NAPOLEON’S METHOD

Evening Star, Issue 16335, 30 January 1917, Page 6

NAPOLEON’S METHOD

THE ESSENTIAL FACTOR: TO BEAT MACHINE GUNS. ARMOR THE THING. SORGO PASS. [By Ciuticus.] B riling in an American journal a. few weeks hack, Mr Winston Cluircliill discussed the problem of tho struggle between flesh and blood and machinery. He pointed to (lie unequal character o c the struggle involved in an attack by mere flesh and blood upon concreted trenches defended by barbed wire and machine guns. He suggested that it is not beyond the scope of human science and skill to devise some key to the apparent deadlock njKm the western front other (ban that of sacrificing holocausts of men in attacking all but impregnable fortifications. There lie loft the question. If lie lias a. solution of his own to suggest he dill not mention it. Yet the problem is probably not insuperable—may, in fact, he as simplii as many another apparently insuperable problem has proved to be w!ien once the key to it has been found. In all problems, whether mathematical or logical, the way to find the key is to go straight to (he, essential point—to disentangle, that is, tho essential from the non-essential factors. The confusion of ideas Into which the generality of men fall w hen faced with complex problems is the result of their inability to do this. But the career o‘‘ Napoleon abounds in instances of the propm- way to go to work in grappling with diliiciilt tactical and strategical problems. One, example in parlhuiiar is worth quoting. At the very opening of Napoleon's career he was at the siege of Toulon, then held by flic. English and besieged hy the. French revolutionary forces. The French forces were, connnatnh'd by the usual stamp of mediocrities - men of some force of character. perhaps, but. allliclcd with a constitutional inability to sit down .and think. To their minds tho problem of how to capture Toulon presented a. Ix'wildermg and inextricable maze, of [actors, with which they were quite unable to grapple. But Napoleon went straight to the essential point, and at once reduced tho problem to simplicity itself. He said :n eli'ert : “If you wish t.> capline Toulon you must drive away the English. To drive away tiic English you must he able to command the harbor with your guns and to bombard their ships. To bombard their ships with vonr guns you must, occupy that little Iml cm the high ground overlooking tho bailin'.“ Napoleon's advice was followed. The fort was captured, and tho English had to go. Napoleon at his best always dealt with the problems before him in this simple and direct fashion, which is chaiai teristie of all really competent thinkers. The stodgy masses of mental obscurity tinder which our library shelves groan—which contain a headache on every page mu! are accepted as being <, f staggering profundity bn that, very reason—are nothing but the piodncls of logical incoinpetetn e. THE ESSENTIA!, FACTOR, Suppose we apply Napoleon's method of reasoning to the west front. What is tin; one essential factor there'.' What is tlie greatc.-t difficulty which we have to tkn e—the successful grappling with which would prove a key to the whole problem? The (ierman front is defended by concreted trenches, barbed wire, artillery, machine gnus, and men. These are tho chief iactors. Winch among these presents the greatest difficulty ? Trenches are passive tilings, and tire not in themselves ionnidahle. We have found that the barbed wire can be beaten down by onr artillery and smashed hy our “ tanks.” We have acquired a vast snperioritv in artillery and men. Yet, in spite of all, we are still laced by enormous difficulties created by the last-mentioned factor—machine guns. it is well established that all other (actors are of trivial importance compared with the diliienlty which the machine guns olfcr. Line machine gun well placed and well handled will cause more casualties than shrapnel lire from many batteries. I i the machine gnus could be success fully overcome our greatest diliienlty would disappear, and there need be no doubt oi onr ability to break the enemy’s line. Paraphrasing - Napoleon, one might say : "If you wish to break the enemy s line you must beat llioi.r machine guns. ] o beat their machine guns yon must devise something which will turn aside the majority of their bullets. To turn aside their bullets von must provide your men with some form of defensive armor.” OF WHAT KIND? The tanks are one form ,nf defensive armor, and there are some purposes lor which they represent the best, method ot attack notably, crushing down formidable patches of barbed wii'e which the guns have missed. I'sed with tactical skill and insight, they are weapons of vast potentialities. Rut they have their drawbacks and limitations. A " tank ” can shelter only a few men, mu! if makes a conspicuous target Cor the eneniv’s batteries if it ventures out into the open, so it must hug the shelter of friendly ridges as much" as possible. We need to protect all our men again.-t (he enemy’s machine guns as far'as is practicable! and the only way to do this effectively is by means of body armor, reasonably light and capable of stopping or turning aside the majority of machine-gun bullets at a moderate range. Tims equipped, our infantry would he much more effective even than tic "tank.” They would make hut, inconspieuous targets in the open, a.ncl (hey would be able to push through Dm machine-gun lire, with moderate casualties, and for ns the full advantage of our superior numbers. Filed,ive body armor, then, is (he key to the position, and its .successful production would probably enable ns to smash the. enemy’s lines as if they were made ot brown paper. As to whether the production „f really suitable body armor ns feasible, one may point to (lie enormous powers of resistance possessed by the modern chrome, steel, such as that out of which tho steel helmets are mMc and to the fact that it is not necessary that every Indict should be stopped f pho steel helmets do not do that, vet they are most successful. To cut down the casualties to a small percentage would Ire sufficient,. But upon this point and the question of the. kind of armor required, a good deal more can be said another day. THE GOLDEN BYSTRITZA. An item of some interest contained in vest ere ay s later cables Mas a. R, llf „iar. claim to have, broken throng), the onemv's positions along tho Kimpolnng-Jaoohonv road, whore they captured 2.030 prison’rrs, .1 he Ormans admit retiring tmv.wls tne Golden Bystritza. This poT.nt is of great strategical importance, because ihe road in question leads to the Borgo Pass' the capture of which bv the Russians would powerfully aft'ori the posit,inn to the south. A blow in that sector would he pcnoctly sound strategy, owing to i>,s clcee connection with the Moldavian and Wallachtan fronts. It is not. likely that, the present move is anything more than a local stroke, however, as only a front of about two miles wa ß attacked! - The Rumanians are taking advantage of the winter months to reorganise and refit, and it is unlikely that a. grand offensive, will he undertaken on the eastern front until thev are readv. --

