany stood sadly in need of it—Russia for economic, and Germany for diplomatic, reasons. OFFICIAL UNCONCERN. The official attitude of the Great Powers towards this new Pact is one of studied unconcern. Jt is true that ” bustling little M. Benes, of Czecho-Slovakia,” as the ‘New Statesman,’ happily calls him, fussed around as usual —this time with an elaborate questionnaire which Germany rightly treated as an impertinence. But the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Italy have not in public so far displayed any undue excitement over this Treaty. There were private explanations given by, and perhaps asked of, German Ambassadors. But they were couched in the tone of the friendly inquirer, rather than in that of the anxious party whoso interests were deeply affected. All the same, the European Press reveals a deep sense of anxiety mounting up to alarm as you reach the countries bordering on Russia. What, accounts for the electric wave of apprehension' that passed over Europe when it became known that Russia and Germany were negotiating a fresh treaty? What would be loss harmful—nay, what could be more beneficent than this agreement? It is concluded between two Powers who were drawn into a terrible war that lasted for years, by a quarrel between two other Powers in the merits of which they were not directly concerned. These two Powers have now entered into' an agreement that henceforth they will preserve complete neutrality if one of them is unfortunately drawn into a conflict with a third Power. On the face of it the agreement is a fresh guarantee of peace. That is the very reason why Europe distrusts it. All these pacts which have in the past provoked war ostentatiously proclaimed that their main purpose was to ensure peace amongst nations. The Belgian Treaty, and the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the AngloFrench Entente, were all declared at the time to be so many devices to ensure the permanence and security of European peace. Assurances were always given to that effect to other nations; but nevertheless between them they landed the world in the bloodiest worth at ever stained its surface. Hence the disquiet shown throughout Europe over this apparently innocuous transaction concluded by Berlin last Sunday. THE FRENCH VIEW. The French view is given by M. Gauvain, the well-informed foreign writer of the ‘ Journal des Debats The Soviets are striving to ensure the neutrality, if not the effective support of Germany in the event .of a war with one of their neighbors. Moreover, they are working to draw the Baltic States out of the sphere of the League of Nations, and to absorb them into a vast Russo-Germanic group. Such a group would be incompatible with the Locarno Pact. . . The Soviet is playing its game, but it is for the States menaced by them to guard themselves against their machinations. As to Germany, she cannot at the same time enter the League of Nations and the Locarno system, and contract with Russia undertakings contrary to the Covenant and to the Arbitration Treaties signed in London on December 1, 1925. She is authorised to promise Moscow her neutrality in the case of the aggression of a third party against Russia; she would exclude herself from the League of Nations and the Locarno system by reserving for herself the judgment as to who would be the aggressor, and in trying - to depart from the application of the fixed rules of the Pact. Then follow some cryptic sentences threatening to “ bring into vigor ” a counter-alliance against the Russo-German Entente. All this kind of comment has an entertaining side to a cynical observer who is not worried about the consequences to the next, generation. France has laboriously organised a group of mutual defence against Germany and Russia. She has advanced huge sums of money to equip the armies of this alliance. She has quite recently entered into a treaty of neutrality with Turkey, just after that provocative Power hud defied the League of Nations. Poland and Rumania have signed a treaty of mutual defence against Russia. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Jugo-Slavia, and Rumania have an entente for muiuual assistance against Russia and Germany. Czccho-Slovakia has even reinsured by entering into a pact of neutrality with Russia. The Polish Rumanian treaty is stated publicly by its authors to have been concluded in order to provide against the contingency “ of the League of Nations not doing its duty.” But when Russia and Germany presume to follow the example of these devotees of the League, they arc admonished for their transgression against the Covenant. Already there are as many qualifications, reservations, and loopholes in arid about the sacred Clauses 16 and 18 of the Covenant as there are around Articles 6 and Bof the Ten Commandments. This is no reflection oir the draughtsmanship of President Wilson. Moses was no more successful. The barbed wire of rules and precepts has never permanently kept the erring human cattle from wandering into forbidden ground. But the rovers ought to deal charitably with those who are tempted by their impunity to follow their example. The real official view of the British Foreign Office is given by a well-informed diplomatic correspondent who is constantly in touch with that office, “ that however legitimate the text of the Agreement, it may lead to severe trouble and perils at a later date.” This is sound enough, but British diplomacy ought to have thought of that before it committed itself to the Franco-Polish intrigue against Germany before and at the Geneva Assembly. < • • The analogy with the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894 is much too close for European statesmanship to feel comfortable about the incident. . Franca had been beaten to the ground by the German armies, and she was at the mercy of the ruthless legions of the victor. Any disposition on her part to assert her national independence brought upon her for oyer twenty years a threat of renewed invasion. Then came the alliance with Russia, and the whole situation changed. Russia was in need of cash. France stood in need of a powerful friend. Russia was an autocracy based on the divine right of an Emperor, France was a republic based on universal suffrage. It was an incongruous partnership, but it was nevertheless real and effective. The French Republicans cheered frantically in the streets of Paris the despot who shot Russian Republicans down in the*streets of St. Potcrshassu National security was more precious than liberty.

Thirty years later Russian Imperialists and French Republicans marched together as comrades into the Great War. The. French Premier who negotiated the treaty was also in office during the war which resulted from his diplomatic triumph in 1894. The treaty with Communist Russia is hailed with joy by both tho party of the old German aristocracy and the Communist Party. On the other hand, it is distrusted by German Socialists. Conservatives and Communists alike arc in agreement. The former see in it the opportunity for national revenue, the latter see in. it the prospect of future trouble; but the Socialists see in it a fresh danger to human peace. How incalculable and confused are the forces that move nations to their destiny! Tho situation can be retrieved at Geneva next September if the' Locarnist Powers realise the dangers, and have the courage to repair their mistakes at the March Assembly. Wifi they do so? M. .13riaiid has vision and courage. But will he be there? His successor would not have the same personal interest in saving Locarno,