DOUAUMONT.

Evening Star, Issue 16050, 29 February 1916, Page 6

DOUAUMONT.

PIVOT OF MANOEUVRE. WHO HOLDS IT? .CHANNEL MINES, BERNSTORFF’S THREAT. (By Griticds.] hold® Fort Douaumont? Vosterdav thc Brunch, definitely claimed to have itcaplurod the place and to b<f successfully m j all counter-attacks, loday a communique reports that the slopes east of Douaumont are covered with German ec-rpges, and the French troops arei closely encircling the fractions of tho enemy which obtained a foothold there. Moieovei’, it is asserted that a powerful attack on tlio French positions situated north of Yanx was repulsed. Now, those positions should no in line with Douaumoiit. The Germans milv claim to luive reached the neighborhood' of the) soiitherii border of tluv wood to tho north-cast of Bias, so that tho village of Bras should remain in of tlio French. The reader will discover Bras on tho plan <>> Verdun published yesterday, lying to the west of Bras and the high plateau to the north of tlio village of Vaux, which itself li es to the north of the fort of the same name, it is rather difficult to believe that the Gei mans can Jiave a secure hold of Douaumont. Yet a German communique decln.rcs -that “ five- Fr-ei*ch -attacki? in .art a.tttimpt to recapture Douaumont >vovo j’Cpulsed, with sanguinary enemy losses." Evidently one side is not telling tho truth, and; probably neither is telling the whole truth. V esterday a French communique declared that the Germans attribute overgroat importance to Fort Douaumont, winch, is out of date and had been dismantled during the first .month of the war. it no longer contained a. gum or a, soldier. This is doubtless quite true so far as it goes, but it is not the whole truth. Very early in tho war it was sliovu that these solid masses of concrete and armornlato merely provide first-rate targets for the enemy’s big guns, and' no matter how strongly they mar ho constructed they cannot withstand the steady battering -of ]2in and 16-jin howity.eisi. tho true method of defence is to dig well into mother-earth and to protect the guns by concealing them, not by sticking them into prominent targets. So tlio real defences of Verdun are not the foils marked on the pla.' l published yesterday, hut the intricate maze of trenches and gunpil.s woven between them. Nevertheless, these fvi fs, arc placed on the strongest natural positions available. If the Germans capture Fort Douaurnont they capture the strong position on which it stands, and the attempt of the French to minimise the importance of the place is not a good sign. A PIVOT OF MANOEUVRE. Ono of Napoleon’s, tactical maxims was always to mameuvre pound a fixed point, T he Fort of Douaumont and the use whmh the French are likely to make of it in their defence ot Verdun afford an illustration of Napoleon’s meaning and of ono of the ways in winch the doctrine, may bo anplied. Tho fact that tho forts have been dismantled docs not lessen the value of yesterdays plan as showing the positions of tho naturally strong defensive points aicund tlie iortress and the several lines of defence. Tho Germans claim to have captured Champ Neuvillo and Talon Hill, and to have fought their wav to tho neighborhood north of Bras. That is not in itself of great importance, for if the reader examines the plan ho will notice (bat Champ Neuville stands in nr. o-:-tremely salient angle ot tho Xleuse. Tt uae probably for that reason voluntarily evacuated by the French, and in the neighberhood of Bras the Germans come info contact with the real defensive line. Assuming them to sweep forward and capture Douaumont, they immediately come under lire from the ‘front of Forts do Louyille (near Floury), do Belleville, and de Tavamics; while they are subjected to an enfilading fire at a range of two miles from Fort do Vaux, and the whole front of six miles between Fort Douaumont and the .Meuse may be enfiladed bv massed batt-eT-ice on the wesb bank of the river. It may ha added that about midway he-t-ween Fleury and Charny, but not marked in tlio plan, is the Cote do Froide Terre, a. strongly defended hill. Tho French, however, should not depend upon artillery fire merely, but should pour in a. terrific hail of shells, as the prcliminaiW to a counter-attack. I'.ach time the Germans attempt to sweep over and beyond Douaumont they should be met first with a deadly blast of shrapnel and high explosives, then at the critical moment, just as the enemy reel under tho tempest, with a smashing counter-attack which -will sweep tjneni back, again. Thus Fort Douaumont would become the “fixed point” of Napoleon and tho pivot of manoeuvre round which th» French combinations would ho evolved. _ Oddly enough, Prime Minister Briand, in a. late cable, describes such a counter-attack, in which the Germans wore swept hack from Douaumont. CLOSING IN.

