GUESSES

Evening Star, Issue 16033, 9 February 1916, Page 6

GUESSES

MANY-AND VARIOUS. • GERMANY’S NEXT THRUST. STATISTICS AND TEMPERAMENT ITHE RAIDER. . [By Caixictrs.] ~ Burnous as to tho direction of Germany’s next offensive are as thick as flies in autumn, just now. In fact, the “news” consists mainly of wild guesses as to tho intentions of the enemy, which should prove infinitely amusing to the Gorman General Staff if its members can find time to read them. One could wish for things to. begin to happen if only to give the corres|K)ndonts something to write about and check the flood of clotted nonsense which they a.r© sending through. From day to day Germany is credited with the intention of taking the offensive against the west front, against Salonika, against the Sorbo-Itaiians in Albania, ago ins, Egypt, and against Mesopotamia. She would need armies as numerous as the sands upon tho sea shore, to cany out a fraction of the wonderful schemes with which the is credited. And in the long run it will probably be found that she will justify none erf the wild guesses, but will tacitly recognise her comparative impotence by adopting a general defensive. Un the west front there is considerable German activity, and there are the usual reports of huge reinforcements arriving with immense numbers of guns and clacks ot anummition, ■ as preliminaries to a grand offensive, ft would save a vast amount of discussion if the. authors of these tales could he persuaded to sit down and think, and to attempt a rational explanation ot why Germany should do these things. Why should she attempt, a. perfectly (hopeless task which could only eponnousiy hasten the process of aftii--10 attack well-nigh impregnable PCcit.ons, which are defended bv much larger numbers than the attackers, with c.igei nnis.-es of artillery and greater sunplies of ammunition, would bo”mere. follV borne minor advantages might be mimed in tho first rush, but then cunorior numoers and resources would tell and the attack would ho driven back. IK THE KNOW. . K more amusing than the way in which correspondents who are not m r, position to know anything o'f Germany's plans produce detailed informaiior. ot what is going to bo done, save, peihaps, the way in which they contradict each other. Tho Geneva correspondent ot Lo Temps’ announces that Prince i.eopokt of Bavarm is going to command an attack upon the Suez Cana! in th° spring. ‘Lo Temps’ cays that Germany h:I V b ron n nn). 0a M fcin ? . tlwt 1«>.000 Germans and 600,000 -Turks are about to invad® Egypt. On the other band, Mr Ward A™*- ■' Trit ffi,g from Salonika, considers that Mesopotamia, i.s likely to. bo the principal German, objective,, on the ground that tho hue of communication from Constantinople to tho Tigris is less exposed to attack than the lino to Egypt. To this assertion it must bo repliedAhab Mesopotamia cannot possibly bo Germany's principal objective, because it is quite “a minor tneatic. xho war can neither be won nor lose there. Egypt is- also a minor theatre. Ihe (,-ermnns would doubtless have encouraged the Turks to attack! Egypt had there been any hope of success, ‘but the defences ot the canal should be practically impregnable- by now, and it can only be attacked at those points where thearnads cross the desert. The season is getfclW late, and the Russians are pressing tb« links heavily in the Caucasus. Moreover, the German General Staff must know that the Allies can cripple tho venture at any time by attacking Turkey iu Palesin Smyrna, or in tho Balkans. So it wall probably not occur.

