THE PASSES

Evening Star, Issue 16195, 17 August 1916, Page 8

THE PASSES

RUSSIA GETTING CLOSE

HUNGARY THREATENED.

THE SOMME OFFENSIVE

EFFICIENCY.

[By CruTicus.]

_ There is again littlo that is sensational m the news from the various fronts to-day, but ono most interesting and significant item comes from Galiciu. It is officially announced from Petrograd that, owing to Russian pressure in a wooded region of the Carpathians, between brandies of the Pruth, the Austriuiis evacuated Jablonitza, which the Russians occupied. There axe two Jablomtzas in Galicia. Ono is a place of little importance, standing among the foothills of the Carpathians, about 20 miles south-west of Kiity; while the other stands on the upper waters of the Prulk, within a few miles of the important pass of the same name, which crosses the main lidge of the Carpathians. From the mention of the branches of the Pruth in the communique, and from the fact that the railway junction of Delai.yn, 15 miles to the north, was occupied by the Russians some time ago, there can bo littlo doubt that the town of the pass is infant. This is important, for the only railway across the Eastern Carpathians passes through a. tunnel near the Jablonitza Pr.ss; while about 16 miles further west is the Pantyr Pass, which, though not crossed by a railway, is served by a railhead at tho toot of the hills, and tho line runs through Nadvorna, which the Russians hold. Thus the Russians, with good railway communication behind them, are now within easy striking distance of some of tho most important passes of the Carpathians, and . are in a. position to threaten a blow at Hungary at any time. PUZZLING THEM. It has alerady been pointed out here that an excellent case can bo made out for the move over the Carpathians, owing to the fact that the Russians would have ample room to extend their left flank once they could get into tho Hungarian plains, while no undue risks would attach to the move. But the peculiar advantage which the Russians now enjoy is that they have the inner line, the initiative, and the choice between different courses almost equally good. It is this latter fact which makes the enemy's position difficult, as they cannot be certain which course the Russians will follow. The soundest and safest would be to follow up their present course until Galicia is cleared, and then conquer the Lublin province of Poland by combined offensives both north and south of the Pripet. But that is tho course which will probably be anticipated by the enemy, and the move across the Carpathians offers the most serious consequences. Indeed, it, might be argued that it would be the swiftest and surest way of clearing Galicia. For once across the Carpathians the Russians could roll up the range strategically, and the enemy would be obliged to abandon the greater part of Galicia. If the move into Hungary is decided upon, the Russians have the advantage that they could swiftly and secretly reinforce the Carpathian sector, and strike before the enemy discovered tho manoeuvre. The Ausko-Germans, with the outer line, and an excessively long one at that, would then have to shift reinforcements front Galicia across the Carpathians and round through Hungary to the threatened sector, in order to make an effective reply. Before that could be done a. well-directed blow might have carried the passes. It will probably°be possible, with the aid of a map, on Saturday to illustiate the strategical consequences which would ensue. SLOW PROGRESS.

Italy reports the rapture of further lines of trenches, but her ptogress appears to be slow at present. Probably she is preparing further strokes, though we have to face the possibility that now that Austria has recovered fiom her surprise and discovered the direction of the Italian offensive she may be able to cheek it. Still, the pressure upon her is greater than it, ever was before, and must continue to increase. One of the results of continued progress hv Italy, coupled with success bv Russia in the Carpathians, would be that wc should he'able to talk to Rumania much more effectively. YVe would be able to iray to her: "your assistance will no longer be of any special value to us it you do not act soon; and if you fail to move by a certain data your aid will be declined even if offered. Serbia will be given a huge increase of territory and population in the Adriatic province* of Austria, and perhaps a slice of the territory coveted by you in Transylvania. You will got nothing. Your chance to increase your territory, population, and power by 50 per cent, will have passed away, and you will 'be completely overshadowed by Serbia." When we are in a position to talk in that way to Rumania, and have common sense enough to do it. she will probably climb down from off the fence. We shall, of course, be able to win this war without her aid, but wo do not wish to do so. The war is costing Britain alone about five millions per day, and Rumania's help would shorten it, immensely. If it were shortened with her aid bv si. week it would save Britain £35,000,000, while to shorten it a monlh would save her £140,000,000. So Rumania's aid is worth having. ITS PURPOSE SERVED. There is no news of importance, from the Sonune. It will be noticed that there has been a marked fallhig-olf in the energy of the attack during the past couple of weeks or so. Occasi3nal marked advances are made, but only with intervals of a number of days between them. This probably means, not that the offensive has failed, but that it has served its purpose. If. as is probable, its main objective was to take the pressure off Verdun, that objective lias clearly been gained, for the attack up:m Verdun is abso-

lutcly dead. On this supposition nothing remains to be clone on the Somme except to compel the enemy to keep I heir forces on that sector by constant local attacks which threaten to develop into a great oll'ensivo at any time. Thus, weeks may elapse before airything really big is ygaiu undertaken on the west front. We are preparing on a great scale for great- filings, but there is ii general determination in the Briii=h Army not to commit ourselves again to a real grand offensive until we are fully prepared and able, to carry it through. When Mr Lloyd George soys that " the premature explosion of sheik at the battle of Loos was so bad that the firing of high-explosive shells had to be abandoned," he reveals clearly why wo are still holding our hand, and why the big stroke in the north is so long delayed. PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION. Mr Montagu's report to the House of Commons as to the progress of our ammunition, output makes very satisfactory reading. Presumably he means, wlku he says that our equipment of 18-pounder field guns is practically complete, that we have almost as many as we require. When the same can be said of heavy guns of all classes we -shall be on the eve of our real big effort, and the Germans on tho eve of the biggest Ghaking up they have ever had. The position as regards machine guns and ammunition is equally promising, and it hj noteworthy that the increased efficiency which has followed Government, control of t-lio purchase and regulation of the prices of metals has been a saving of £41,000,000. Wo have gone far since the opening of tho war. It used t-o be held that it was impossible for the Government to regulate prices, and that Government administration inevitably meant inefficiency. The red-tape methods of many Government departments were pointed to, and contrasted with the efficiency cf many r.rivate firms. That, school of thought overlooked the fact that many private (inns are inefficiently administered, and that some Government departments are highly efficient the British Navy and the German army, for instance. The same school -argued that Government control was fatal to invention.

Tiiey overlooked the frxt that the Govern-ment-controlled navies of the world are the most marvellous examples of mechanical ingenuity and inventiveness to which it is possible to point In truth, it is possible to have both efficiency and inventiveness in cither Government-conhollcd or private concerns by the simple expedient of providing for liiem in the organisation. Seme day we shall have a science of organisation, which will enable our statesmen to understand how to do this, and when ihey have to organise an army, or a navy, or any other Government department will teach them how to do it without unnecessary bung!in". A few of its general principles might be kid down offhand. Thus, unity of administration should always go hand-in-hand with decentralisation. Responsibility and power should always go together. Promotion should go by merit, and the system should so test the individuals that no mediocrity could rise to high office. Invention should be encouraged, both by providing facilities and by rewarding success. We need to build up a 'ssysteui of'broad,'ireuerai sriccasies,'coming

the whqle fl«ld of administration. and from these work down to aiinor principles. This will_ neoossitato a much r.le«.r*r grasp of fundamental principles tha-n wo at present possess; but when we do got it we shall discover that efficiency mid inefficiency do not depend on whether control is public or private, but upon, whether «ound principles of organisation havo been intelligently applied. Inefficient armies and navies ought then to be things of the past.