LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS.

Evening Star, Issue 16664, 21 February 1918, Page 6

LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS.

I MIIED CO-ORDINATION IMPERATIVE. SCHEME UNANIMOUSLY . ADOPTED. SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON ©PPOSESJ IT, AND THEREFORE RESIGNED.' Press Association —By Telegraph—Copyright. Australian and N.Z. Cabks Association.

LONDON, February 19. (Received February 21, at 8.45 a.m.) Mr Lloyd George, speaking in the House f. Commons on the recent army changes, Jaid that the retention of Sir William Robertson as Chief of the Imperial General Staff had latterly been incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that the Allies had suffered in the past through lack of concerted, co-ordinated efforts. Reuter's Telegrams. LONDON, February 20. (Received February 21, at 9.20 a.m.) Mr Lloyd George said he regretted that Sir William Robertson's position was no longer compatible with the policy decided ] upon at the Allied Council at Versailles, but if that policy was right no personalities, however valuable, important, or distinguished, should stand in the way of its execution, (Cheers.) If that policy was wrong, no personalities and no Governments ought to stand in the way of its being instantly defeated. DEFECTS OF THE PAST. The Prime Minister emphasised that there was absolutely no difference between our policy and the policy of France, Italy, and the United States in this respect. That policy was based on the assumption that the Allies had hitherto suffered j through lack of co-ordinated effort, and our purpose and policy had been to get con- | centration and unity of effort. It was only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly j the same set of circumstances, inevitably, diminishing our power of concentration which would otherwise have been possible. In order to counteract the efforts of the ! Germans and of the Russian collapse it ■was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority to exercise discretion over the allied war policy; that that authority must be interallied, and must have executive power. The only difference of opinion was over how that authority sfepuldbe constituted, but agreement on this point had also been reached. UNWORKABLE SCHEMES. The Prime Minister then proceeded to mention several proposals which were con-! sidered and rejected at Versailles. One was that the central authority should be composed of the chiefs of staff, but this idea was unworkable. It was felt that the new body must not only know the conditions of its own armies and its own fronts, 'but all the conditions on all the fronts and in all the armies. Versailles was now the repository of such information, which was co-ordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information. The Prime Minister proceeded to adduce cogent reasons Why the chiefs of staffs in the various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at. The Supreme Council, for these reasons, had unanimously rejected this proposal. ' AMERICAN SCHEME ADOPTED. The delegations then separated and considered the matter independently, with the most remarkable result that next morning tach delegation submitted exactly the lame proposal—namely, the proposal which now held the field. He would have liked to have read to the House the document wherein the American delegation cogently put the case for the proposal which was finally carried; but he could not, because it was mixed up with the plan of operations. The Americans presented their case with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours of discussion, in which there was not a single dissentient so far as the plan was concerned. HAIG'S SUGGESTIONS. " Sir Douglas Haig," continued the Prime Minister, " called attention to a "weak point or two, and we undertook to remedy them; but these were not points . affecting the root proposal." Upon returning here he reported to Cabinet that he thought the plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently the Army Council made certain criticisms from the constitutional viewpoint. The Prime Minister said he considered these carefully with Lord Derby, who throughout had put Sir William Robertson's case before Cabinet. The Prime Minister emphasised his anxietly that these arrangements should receive the whole-hearted support of all British and French military authorities, and especially that Sir D. Haig should be satisfied. Therefore, before the agreements were made, he had talked the matter over with Sir D. Haig, who said ho would work under the new arrangement. THE SCHEME OUTLINED. This arrangement was that the British permanent military adviser on the Council of Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should constantly communicate with the Chief of Staff, and should be absolutely free in the advice he gave. The Chief of Staff would have the same powers as his prede- ] cessorg and as Sir William Robertson, and would remain the supreme military adviser to the British Government. He would accompany Ministers to the meet- ' ings of the Supreme War Council as their adviser, and would have the right to visit France and consult with the military re- : presentatives there. Our representative at Versailles must have the most perfect'freedom to discuss and recommend plans. If the Commander-in-Chief did not approve . of.'them,-or if there was a difference of opinion among the various representatives, then the Government would decide. There " was no derogation of authority by the Government. The Chief of Staff would be 1 chief adviser to the Government in the event of any such difference of opinion. ROBERTSON OBJECTS. It was only after the Government had decided to offer Sir William Robertson the position of British representative at Versailles that the Prime Minister realised that Sir William Robertson objected on military grounds to the system which the Versailles Council had decided unanimously to adopt. Sir William Robertson suggested that our representative at Versailles should be made a deputy of the Chief of Staff; but the Government rejected this suggestion because .the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make the British representative inferior to the other members of the Versailles Council. A Voice ; " What about General Foch?" The Prime Minister pointed out that General Foch was within 25 minutes of • Versailles, and could be consulted in the

ter reiterated that the Government most deeply regretted that they had been obliged to proceed without Sir William Robertson., It was a choice between carrying out the unanimous policy formulated by the military advisers of the Allies and of retaining the services of a most distinguished and very valued public servant. He (Sir William ".Robertson) was paid the fullest consideration, but, in view of the magnitude of the policy, the Government were bound to stand bv the arrangement with our Allies. GERMANY'S NEW CONFIDENCE. . (Received February 21, at 10.45 a.m.) Mr Lloyd George dwelt on the natural difficulties in securing military unity of the Allien, some thought the new arrangement would' secure ipolitical unity, but the prime need was unity of the armies. The Government proposed to invite suggestions from the lushest military authorities as regards the best means of removing the anxiety felt lest the new scheme should impair the efficiency of our army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the new scheme. National feeling, liistorieal tradition, and suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also difficulties due to professional conservatism. He pleaded for mutual trust and confidence, which were the very soul of victory. Mr Lloyd George further said: "Wo discussed and rediscussed this plan, in order that our whole concentrated strength, should be mobilised to resist and Tweak the most terrible foe that civilisation was ever confronted with. We are faced with terrible realities. The enemy have rejected our most moderate terms, which the whole of civilisation accepted as reasonable. Whyhave the enemy rejected them? Because they are clearly convinced that the Russian collapse will givo them power to achieve a military victory and impose Prussianism forcibly on Europe." CLOSE UP TOE RANKS. The Premier begged the House to turn down all controversy and close their ranks. (Loud cheers.) If the House disapproved of the Versailles policy, let members put in a Government who would refuse to accept that policy—but it must be another Government. (Cheers.) The Governmentwere entitled to know, and to know that very night, -whether the House and the nation wished to proceed with a policy deliberately settled with a view of organising our forces. W r e must advance on the foe! In conclusion, he said: "I have endeavored to discharge th» terrible functions of my position to the utmost capacity of my strength. (Cheers.) If the House torn gnt repudiate that policy, for which I am responsible, and on which I Relieve the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but one regret—that I have not had greater strength, and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest hour of her history." (Loud and prolonged cheers.)