FRANCE'S ARMED FRIENDS

Evening Star, Issue 19175, 16 February 1926, Page 4

FRANCE'S ARMED FRIENDS

FROM BLACK SEA TO BALTIC. Up to the present the discussion concerning the proposed Security Pact has been mainly concentrated upon the existing frontiers of Germany and her neighbors. It is not sufficiently Teatised (says Lancelot Lawton in the London ‘ Dajly Chronicle’) that the real peril to the peace of Europe lies farther to the eastward, over the long frontier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. between Soviet Russia and her neighbors. The terms of the suggested Security Pact imply that in the event of Germany breaking arbitration treaties .with her Eastern neighbors, France shall have the right to go to their assistance. But it seems more likely that the trouble will begin on the Russian side ; in which event Germany would not consider herself bound by any pact or arbitration treaty. The small States in Eastern Europe (Austria and Hungary, and perhaps Lithuania, may be exceptions) are united in friendship for France and hostility towards Germany and Russia. THE LITTLE ENTENTE. There is the Little Entente, composed of Czecho-Slovnkia. Rumania, and Jugo-Slavia. This 1 Triple Entente ” is, to all intents and purposes, a military ally of France. Poland does not belong to this combination, but she, too, may bo regarded as a military ally of France, and is at the same time on close terms with two States of the Little Entente—Rumania and Czechoslovakia, with whom she has made certain military arrangements which have mainly Russia in view. At the same time she preserves good relations with the three Baltic States—Latvia, Esthonia, and Finland, who all live in constant fear of Russia. The first two States mentioned (Latvia and Esthonin) have concluded a defensive union. Thus it will be seen that the various States, which stretch from the Baltic to the Black Sea, have made arrangements, aided and abetted by France, which might involve them all in war against Germany or Russia, or both. At the present moment the military spirit is dominant everywhere between those two seas. The number of men under arms is very great; certainly not less than it was three years ago. Most of these men have been trained under French direction. And everywhere an aggressive nationalism is asserting itself. States that once wore powerful, and that suffered decline, are lifting their heads again. NEW EUROPE’S NEW EAST. . When I lived in Western Russia before the war streets were divided into nationalities. Now these “streets of nationalities” have suddenly grown into States. On the other side of the new frontier—in what is called “ Soviet Russia”—a new force which will have momentous significance for the world is awakening, the force of Russian patriotism. Russians —not only in Russia, but outside Russia—are becoming intensely nationalist and “antiforeign.” Much as they detest Bolshevist methods within, they admire Bolshevist assertiveness without. This brings ns hack again to what I would wish to emphasise—the perils of the Baltic-Black Sea line. It is here, and not so much on the Rhine, or on Germany’s eastern frontier, that the menace to European peace exists. RED LINE MEANS DANGER. From end to end of the lino which divides Russia from Finland. Esthonia, Poland, and Rumania the Stales composing the so-called “cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism,” guerrilla warfare, is constantly in progress. In particular, Poland and Rumania are tlio objects of Bolshevist aggressiveness; frequently armed bands make raids over the frontiers, carrying with them the munitions and propaganda for the peasants and workers.

Jt is not .easy to find suitable language to describe the liell-on-eartli conditions existing in those border regions; for here it would seem that human hatred and degradation have reached the last limit. There is no humiliation which those neighboring States have not imposed upon one another’s subjects. The prisons arc full; poverty has brought all classes down to an animal existence; and the most atrocious deed no longer inspires horror.

A war between Russia and either of her neighbors, Poland or Rumania, would stimulate Russian patriotism and go a long way towards uniting Russians, regardless of the deep enmity so many of them feel towards the Bolsheviks. That is a danger which Germany apprehends, for once Russia moved westward there would be an instant end to peace, and all pacts of peace. There is one border State which stands out of all these anti-Russian and anti-German arrangements. Lithuania, the onee great nation that repelled the Tartar hordes. Lithuania, despoiled by Poland of the Vilna region, has economic arrangements with her Baltic neighbors, Latvia and Esthonia, but she is hostile to Poland; and, for that reason, she will not form any group openly opposed to Russia. Thus she maintains a curious isolation among the anti-Bolshevik States of Eastern Europe.

Communism of native origin is siernlv repressed, and the Bolsheviks outside wisely abstain from sending their propaganda into the country. They realise that Soviet Russia and Lithuania have at the moment a common cause against Poland. 7n all other countries, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Bolsheviks are waging an incessant propaganda. They do not seek war, hut they strive to create revolution. Poland, they confidently declare, will he the first to fall to the Rod Fk>g. RUSSIA’S WATCH ON THE DNIESTER.

Against Rumania their principal weapon is Bessarabia, the annexation of which by Rumania they have never recognised, as a consequence of which Rumania has in turn refused to recognise them. And on the Dniester adjacent to Bessarabia, they have established the Red Moldavian Republic, and the sentries on both banks kept constant watch in high towers lest guerrilla bands should cross. As far as Bessarabia is concerned, the Bolshevik appeal is mainly to Russian nationalist sentiment; but, however their policy may bo _ shaped at the moment, its purpose is always the same—to stir up trouble and pave the way for revolution’.

Tlie terms of the proposed Security Pact (ns at present disclosed) take not the least account of the perilous situation in (he East. What is to happen if there mas a revolution in Poland, or if Russia was at war with Poland and Rumania? How would France act in that eventuality? Would she insist upon a right of way for her troops through Germany? And what would Germany he expected to do? A pact that ignores these vital Questions guarantees nothing and creates merely the illusion of a, fool's paradise.