MURDER AND INSANITY

Evening Star, Issue 18050, 18 August 1922, Page 6

MURDER AND INSANITY

CRUDE INTERPRETATION. DR LEVINGUS VIEWS. A SECOND JURY. The case of Roland True, in England, to which there have been references m the cablo news recently, has several as^° ts which approximate closely to the Now Zealand case of Reginald Matthews. In both cases the accused were found guilty of ™. ur " der, and the extreme penalty of the law hag nob b&on 'given effect to as ine result or pleas of insanity having been successfully raised. In England the True case has led to tho appointment of a committee to investigate the procedure at criminal trials in which insanity is pleaded; a recent cable message announced that Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, had been appointed to this committee. The question is a highly important one, and, knowing that Ur it. CL Levinge, M. 8., for many years medical superintendent of the Sunnystde Menial Hospital, as much interested in it, a representative of tho Christchurch ‘ Tress sought and was granted an interview, in which Ur Levinge amplified opinions and views previously expressed by him on the subject, “I feel,” lie said, “that it would be better if the insanity plea were not allowed until tho verdict of guilty, _ one way or another, was given by jury; if it were afterwards advanced in mitigation of punishment, menial specialists should bo appointed by the judge, or by the Grown, as in England, to report to a special jury on the menial condition of the accused, and that jury should decide, on the evidence of the mental experts, without any cross-examination by counsel, whether the life of the accused should bo forfeited. At present this decision is left to the Crown, or Cabinet—l suppose really to tho Minister of Justico in N"w Zealand or the Homo Secretary in En''land. But I think it would bo less open to objection (outside influence, for instance, a 6 I understand, is alleged, and is the cause of the recent agitation in England on the subject) if (he decision were made by a jury of his peel's composed of common-sense men of the world. I submit that such a jury would bo the right authority to determine the question of tho man’s life or death. I don’t think medical expert witnesses so -appointed, without any temptation to lean to one side or tho other (as is likely to be the oaso when appointed for tho Crown or tho prisoner) should bo subject to legal crossexamination for tl>9 purpose of disttfcditnig their evidence by confusing them or casting doubt on their bona fides. ■ Such witnesses being tho most experienced and recognised authorities available and absolutely independent, should bo protected from such indignity.” , , ~ in reply to tho question as to his reason for advocating a second jury, Dr Levinge paid: “The first jury having already given a verdict of guilty might he to some extent prejudiced or biased, and mentally influenced, however unintentionally, against tho prisoner, and therefore it would be safe 'to bring an absolutely fresh and open mind, without, any preconceived ideas, to bear on the subject and decide the fate of the accused.” , “All our ideas ou the punishment of crime,” Dr Levinge said in concluding, “have completely changed since the legal dictum in respect of tho plea of insanity was laid down in tho M’Naughton case eighty years ago; and the conception of insanity Laving no less completely altered in that "interval, there is no justification for maintaining that exceedingly crude, unscientific, and out-of-date interpretation of tho law, except ns a test. I have often wondered why tho decision of a particular judge should bo used as a precedent for all time as the correct interpretation of the law, and yet how often do we see such precedents referred to as justification for judgments of the court. /The question of tho knowledge between right and wrong—tho knowledge (hat killing a man was wrong, an offence against the law and punishable bv death as a test of insanity—(on which the dictum laid down in the ITNaughten ca-,0 waa largely founded)—has always been disputed and rejected by mental exports, and, indeed, by the whole medical profession, _ as an insufficiently comprehensive foundation on which to base a scientific opinion of sanity or insanity: and very strong and protracted controversy between tho two professions has arisen over it.

“Present-day feeling would eeera to indicate that every case should bo judged on its merits, for we eo frequently find juries bringing in verdicts of guilty qualified by strong ’recommendations to mercy, or even verdicts of acquittal obviously formed on their view of justifiable homicide. But while I would like to see the basis of decision referred to above considerably widened, I would like also to soo it clearly laid down a.s duo to society that a person once found guilty of murder, but reprieved on the ground of insanity and committed to a mental hospital, should never under any circum-ttunre-s be released again; for the mental state which allows a man to commit murder (unless perhaps in a few cnees of very impulsive acts) implies such an unstable and diseased condition of brain, from which reoobery lo normal sanity is hopeless (and I go even so far m to say impossible), that the knowledge between right and wrong is an insufficient basts on which to found opinion of legal responsibility, and must, I rhink, be apparent to anyone who reflects that a very considerable proportion of the inmates of our mental hospitals know well that. certain acts are wrong and may lead them to punishment (or corrective treatmen:. as it is scientifically. styled) in one form or another, such as deprivation of certain privileges and pleasures, yet are not restrained thereby. It is on tins accepted view that -a great, deal of the moral or disciplinary treatment of these institutions has niways been based, and yet who would hold that an inmate of a mental hospital who lulled a fellow-patient should bo punished by death for his act? It is therefore, I submit, high time- the legal dictum referred to above was reviewed and made more in accord with the advancement of science and present-day knowledge of mental disease, it is to bo hoped that the committee, which includes such a high legal luminary as the present Loul Chancellor, sot up in England to investigate the subject, will be able to evolve a more comprehensive and up-to-date dictum which can be accepted bene and become ib e governing factor in deciding the degree, or nature, of the mental disease, justifying .acquittal on the ground of insanity.” '