EMPIRE DEFENCE

Evening Star, Issue 18333, 21 July 1923, Page 4

EMPIRE DEFENCE

THE SINGAPORE BASE. DEBATE IN THE COMMONS. GOVERNMENT CARRIES THE DA?. Press Association—By Telegraph— I Copyright. LONDON, July 19. In the House of Commons, in Committee of Supply on the Naval Estimates, Mr G. Lambert (L.) moved to reduce the vote as a protest against the construction of . the Singapore base. Mr Lambert complained that the proposal did not mention the Washington Conference. The very basis of such a treaty must be confidence and goodwill. Concealment in these matters was inconsistent with the best traditions of British statesmanship. If we proceeded witli the base we should bo taking the lead in a new armaments race. The base was only necessary in contemplation of a war with Japan, and if this were contemplated, why did we sign the Washington Treaty ? It was inconceivable that the British Grand Fleet could be sent 1,000 miles to Singapore to destroy the Japanese fleet. The whole thing was “ a piece of woolly thinking.” Commander Burney (C.) s.aid that the Singapore base was not a violation of the spirit or the letter of the Washington Treaty. Ho believed that a combination of the airship and aeroplane would eventually eliminate the floating battleship. However, Singapore was vital for the defence of Australia and Britain’s Eastern trade. The oppositionists were gambling with the fate of the Empire. Major T. W. Hay (C.) said that it would require 2,000 artillerymen and 2,000 infantry to protect Singapore on the land side.

Colonel J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon (C.) declared that the Singapore scheme concerned the Empire more than England. He suggested that they should not commit the country before the question was considered. If there was a danger of war with Japan a generation hence, then Singapore would bo the most important strategical point in the world, but the proposed policy would lead to an expenditure of £50,000,000. Was the country prepared to face that? Sir E. G. Banbury (C.) said that so long ns human nature was as it was there would be wars and rumors of war. The ordy security was preparedness. Rear-admiral Sir G. Gaunt (C.), in a breezy sailor-like way, swept aside tho objections, saying: “You must keep in touch with tho extremities of your Empire, and for goodness’ sake bo prepared for war. If you want to run an Empira you must have a base somewhere, and there is no place better than Singapore." Viscount Curzon (C.) combated a suggestion that Singapore was a threat to Japan, which was six and a-half days’ steam away. The distances in tho Pacific were terrific. Both in Australia and New Zealand the Singapore base was ardently desired. “Surely," continued Lord Curzon, “when Australia appeals for help this country will not say to her: ‘We are very sorry. You are in danger, we know, but we cannot come to your assistance.’ ”

Mr C. W. Darbisbire (L.) objected to the policy because it was aggressive, and would make war inevitable in the future.

Sir A. Shirley Bcnn (C.) said that the Japanese had far more sense than to think that a naval base 3,000 miles from their shores was part of a preparation to attack them.

Mr C. Bellairs (C.) said that successive Committees on Imperial Defence had been convinced that Singapore was a vital necessity. Without it we might have to abandon the whole Empire, as well as our interests in the Far East.

Lady Astor (C.) said she hoped that even now the Admiralty could agree to postpone the, final Singapore decision until the Imperial Conference. If the conference agreed there could not be a voice raised against the proposal. Mr W. Wedgwood Benn (L.) said that Britain was tho most heavily taxed of all the signatories to the Washington Treaty, and she was the first to embark on an expenditure which was an infringement of the spirit of that treaty. Mr Amery (First Lord of the Admiralty),, in replying, repudiated the charge that the Singapore base would bo a violation of the Washington Treaty. Great Britain bad led the world in the fulfilment of the treaty. It was perfectly clear that Singapore was outside the zone of non-action. The Japanese, before and since tho conference, iiad been engaged on a policy of dockyard and naval base extension on wl deb they were spending large sums. They had said nothing about it at the conference. In the present year Japan was spending £2,000,000 on naval bases. America, on the east side, was strengthening her fortifications These operations had no offensive object. As a matter of fact, it was their object to establish zones of neutrality in the Pacific, and to separate tho nations by such disances that they could not act offensively against each oilier. Tho only reason why the Government had considered this base was because the capital ship to-day was very different from that of pre-war days. It was difficult to protect such craft from tho attacks of submarines, and therefore it was necessary to have in Pacific waters graving docks large enough to hold these ships. “If we had had any aggressive designs against tho Japanese,'’ continued Mr Amery, “ wo should never have proposed a scheme under which we would be deprived of the use of Hongkong, whore we already have a base. Tho distance from Yokohama to Singapore is the same as from Gibraltar to New York. If we were to put an additional dock at Gibraltar could it be said that we had menacing designs on America ? We cannot expect the dominions to help to defend the Empire unless we are able to help them. There is no reason why tho estimated cost of £10,500,000 should bo exceeded,”

Tho motion was rejected by 217 voter to 130.—A. and N.Z. Cable.