THE CUP

Evening Star, Issue 16675, 6 March 1918, Page 6

THE CUP

RUSSIA'S BITTER DRAUGHT. DIPLOMATIC DRIVELLING. WHAT JAPA]N T SHOULD DO. OTHER ITEMS. [By Criticus.] The cup of Russia's humiliation is now about full, and ihe net result of the policy of no annexations and no indemnities and turning the other cheek to the smiter may be briefly summed up. Russia, abandons all territory west of a line formed by the river Narva, only 80 miles west of Petrograd and Lakes Peipus and Pskov. Thence the new frontier lino is to run south-west by Lake Luban towards the town of Livenhof, on the Dwina, about one-third of tho distance iron Jauobstadt to Dvinsk. Where the frontier line is to run south of this is not yet made clear, ■but it will probably follow the- Dwina. to Dvinsk, and may thence run via Vilna to Brost-Litovsk, or ©von to Pinsk. Smith of the Pripet the whole country becomes independent under the nanio of Ukrainia. Finland is to be independent; Poland is to go; and in the Caucasus tho fruits of a century of war and work are to be given up to Turkey, the latter country apparently gaining all the territory as far as tbe Caucasian Mountains. Russia, by tho terms of the treaty, is to lose the greater part of her most valuable territory in Europe, and be reduced to the status; of a third-rate Power. What the indemnity is to be is not stated up to th. moment of writing. For her present, unparalleled humiliation Russia is entitled to draw whatever consolation is to he found in the fact that by a course of dastardlinesfi and folly scarcely excelled in all the annals of history she has thoroughly deserved it. On the other hand, the present treaty can only be looked upon as a-merely provisional agreement, which will be completely overhauled at the final settlement, but Germany has a vague hope of including V.sfchoma, Livonia., and at least a part of Poland in the German Empire, probably as self-governing States, on the same footing as tho other German States. Failing that, she hopes to use them as valuable cards to play against concessions in other directions; while, by establishing tho independence of Finland and the" Ukraine she hopes so to reduce the power of Russia. as to remove all chance of danger from her in the future, and thus secure an overwhelming predominance on the Continent. A CHANCE FOR. STATESMANSHIP. This is Russia's funeral, and there is nothing in the peace terms for the rest of the Allies to weep for. Indeed, there are great hope and consolation to he drawn from the fact that they arc such as no self-respect-ing nation can possiblv lie. down under. and if proper advantage is taken of the ■situation Russia will rise again a much wiser nation. A Petrograd message declares that the peace treaty is looked upon as merely a scrap of paper, and if one gleam of spirit is left "to the Russian people, they can only look upon it as a humiliating necessity forced upon them by the circumstances of the moment and to be torn up at the first opportunity. It is for the Allies to see that the uppor. trinity is forthcoming, but the comment, that has been rallied thus far can only be described as absolute drivel. Japan is actually being told that even if she* occupies Siberia she will not thereby establish any territorial claims after the war. Are we to infer that the men of senilis who produce this sort of stuff arc" absolute! v bnnd to the great -hirigs Janan can do for the Allies on the east front, and what a splendid opportunity to secure her assistance now opens before us? Or is it that the.v expect Japan to send a million men to Europe, spend hundreds and perhaps thousands_ of millions of Bounds in dragging Russia out of a bog" into which she has fallen through her own insane foil v. and get nothing in return except more or less cordial thanks? The Japanese are apoor but very practical people, with a keen eye to the main chance. Thev are by no means a nation of altruists, and for what they do they will expect adequate compensation. That is perfectly just, and it is entirely to the interest of Russia and the Allies to see that they get it. If they are not promised suitable compensation they are likely either to abandon tho whole business or else take the bit betwee.i their teeth. The complications which raav result from the latter course are indicated by German comment, which hints that "Germany will only help Russia against Japan if asked to. do so, "and then only on her own terms." Wore the authorities at Petrograd a few degrees less insane than the Bolsheviks, the notion of their looking upon Japan as an enemy and Germany as an ally- under present circumstances would be laughable, but we know from bitter experience what the Bolsheviks are capable of. They are quite capable of treating the Japanese as enemies who are bent upon the conquest of Siberia, and of making common cause with the Germans, unless the whole situation is handled with the utmost intellectual lucidity. If the Allies possessed a diplomatist of Bismarck's character, he would go straight to the point and offer to mediate between Russia and Japan, the latter to receive a well-defined slice of Eastern Siberia, perhaps Manchuria, in return for rescuing Russia from the clutches of Germany. The skill of his diplomacy would consist, not in ambiguous philandering _ mistaken for diplomatic subtlety, which is tho universal weakness of second-raters, but in the lucidity of his exposition and the vividness with which he would portray the advantages of such a bargain to the Bolsheviks. He would have the advantage that, to anyone retaining soin.o trace or sanity, there can he no comparison for Russia between being re duced to a third-rate Power in Europe and ceding a substantial slice of territory at the other side of Asia. PATIENCE AND SHUFFLE THE CARDS. Some interesting comment is provided by the German Press. ' Vorwarts' sagely remarks : " Russia ends the war unreconciled, and her policy of patriotic 'revanche.' once, it gets a lead, will find an easy-game to play." It is for the Allies to give the lead, and upon their action will depend whether Russia has really ended the war, so far as her own part is concerned. Other papers state that Germany will rot fight in Siberia, which is obvious enough, because she is in no position to do so ; but they draw consolation from the fact- that it will be months before Japan is in a position to take effective action. This, again, is true, but we can afford to take long views in this matter, because In tho normal course of events it will be 12 months from to-day before America is ready to take really' effective action on the west- front. If Japan is ready for effective action' in the east bv the time that the Allies are ready for combined action in the west, that will suit us quite well, and Japan, unlike, America, has not to create an army before she can act. But the Germans aro only about 100 miles from Petrograd, whereas the Japanese are 4,000 miles away. No open understanding with Japan is'possible for Russia under present circumstances, for it would bring tbe enemy down upon Petrograd and Moscow. Private negotiations, however, are still possible, and Japan, with the assent of the Allies, should proceed to occupy Siberia right up to the Ural Mountains. She should mass a- powerful army there, and she would then stand in force upon the eastern frontier of Russia proper, ready to march swiftly upon Petrograd and Moscow. She would thus be in a position to negotiate to advantage. The peace treaty insists upon the immediate demobilisation of the Russian army, but the very helplessness of Russia will play into the hands of Japan if' Skilful diplomatic advantage be taken of it. The Bolsheviks should be told in lucid language that Japan is ready to dig Russia out of the pit without any unnecessary interference in her internal affairs, in return for compensation in Eastern Siberia. They should also be told that if thev fail to come to terms Japan will negotiate with

