MOST DECISIVE SEA FIGHT

Evening Star, Issue 19063, 5 October 1925, Page 12

MOST DECISIVE SEA FIGHT

1 BATTLE OF TSUSHIMA On May 27 last a portion _of tho Japanese navy reproduced in the Straits of Tsushima the evolutions which led to the complete destruction of the Russian Baltic fleet on May 27, 1903. Sea battles decisive in the sense that one contending fleet utterly destroys the other are extremely rare. In the Jutland action losses were heavy’ on both sides, but each fleet withdrew’ with its main forces more or less intact. Nearly half the Franco-Spanish fleet survived Trafalgar, and even at the Nile, wdiero Nelson scored his supremo tactical success, two of the French line of battleships escaped his consuming fury. It is time that annihilation overtook the Spanish force at Santiago in 1898, but that force was only 'a cruiser squadron. At Tsushima, however, a great fleet, complete in all its component parts, was absolutely’ destroyed (writes Mr Hector C. Bywater, in the London ‘Observer’). When Admiral _ Rojestvonsky attempted to fight his w'ay to Vladivostock he had more than fifty vessels of various types under his command. Not a single major ship won through, and all save three of the auxiliary craft were sunk, captured, or driven into neutral ports. Unless we except certain battles of antiquity, the details of which are more than obscure, Tsushima stands unique as the most decisive naval action in history.

The ill-omened voyage of the battle fleet under the command of Admiral Rojestvensky began at Libau on October 15, 1904. Four months later Admiral Niebogatoff left Libau with a reinforcing squadron of older ships to join up with the main body in Chinese waters only a fortnight before the battle. Niebogatoff’s arrival brought tho fleet up to strength of fourteen armored ships, including eight battleships and three belted cruisers. There were besides six protected cruisers, five armed merchantmen, a division of destroyers, arid a herd of transports and fleet auxiliaries. Rojestvensky’s subsequent movements were determined by the exigencies of the coal problem. His goal was Vladivostock, but even with bunkers filled to capacity ho was doubtful whether the fuel would suffice for a detour outside the Japanese islands and thence into the Japan Sea via tho Straits of Tsugaru or La Perouse. In tho end he elected to follow the direct route through tho .Korean Strait. This decision was severely criticised in Russia, where it was held that by taking the indirect course round the Japanese islands the fleet might have avoided Togo and thus reached Vladivostock unmolested. But from what we know of Togo’s own dispositions it is clear that only a mira.de could have saved the Russian fleet from being brought to action. At _ dawn on May 27 the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shiuano Maru caught a glimpse of the approaching armada

through the mist, and at once flashed a wireless warning to Togo. A few’ minutes later his battleships at Masamno and his cruiser squadrons _at Tsushima Island were hastily weighing anchor. Their positions were such as to place them well ahead and right across tho path of _ the Russian fleet. During the intervening hours Togo w r as kept closely informed of the enemy’s position, formation, and course by his scouting cruisers, which steamed just beyond the range of the Russian guns and watched every movement. Togo himself did not sight his prey until 1.45 p.ra. Ten minutes later he made his famous signal: “The salvation or the fall of the Empire depends upon, the result of this engagement; do your utmost, every one of you.” At 2.10, W’hon the fleets were swiftly drawing together on opposite courses, he made a turn of 12 points to port, thus swinging his line athwart the bows of the Russian columns. In tho presence of u more efficient foe this would have been a most dangerous manoeuvre, for it exposed each ship in succession to the concentrated fire of the enemy. But tho Japanese admiral had correctly taken tho measure of his opponent. Tho daring turn was made with impunity, and then the rolling Japanese broadsides smote the leading Russian ships with appalling effect. One after another they sheered out of line, riddled with shell and with fires raging above and below. Some went to the bottom very quickly; others, like the flagship Kniaz Suvaroff, endured this terrible punishment for hours before they foundered.

Nothing could surpass the heroism of the Russian sailors, who fought and died stoically. Darkness brought them no respite, for Togo sent in his torpedo craft to complete the work of destruction, while ho himself steamed on ahead ready to renew tho action at daybreak with such remnants of tho hostile fleet as might still be afloat. But shell and torpedo bad done their work too well. Barely half a dozen of the Russian ships survived tho ordeal of the night, and these surrendered next day when confronted _ with overpowering odds. Three cruisers got as tar as Manila, there to be interned by the American authorities. At dusk on May 29 the small cruiser Almaz crepi into Vladivostock, to be followed later by two destroyers. All tho rest of ifojestvensky’s fleet was at tho bottom of the sea or in ‘Japanese bands. In this amazing battle there perished 4,830 Russians and 110 Japanese, a proportion of 44 to 1. Apart from its other consequences, the victory gave Japan that command of the Western Pacific which she has ever since bold and which is hardly likely to be challenged in our time.