DRAMA OF LE CATEAU

Evening Star, Issue 17155, 23 September 1919, Page 2

DRAMA OF LE CATEAU

NEARLY ANOTHER SEDAN

WHEN" THE ALLIES WERE FORCED TO RETREAT.

The gallant Field-marshal's nawative, which appears in the ' Daily Telegraph, having-' sketched in vivid terms the preparations for the first trial of etrerigth in the world war, comes to August 21, when in high spirit* he lay down to rest, liia superb ltttlo force sharing the high hopes oi the commander, who had so sedulously trained for the hour which had now "come. At tha very ouUot an important change in tie High (fommand ■was rendered necessary' by the hand of death. Tho Ist Corps was commanded ty Sir Douglas Halg, the second by General Grierson,, who died quite suddenly near Amiens.

Instantly Lord French wired, to Lord Kitchener to appoint General Plumer to liha vacant command. «He followed it with a letter, in which he wrote t

.... I was much .shocked to hear of Grierson'e sndden death near Amiena when Ilirrived here. I had already wired fluking you to appoint Fhu&ei'' m his place when your wire reached me, and also thsA of fan Hamilton, forwarded —*s I understftnd —b*y you. I veiT nruoh hope you will i»nrt rae Plumer 5 "Hamilton is too senior to command an army corps, and is elready engaged in an important crnimsnd at home. Please- do «s 1 ask you

In this matter. Lord Kitchener eventually gave the pot-t lo General Smith-Dorrien.

On August 21 the Ist Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Hate, was itv cantonments to the north of Maubeuge, between that .place mid Liivry. The 2nd Corps, under Sir Hot-act- Smith-Dorrieu, was to the north-west of Miiubeuge, between that place and Sars-le-Bruyere." The 19* Infantry Brigade was concent-rating at Valenciennes. Turning to our Ally, the 6th and 7th French Reserve Divwion.were entrenching themselves on a Hue running from Dunkirk, through L'ambrai and La Capelle. to Hirann. The sth French Army was on our right, the 18th French Corp* being in imniediate touch with the British Army. Three divisions ot French cavalry, under General Sordet. Vhich had been 'operating in support of the Belgians, were falling back behind tho. 18th Corps for rest and refit. The 3rd and 4th French Armies, comprising SA corps, three cavahy divisions, and some reserve divisions, were between Alezieres and Longwy. Th-? French troops further south had taken the offensive and marched into Alsace. Liege still held out. Numur was intact. The Belgians seemed secure behind the fortification* of Antwerp. In the early hour* of Saturday, the 22nd. the British Commander-in-Chief left Headquarters without misgiving.-, hut s<u>n found himself in the midst (if the troops of the sth French Army, already in retreat. The sth had b?-n "roughly liandled." and so began the first stagein the rugeed that only ended a few months ago. General Lanrezac

ASKED LORD FRENCH TO ATTACK. and thus afford him relief. The British commander replied that he whs ready to fulfil tho role assigned to him when "the Fifth Army advanced to the attack.'' There was,"however, now no question of au advance. On the contrary, a lonic, arduous, and dangerous retreat began, with our men standing at, intervals at bay, and fighting like lions to stem the pressure of the. oncoming German hordes. At this time Sir Archibald Murray was Chief of Staff. Lord French, describing the strain of events at his headquarters at Le Gateau, writes :

In a close room on the upper floor of the Maine I found Murray,"my Chief of Staff, working hard, minus belt, coat. and collar. The heat was intense. The room was filled with Staff officers bringing reports or awaiting instructions. Sc*ne of the Headquarters Staff had not closed their eyes for 48 hours and were •tretched on* on forms or huddled up in corners, wrapped in that deep slumber which only comes to brains which, for the time being, are completely worn out. It make* my Wood boil to hear and to read of tho calumnies which are

often heaped upon the head of the uu-fort-nnate " Staff."