_'Lho Gormans are now closing in upon Verdun from the cast, as well as frmn Hie north. A French communique states that tho Germans established contact, with (ho French outposts towards 15ianz.ee and Moranvillc, winch is a way of admitting that, tho Germane have, progressed thus far. Moranvilie may bo seen in yesterday's pta-n, dud <?aei of IToxt do Ta-vajmc-s and it is probable that Btanzee is a cable error for Bonzce, which lies slightly to tho south-east of Haudimont. A lino drawn on tho plan from Vachcrvillo, on tho Meuse, close to Jlouaumont, through Dieppe and Moranyille to Haudimont will givoa. fair conception of tho closeness of the investment at tho moment of writing. Bub it is now that tho Germans have got to close qu'vrters with tho defences that their real task begins. The French have drawn back from the Plain of the Wocvro to the foot of tho heights of the Meuse. “Tho hilly ridge on the Meuse heights, whore the Germans are endeavoring to advance,” says tho Paris correspondent of the ‘ Gaily (Mail, 1 “ is seamed with ravines and watercourses, and the French from their trenches and .batteries enfilade them. The carnage is terrible.” Tiie Germans now claim to have captured 15,000 unwounded prisoners, whereas the French denied in a. late cable yesterday that more than 5,C00 had been "taken. It, is impossible to be certain who is toiling the truth, though ws do know that German claims lately have been very untrustworthy. Still, that number is a’trifle when compared nith the magnitude of the issue and {ho numbers engaged. The French are said to be pushing up troops, munition trains, and battery after battery. That is the way to win, and tho only way. If a sufficient force is massed there victory is sure. Tho consumption of shells is exceeding all estimates, and much will depend on whoso supplies last the longer. Fortunately, the French have a huge reserve accumulated, but if they should be hard pressed it would bo advisable to accelerate the consumption of German stocks by vigorous offensives ehcwdiore. FIERCE DELIGHT. Colonel Repington says that the decision of the Germans to put their fortunes to the touch at Verdun will bo received by the Allies with fierce delight. Certainly, unless we have been grossly deceived as to tho development of our artillery, there seems to be only one possible result. He also points out, what has already been several times pointed out" here, that the general security of the Allies’ lines is not seriously menaced, and would not be even if the whole right bank of tho Meuse was in German hands. That is so obviously true that it makes the German strategical conception inexplicable. It may be said that they have chosen to strike at the point which offers tho maximum of difficulty and the minimum of results. The ‘Berliner Tageblatt’ hints that Hindenburg has been shelved. Perhaps this accounts. foj’, thaistranga-nolionS'-of .-strategy

at present prevailing at the German Headquarters. Colonel Repington thinks that if the Germans are willing to pay the price which we shall exact they may initiate a fresh offensive elsewhere—possibly, in Champagne. But why not down the left bank of tho Meuse through the Argonne? That would increase their chances of capturing Verdun, ’ and offer strategical results which the present attack does not.Colonel Depington also suggests that the appointment of Prince Hem'y of Prussia to a high naval command heralds a German offensive on the water. This is the lirst we have heard of that appointment. It may ho pointed out that a Gorman offensive on the water could hardly lead to anything but disaster for them, and that would lose them their invaluable command of tho Baltic. Still, they are getting desperate, and such a course would be little more futile than the strategy of Verdun. MINES IN THE CHANNEL. Tho sinking of the by a min© in the, English Channel off Dover, and of the Fort William when going to her rescue, is rather an unpleasant surprise. Across the stretch of water in question have been passing, ever since tho opening of the war, hundreds of transports conveying troops .and supplies to France. Thus far not one has been lost, and the Channel had come to bo regarded as practically secure. .-The reason of past security has lain in the iact that lines of nets have been stretched across tho Strait of Dover from Dover itsch to Cape GrisOsez, on the French coast, about 10 miles west of Calais, and about 150 miles further down the Channel, between Portland Bill. 50 miles west of Portsmouth, and Cape La Hogue, 10 miles west of Cherbourg. These nets are of steel, and the upper edge is fastened to a line of buoys, while the lower edge is anchored to the bottom. The anchoring is done in such a way that the nets are not affected by storms or tides, and the anchor chains are shortened, so that the buoys are held beneath the water and the submarines cannot detect, their position, Gateways which can be opened ami closed are provided, and these are constantly guarded by torpedo craft. As the nets reach from tlie surface to the bottom .and from shore to shore, and 1 as no submarine could attempt to breakthrough without being wrecked, the protection affended by them would appear to be complete. It is difficult to. believe, therefore, that the minefield which sank the Maloja and the 3’ort William can have been. Jaid hv au enemy submarine, hut tho only alternative theory is that they were our own mines which had broken loose and drifted as _ mines have an unfortunate habit of doing. The space between tho nets is said to bo heavily mined, though why this should be is not clear, since no enemy battleships or cruisers are likely to find their way down the Channel. 'The nets should give adequate protection against submarines, and to sow mines seems to be to subject our own shipping to a needless risk. Doubtless _an examination of the nets -will reveal if they have been forced or passed by a. submarine at any point, and an examination of any minefields that the Allies may have in the Channel will reveal if any have drifted. So the Aduinalty should be able to ascertain with some confidence the origin of the mines which sank the Maloja and Fort William. Ain other drifting will soon bo swept up by mine sweeper!;, which would be on the scene within a few hours. It may be added that, in addition to the nets mentioned above, other nets have been stretched between tho Mull of ’Kintyre, on the Scottish coast, and the coast of Ireland, thus closing the Irish Sea on the ( north : and from St. David’s Head, in South Wales, to Carnsoro Point, in Ireland, closing tho Irish Sea from the south, and giving fairly secure protection from submarines to vessels which have once eutered it, “ SINK AT SIGHT." Count Bernstorff has notified the United States that the German assurances in the Lusitania and Arabic cases apply only to unarmed merchantmen, and others will be sunk. As it is impossible for the submarines to know whether a vessel is aimed without examining lier. and as this would involve the risk of being sunk, the intimation practically means that tho Germans will sink at sight. Tho next move lies with President Wilson. Even if Americans were formally warned off belligerent ships, that would probably be ineffective, as American shipping is limited. If Americans lose their lives by submarines the President will have no difficulty in carrying the nation with him, in spite, of Congress, if he is prepared to take strong action.