time, she should get into close touch with Akxieff, Kcrnilofl', and the Cossacks, with the Ukraine, and also, privately, with Rumania. After all. the Ukrainians are still Russians yrho were driven into the -arms of the enemy by the Bolsheviks; while if Rumania is forced to accept peace now she will probably onlv bide her time Posted along the'Ural'Mountains, Japan won.d be able to throw troops quickly forward f ()1 . the defence of Petrograd and Moscow once an agreement with Russia was arrived at. "THE AALAND ISLANDS AND FINLAND. We heard the other day that the Swedes had occupied the Aaland Islands, but now it appears that the Germans have seized '™- As they cover the entrance to the «ulf of Bothnia, it is rather surprising that Germany should have delayed occupying them for so long. Considerable resentment i a expressed in Sweden, where the islF.nds were strongly coveted. It is not improbable that their seizure by the Germans is a preliminary to a descent upon 1< inland. There are reports of a German squadron manoeuvring off the Gulf of Finlard, and Germany may contemplat-e-send-mg troops to Finland for the rmrpose of restoring order, organising the ""Finns for defensive purposes, and establishing a footing there which may be useful later. JAPAN AND THE. WEST FRONT. Raids, counter-raids, and local offensives r.re the crdc-i- of the dav all along the west front; but the official French warnnig against taking it for granted that tliesactivities aro the prelude to a great German offensive reveals that the leadin" authorities anions the Allies aro as un" certain about the German plans .is ourthere is going to be a bio; German offensive in the west. But it is worth noting tlv.t if Japan takes action in the cast the Germans will have t-o face the question of whether it will not be necessary to force an issue in the west beforo the former is readv for action, in order that thev raav then be prepared to deal with her. ' Did' Germany stand a reasonable chance of decisive suecess in the west, that might be a. gamble worth tryintr: hut as she has little hope or any result from a western offensive, Da vend the exhaustion of her reserves she will probably be better advised to economise them and prepare for future action in the east.