I determined at daybreak on the 26th to direct the march on St. Quentin ami Noyon. The troops were to he held so concentrated ae to enable me to take immediate advantage of any change in the "situation which might check the retreat and offer favorable opportunities for taking the offensive. At 6 p.m. all the troops of the 2nd Corps were on the La Cateau lino except M'Cracken's brigade, which had been obliged to stand and fight at Solesmes. The lst-Coip!. however, was, delayed in starting for several hours, and wan only able to reach the neighborhood of Landrrcies: so that at tho conclusion of the day's march a somewhat dangerous gap existed between the Ist and 2nd Corps, which caused me considerable anxiety. Sir Douglas. Ha ; g, although his troops were very tired, and handicapped also by heavy rearguard fighting still proceeded to carry out the instructions he had received, and the retirement of the Ist Corps was continued in excellent order and with complete efficiency. Things did NOT {3O ON SO WELL WITH THE 2nd

CORPS. General Allenby. who had been most ably covering the retreat of the Army with his cavalry, had already materially assisted the rearguard of the 3r,d Division to surmount their difficulties at Solesmes. M'Cracken's Brigade (3rd Batt. Worcester Regiment, 2nd Batt. S. Lanes. Regt., Ist Batt. Wilts. Regt., and 2nd Batt. R. Irish Rifles) did not reach the Lo Cateau position until 10 or 11 p.m. on the 25th. His ns*n were, of course, nearly done up, and he had suffered severe losses. Colonel Ansell, Commanding the sth Dragoon Guards, one of the finest cavalry leaders in the Army, who fell at the head of bis regiment a few days later, gave information to General Allenby at about 2 a.m. regarding the nature or' the. German advance. This seemed of such great importance that the latter at once sought out Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien and warned him that, unless he was prepared to continue his march at daybreaK. he would most probably be pinned down to his position, and would be unable to Ret away. Sir Horace asked General Allenby what, in his opinion, were the chances he had if he remained and held the position, addi'iii that he felt- convinced hi 3 troops were so exhausted as to preclude the possibility of removing- them for some hours to come, Allenbv's reply was that he thought, unless the Commander of the 2nd,' Corns made up his mind to move at daybreak, the enemy probably would succeed in surrounding him. Nevertheless. Sir Horace determined to fight. As to this decision, a commander on the spot, and in close touch with his division and brigades, is in the best position to judge of what his men oan do. I had, late on the evening of the 25th, before leaving for my headquarters at St Quentiu, visited several units of the 2nd Corps in their bivouacs, •and; though tired, indeed, they had not struck me a* being worn-out troops. By the break of day on the 26th the sth Division on the rigfit had secured several hours' rest. The same may be said of the Bth and 9th, Brigades, which came next in the line. The 7th Brigade had only just arrived at cantonments at 10 p.m. or 11 p.m. on the 25th after a_ heavy day's march and some severe fighting, but they could in such an emergency have marched at dawn. The 4th Division, on the left of th» 2nd Corps, was comparatively fresh. I visited in particular one artillery brigade, some of whose guns had been saved from capture on the previous day by the cavalrv. The Brigade Commander

BROKE DOWN WITH EMOTION as he recounted to me the jrlorious bravery displaced by Francis Grenfell and the 9th Lancers. This brigade fought magnificently for several hours next day on the Le Cateau rjosition. The Ist Corps had experienced a much harder day's march on the 25tli, and was attacked at Landrecies and Hs neighborhood before it conld get anv rest at all. Sir Douglas correctly «-p----predated tho str«nstt'u of the enemy on his Immediate ..front, and *g * ujjed, the.. situut iou

