THE INFANTRYMAN'S MAIN ARM

Evening Star, Issue 16560, 20 October 1917, Page 8

THE INFANTRYMAN'S MAIN ARM

RIFLB FIRE IN WAB, The multiplication of weapons of offence such as bombs., rifle grenades, trench uiortaiw' machine guns, gas, and liquid fire, and tho increased use of artillery fire during the actual assault on trenches have tended to obscure the value of the rifle as the infantry soldier's main arm (wrote a correspondent to 'The Times' on August 8). It is sometimes spoken of by those not acquainted with conditions at the front as if it were merely a haudle for the bayonet and as if, as a firearm, it were comparatively useless, except for snipers and specially selected shots. This is by no means the case, and it would be verv unfortunate if such nn impression got abroad. Only yesterday the special correspondent of 'The limes* Fjpokc of the pre-emineut importance of rifle fire in recent fighting, and of tho soundness "beyond everything else" of musketry as a tradition of the British Army. In the early stages flf the war, when "the O-ermans had ah immense superiority over us in artillery, the rifle fire of the British infantryman, more than any other emMo cause, saved the British Expeditionary Force from annihilation. Outnumbered as it was 111 iJ , Carlj " en Sagements of the war. it would have been overwhelmed and almost wiped out had it not been for the infantrymans wonderful shooting. At Mons, La Oateau, and elsewhere the Germans ventured to approach our trenches in massed iormahon. They reckoned, it is said on losing most of their first line from our rapid fire, and possibly the second, ,but with the third they expected to come in. But they liad not reckoned with the British soldier's 15 rounds a minute." In consequence, when the Germans came up in their compact masses the British soldiers found them such an easy target as they had never experienced on the range. With no perceptible pause for reloading their magazines, as an observer noted, the pitiless fire went on from the men lining the trenches, until finally the thick masses broke and withered awav. And so it was in all the early battles. A German officer, an expert in musketry, described our shooting in these early days of ™, J a f « marvellous. The Germans, ho added, had counted on being able to rush us by weight of numbers, and found themselves quite unable to do it, because our fire was so straight and eo quick." Such mastery of the rifle as these men possessed could not bo expected from the new armies and the new drafts; whose training had to be completed sometimes in less months than the old armv had years of soidienng. Nevertheless, by a careful selection of points to be insisted on in training and still more by copious practice with live rounds at the. ranges, the standard of musketry in the British Army has been consistently maintained at a high level. Recruits havo to be practised in picking up objects at which to aim on miniature targets and at 30 yards ranees in the oprn, where the varying conditions of light and distance and the multiplicity of objects can be demonstrated practically bv the instructors. By such methods the recruits cf today are being trained for the actual conditions of warfare. The old 15 well-aimed round-s a mmute" is, no doubt, unattainable now, but 10 or even 12 a minute is a by no means rare accomplishment in our new battalions; whereas the best-trained German regiments before the war did not exceed an average of eight or nine rounds a minute. THE ESSENTIAL rNSTRTJMENT. Haw far, it may be asked, is this power of rapid firing utilised in the present war? When it conies to active attack or defence the rifle as a fire-weapon is still, in spite of guns, binibs, mortars, and machine guns, an essential instrument of victory. Other weapons havfc their uses in greatly facilitating tho attack, but success in the main is duo to the personal factor of the infantryman carrying out the charge. The importance attached to the ride for his work is obvious from the fact _tbat he carries 170 rounds on his person in the assault. If tha infantryman had nothing to relv upon during his advance acrces the open but his bayonsb or the few bombs he carries our successes would not have been what they were on tho Somme, at the Vimy Ridge, and at Mcssiues and Wytschacte. But he has his rifle, and has often to use it in that perilous journev. For tho iv-ccessful use of fire tactics in tho advance tlirough a bullet-swept zone the officers must have a complete control of their men and be quick to grasp the situation, while the men must have had a thorov-'h training in the use of the rifle. The fact "is that, in spite of new weapons and, in soiuo respects, new methods of warfare, the old regulations for training in the use of (lie rifle and for its use in tho attack are in principle as sound ae ever. In the defence, of p. trench against an assaulting party the rifle is equally the brsfc weapon. Bombs and trench mortars are of comparatively little use against attackers rushing forward in the open. Shrapnel, if it can be brought to bear quickly enough, may be useful, but it cannot take the pi;ica of rifle firo from the trenches. This can be brought to bear at once, and each round can bo aimed with deadly effect. Hence acool line of riflemen in tho trench&s s!i!I provides the most effective mc'hod of picking off tho assailants as they advance. Machine guns arc, of course," useful for t lie same purpose, but. c en with their vastly increased numbers, they are luiable always to sweep the whole lino of advance. Ats long as the infantryman has confidsnoa i.i hiiiisdf and his rifle and has plcntv of ammunition he remains the real master of the situation. Iho same applies to the defence of a captured trench, which has at onco to b9 strengthened against counter-attack. The ends lesiding into the. enemy's communionfion trenches are barricaded" and bombem and riflemen are posted to resist an advance. New reverse parapets are hastily dug, and the diggers are guarded by riflemen posted to pick off anv enemies seen advancing. Onco more, until the next wave leaps forth to a further, trench, tho rifle is chiefly uoed for defence of the newly-acquired trench. Besides, the trench warf;>.« of the western front is not the only form of battle fcr which the British soldier must be trained. Throughout this war, even on the west, we have consistently kept before our eyes the possibility of more open warfare, when bombs will he weleas, and tho day must- be won by the rifleman''; advance and fire mastery of hi» opponents. On other fronts this is already tho case. Constant, exercise, therefore, in fire practice with the riflo, as is insisted on in courses of instruction both at Home and in France, is essential. The infantryman mi*t learn to rely on his rifle as his" own ultima ratio. In. f3<rt. to ust. the words of a recent army memorandum, "It is tha spirit of the bayonet, lhat takes a position and the b'lllet which holds it. The bul'efc shattoM tho counter-attack ar.d kills outside bayonet distance." An 1. finally, "the bullet is the paramount executioner for offence an 3 defence."