over. We are prevented from doing this chiefly by tho fact that! the opposite coast to a neutral country. No matter how thickly the North Sea is strewn with mines, the submarines can leave the Baltic and steal along the neutral Norwegian coast in territorial waters until they got well to the north of the Shetland Islands, Still, tho plentiful sowing of minefields will take a steady toll of those submarines which navigate tlie North Sea for tho purpose of attacking shipping along the eastern coast of Britain. THE ENEMY'S FOOD CRISIS. Tlie cables continue to describe the growing seriousness of the enemy’s difficulties in the matter of food, and according to the Budapest correspondent of the ‘ Morning Post ’ a famine of tho worst kind is, inevitable unices a miracle happens. Sonic confirmation of this is provided by an announcement by the Imperial German Food Office, which declares that in spite of tho favorable coni crop the position is worse than in 1916, owing to the. failure of potatoes, and that a system of economy must be carried out immediately if it is to bo possible to hold out until the next harvcHt._ To appreciate the significance of this it is well to remember that it is wrung from the enemy hy necessity. Hitherto the German Government, to maintain German prestige, have loudly boasted that food supplies were, amply sufficient to last until the next harvest. But, concurrently with these assertions, there are constant cutting down of rations and raising of prices. Naturally, the German people want to knoM- why, if food is plentiful, they have to put up with semi-starvation. The Government arc thus compelled to acknowledge a measure of the truth, owing, as they admit, “to the, opposition and resistance of large sections of the population to the ordinances and restrictions issued."

ANTI-SUHMA RTX K M ETFTODS,

Evidently one. of the met hods to be adopted in fighting the submarine is a more extensive use of minefields. The American Embassy at. London has notified Washington that Britain has enlarged the North Sea area which is dangerous to shipping, while from Scandinavia" comes the intelligence that Britain is laying a minefield off the coast of Jutland. We have already blocked the Channel, and if we could succeesfullv block the, northern exit from the North Sea the submarine danger would be