As for 100,000 German troops taking part,, that would) indicate that tho German higher command lias taken its notion of strategy from romantic novelists and war correspondents. '.Hie Allies have several hundred thousands of . men rio-ht on the flank of the German lino of communication with Constantinople, and the force is steadily growing, Moreover, the bulk of tho forces now in Fgvpt mav be added at any time if the communications m that quarter will allow. The German General bluff must he wondering how tlmy can present the overwhelming of Bulgaria, the cutting of their lino of communication with Constantinople, and tho turning of their flank in. ilia oast. If Germany°has any troops to spare from the main theatre she will find jdenty of scope for them in tho Balkans ; and she is more likelv to need the assistance of Turkey than to he able to send 100,000 troops to her aid. Tu a few words, Germany’s policy in Turkey will he to encourage that country to do nil in her power to make diversions, and to assist her as much as possible with officers, arms, and ammunition, but not to waste her own troops in impossible undertakings. CARPING. After an analysis of Germany’s. Josses thus far. Colonel Itepington indulges in a characteristic piece of carping against the strategy ot tho Allies. Ho concludes that Germany still lias reserves amounting to 2.800.000, of whom guarding communications and garrisoning towns, and he adds : “ If tho Gormans Inso 250.000 per month their power of reinforcing will end in September. ' If wo proceed fighting tho Turks, Bulgars, and what not, and destroying only 56,000 Germans monthly, the war will ho interminThis passage reflects Colonel Repin gto ns dislike of tho Balkans campaign. His criticism has not been of tho kind winch shows with lucid logical demonstration what is wrong, but of the variety which “hints a fault and hesitates dislike.” Ho seems to have a vaguo impression that wo can take tho Turks and Bulgarians out and lose them, and thus avoid fighting them at all. But if wo tried to adopt a defensive attitude in the Near Hast it would moan the tying up of a huge garrison in I.gypt for purposes of purely passive defence. It would ■ leave the Turks free to attack us in Mesopotamia and Persia, and the Russians in the Caucasus. Tho Russians would he compelled to transfer troops from tho German front to operate against the Turks. Finally, it ■would ho open to tho Austro-Germans, Bulgarians, and Turks to uso their combined forces to coerce Greece and Rumania into executing their will. STATISTICS AND TEMPERAMENT. It has been said that figures cannot lie, but Bagehot, tho economist, moro wisely remarked : There are lies, damned lies, and statistics.” In point of fact, whenever a writer sets out to produce estimates on any subject tho details of which are little known, it can ho predicted with confidence that his results will- be, not so much an accurate reflection of the truth as a reflection of his own temperament. Thus Hilairo Belloc, who is an optimist, lows ior Vra\ Mgtnng and proving Ito his own satisfaction that Germany’s reserves will he on tho point of exhaustion about this time; whereas Colonel Rcpington has just produced an exhaustive analysis which goes to show- that Germany’s reserves will not be used np until September, even if we inflict a future loss upon her of 250,000 monthly. It may be mentioned, in further illustration, that the “ exceptionally , well-informed ” critic who writes for tho American ‘Review of Reviews’ produced an “ estimate ” which credited Germany with a net loss of over 4.000. for 'the first year of the war, whereas she has even now lost only about 2.500.000 according to Colonel Repington. With a little expansion here and a little compression there it is possible to produce any result. Thus Hilaire Belloc only allows Germany 8,000,000 effectives as against Colonel Repington’s 9,000,000, and with a someivhat higher allowance of losses-the difference in the • finished gro-

duet is marvellous. It may be pointed out that it is wiser to base our calculations on the pessimistic rather than on, the optimistic estimate, and. thus we shall avoid ( disappointment; How ' that tho Labor difficulties are settled Mr Lloyd George is openly optimistic about th’e'ammuiutioii- problem. It is even boasted that ’we shall shortly be in a position to do without' American supplies. The Ekaterina railway was announced as completed iu September, so that Russia’s difficulties m the matter of ammunition are over. We should soon be in a position, therefore, to -pour upon the enemy such a flood of fire all along the line as to produce a casualty list compared with which all former losses were trivial. CONSTANTINE PLUCKING UP. King Constantino lias called up the Greek reserves of the 1892-1914 classes, inclusive, living abroad, except those resident Jil Russia and the Balkans, according to an Athens cable. We-have received from time to time statements that the Entente lowers wore trying to persuade Greece to aemobihse, but apparently she lias no intention of doing so, nor Is it to the interests of the Allies that she should. Perhaps some light i.s thrown upon the reasons for these further preparations by the news that Greece has demanded from Germany an indemnity for the Salonika air raid. Apart from the brutal slaughter of harmless civilians, there would be something amusing in the Germans following a policy ot bombing (,-Jreek cities for the sole purpose of paying indemnities afterwards. But it she persists in that policy, and declines to pay indemnities, Greece will bo ljitu-r!y antagonised, and ‘great possibilittes opened up. King Constantine is probably becoming quito conscious o’f the fact that his betrayal of Serbia and the Allies was a- blunder of the first magnitude, and one which may vet have unpleasant consequences for himself and his dynasty. Moreover, the spectacle of Germany’s present impotence after all .the grandiose talk that has been indulged in will probably soothe his nerves. If he should desire an opportunity to retrace his stops with dignity, the German bombings of Greek cities would provide an admirable casus belli, and an excuse for taking his stand by the side of the Allies. NO ULTIMATUM YET.

The emphasis placed yesterday on the need for caution in accepting the imports of an ultimatum from tho,Central Powers to Rumania has been Justified by the announcement from London that the Government have received information that they were without foundation. This is a ma-t- ---- for satisfaction rather than otherwise. W hen the snow melts in the Balkans, and the Anglo-French and Italians are free to operate against tho Bulgarians, tho Central Powers may send iu their ultimatum as soon as possible. Till then, .however, it is better that Rumania should keep tlie peace. THE MOHAVE .MYSTERY.

I he latest and apparently the most reasonable explanation of the"identity of the ship which captured the A.ppam is that she was a supply ship of the Konigsberg which was hidden in one of the East African rivers when the cruiser was sunk. Ihe presence of the name Moew© on many of tho sailors’ caps is explained by the fact that* the little survey ship was •/■nk at Dax-es-iSalaam early in the war. This is satisfactory, if true, because the s ■ p should soon ho hunted down, and it-

would mean that Germany has not succeeded in devising a now method of war against our commerce._ 'The theory that tlie raider was a- cruising submarine is rejected, because the Appam sailors would have recognised the marks inseparable from a. submarine. But tho story that first reached us was that the submarine had armed another vessel and used that to capture the. Appam. Perhaps that story, however., was merely in the nature of inference by the passengers and crew of the latter vessel.