—namely, the German design to impose an ns the idea that he was in great strength, amd to pin onr troops to the ground whilst his flanking movement became effective. For tlr.9 ■ purpose tho enemy 'had hurried forward a large force of artillery, composed of guns and howitzers of all calibres, escorted and •protected by four cavalry divisions and a limited number of Jaaer battalions. These tn'oops were Eushed forward against the 2nd Corps at e Gateau, as they had been against the Ist Corps at Landrecieis, and with a precisely similar purpose. The superb gsltentry of the troops .and the sfcOful tending by divisional and brigade and battalion commanders, helped very materially by t&8 support given by AUeitby and, ste I afterwards teamed, by Sovdet and dTAxnade, saved the 2nd Corps, which otnaraise would assuredly haw ocsfl pinned to ttheiv ground and then ««■- rounded. The oav.»lry might have made good, their retreat j bat thre3 out of five divisions ol the British Array, vriba tho 7th Brigadfe, must have been k#tf. The ewmv, flushed by this primary Victor?, would have presßsai in on the flan&fl of the' Ist Corps, cut off their retreat, and, continuing his combined feoni and flank attack, would have davost ceTtomly puffied the whole ftlMed amy ofl their jjw of retwet and ft stupendous repetition at fceoan mighi weE have resulted. The magnificat fight put up by these gionons troops saved disaster ? bv* tta actttal result was « total loss of' at head 14.000 officers «wl men, about oO guns, numbers of machine guns, as well aa quantities of ammunition, war 'material, and baggage, whilst Ihe enernv gained time to olose up hra infan-c:y columns marching down from fcbe norUeast, at the cost of loisea not greater than (if »3 great) as ow own. but which wen, in view of the immense superiority i;u possessed in numbers and fighting power, infinitely less important to hrm.

THE EFPEOT UPON" THE BRITISH ARMt

was to render tho subsequent coxMruct- of ■the retreat more diffkufe and arduous. The hope of making "stand behind the Soinme or the Oise, or any other favorable pc-sition north, of the itarna, had now to be abandoned, owing to the shattered condition of the Army; and the far-reach-in"- effect of our bases at the battle of Le Gateau was felt seriously even throughout the subsequent battle of the during the early operations on the Aisne. It was not possible to replace our lost guns and machine guns until nearly_ the end of September.' 1 In my despatch, written in September, 1914, I refer eulogistically to the battle of Le Gateau. I had been, together with my Staff, directing the movements of the British Army day and night x»p to the lime of the battle o'Khe Mame, in the course of which battle I received.-m urireiit demand from the Government ■ that 0. <k?patch should be forwarded. It was. completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before there had been time or opportunity to give thorough study to the re-" ports* immediately preceding and coveting the period of that battle,, by which alone the full details could be disclosed. It was, indeed, impossible-, until much later on, to appreciate in all it*s details lite actual situation 011 the morning of August 26. At the time the despatch was written, indeed, I was entirely ignorant of the material support which was rendered ■throughout, the day by Generals Sordet and d'Amade, and I accepted without question the estimate made by the oommamter lof the 2nd Corps aa to the nature the I threat against him and the position of the German forces opposed to him.

In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mans it is alleged that some tacit content at Jeaet was given at headquarters at St. Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of the 2nd Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my Staff to say that there is not a. semblance of truth in this statement. A MOMENTOUS DECISION.

A decision of Lord French, which was a turning-point in the campaign, roust be noted in reference to the fortress Maubeuge. Would he cling to tlte fortress or give it up? \"vt; know now that to have held on would have meant ruin. The fortress of Maubeugc was we 1 ! fortified and provisioned. "It is impossible for anyone who has not been situated as I was to realise the terrible temptation which such a place offers to an army seeking shelter against overpowering oocls. For a short time I debated within myself whether or not I should yieid to this temptation j but I did not hesitate !long, because there were two considerations which forced themselves prominently upon my mind. ' Inthefiist place, I had an instinctive feeling that this was exactly what the enemy was trving to make me do; and. in the second place, I had the t-x----anvple of Bazaine and Metz in 1870 present iu my mind, aaid the words of Sir Edward Hamley's able comment upon the decision of the French marshal came upon me with overwhelming force. Bamley described it as '* the anxiety of the temporising mind whioh prefers postponement of a crisis to vigorous enterprise.' Of Bazaine he says: ' In clinging to Metz he acted like "one who. when the ship is foundering, should lay hold of the anchor.' I therefore abandoned all such ideas, and issued orders directing the retreat some miles farther back."