OUR NAVAL POLICY

Evening Star, Issue 15072, 2 January 1913, Page 9

OUR NAVAL POLICY

« TOWARDS THE FLEET IN THESE DAYS OF DANGER. [Specially Written for the ' Star.'] No. 111. —Grave Enough—North Sea Plus Pacific.— In the previous parts of this article wa havo seen that Germany has obtained by a great effort a fleet that seriously rivals the British fleet. Britain's superiority in battleships over Germany is now about 50 per cent., but Mr Churchill has pointed out that if Germany were to attack the English fleet (wo do not here raise the question of the probability or improbability of her doing so) it would be when the ordinary vicissitudes of peace, the need for docking, absence of ships in distant, waters, had weakened our North Sea fleet to its minimum strength, while her ow-n fleet would have been brought to its maximum strength for action. This process would, according to the First Lord of the Admiralty, reduce our superiority by 50 per cent., our margin of superiority in the circumstances would have been decreased to the extent contemplated by the preamble of the German Naval Law of 1900, and the German Navy would be of "such strength that a war even against the mightiest naval Power) vould involve risks threatening the supremacy of that Power." But, in addition to the dangers which threaten the heart of the British dominions, thero are problems facing us of equal moment in the_ Pacific, which, if neglected, may imperil, as homes of the white race, Australia and New' Zealand, the two countries which aro as yet the freesv in the world from racial and soc ; al problems, and whose pa Dole have a magnificent opportunity to work for a better organisation of society than has so far been attained. The security of either of these countries against Asiatic invasion is gone when the other is invaded. —Japan's Naval Growth.—

At the conclusion of the last article it was pointed cut that Japan possesses a navy as powerful as that of France, and that Baron Saito,'Minister for Marine, is credited iu Japan with having stated last February, before a secret session of the Budget Commission, that the i.reducible minimum, of Japan's naval expansion was the construction by 1920 of lb ouperDreadnoughts. It is intere3ling to compare Japan's present battleship fleet with that of other Powers in the Pacific—Russia and the United Stater.. As before, ships more than 12 years eld are not included, and pre-Dreadnought battleships are only counted as of value one-half in the '■' total scrergth": Battlerhips 1912. Russia. Japan. U.S.A. Battleships .... ... 8 11 16 Dreadnoughts ... 4 6 or 7 10

Total strergth 8 12 13 The Russian fleet is divided between the Black Sea and the Baltic, and reientlv most of the United States shins were in the Atlantic. The British, Chinese, and South American fleets in lie Pacific are insignificant compared to that c£ Japan. —The Purpose of the Japanese Fleet.— It is a matter of moment to New Zealand and Australia to know why Japan after two recent and exhausting wars makes the sacrifices necessary to maintain a somewhat more powerful navy than such a country as France, whose possessions and trade are greater and more worldwide. In finding an answer to this question we may examine our own motives for maintaining a navy. They have been (1) to give to our scattered Empire security against aggression, and (2) to guard our trade routes, especially those upon which England is dependent'for her food. The only other purpose for which a navy can be intended is the invasion of other States, the function of the navy being to guard' the army transports. —ls It to Resist Invasion?—

For which of these purposes the Japanese navy is intended will now be considered. It is true that Japan is made up of many islands, Formosa being about 1,000 miles from Tokio. But Japan, densely populated as it is, with its 50,000,000 people, can scarcely fear invasion. At worst, that form" of attack could only come from China or Russia; the former having no navy is impotent for such a purpose. That Japan fears anv danger in the near future from Russia is unbelievable. Russia, weakened by revolution and inferior in naval power, will wait long before she ventures to attack Japan at sea, and risk again the overwhelming disaster that previously befell that undertaking. The possibility of invasion of Japan by Russia or any other Power is not worth serious consideration. No adequate motive can be. found, no probability of success awaits the undertaking. It is not the densely populated AsiaticStates which need fear invasion, but the thinly populated ones in the temperate zone? —ls It to Protect Trade ? Is the purpose of the Japanese navy, then, to guard Japan's trade routes and shipping? What shipping and trade has she to protect? Who are her possible enemies in this respect? In the following table Japan's trade and shipping is com' pared with that of Now Zealand and Australia and Great Britain : Trade and Shipping, 1910. _ Great Japan. Australasia. Britain. £ £ & Imports and exports per annum 92,000,000 171,000,000 1.100 000,000 Tons of ships owned 1,600,000 560,000 12,000,000 Japan's navy is quite disproportionate in strength to tho trade and shipping it has to protect. Further, her two chief customers are England (India), and the "United States, the world's first and third naval Powers, who also carrv most of Japan's imports and exports, '('he greatest difficulty in assuming that Japans navy exists for the protection of her commerce is to find any possible enemy, to find any naval Power that will wish to injure hp'r sea-borne commerce. Russia is the only conceivable Power. Japan's fleet is needlessly strong to prevent such injury. If her fleet exists neither to resist invasion nor _to protect trade routes, only one possibility remains, and that is it exists for purposes of aggression. Tlwt conclusion is in harmony with Japan's history, which records her having fought two successful wars in eighteen years, and her need for territory to"take her surplus population. Her population is increasing by about 600,000 people per year. —Japan's Surplus Population.— Tho 'Round Table' for May, 1911, contained an able article on ' The Emigration Question in Japan,' wherein the following passages will bo found : a When the Japanese undertook to check tho southward advance of Russia in .Manchuria they did go primarily, no doubt, in order to prevent "Russia establishing herself in so secure a strategical position that she might dictate to China and to Japan alike. . . . There was also the conviction in the minds of the Japanese statesmen that the rapid growth of the Japanese population must result either in the extension of the boundaries of Japan or in the flight of the Japanese to other countries. ""Korea was not overcrowded. Not only, therefore, did it occupy the position of' a buffer state, , . . but it also offered a field for colonisation. So also Manchuria offered similar prospects. Formosa, had been acquired by Japan after the Chino-Japanese War in 1895, partly to prevent the island falling into the hands of a European Power, but- also because, it offered a field for colonisation. For the problem of overcrowding is becoming acute. The Japanese are excellent farmers, and their frugality is beyond question, but tho area of cultivable land is not great enough to support so numerous a population. Japan has now available for colonisation Korea, the Liao-tung Peninsula, and one-half of the island of Saghalien, together with such portions of Manchuria in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway as she may be able to colonise without actually possessing.

The writer goes on to show that ' The- plain fact is that up till the present time Japan has been unable to induce any considerable number of iier people to fettle in the Liao-tung Peninsula, or elsewhere in Manchuria or Sag-, haiien. . . . The Chinese and . the Koreans, their competitors in these regions, work and thrive on wages which the Japanese cannot accept without - lowering, or at least altering; thgir mode of life. . . . In short, for the-Japan-ese farmer, as for tho Japanese laborer ! there is nothing to induce him to go to Manchuria. . . . All tho above considerations apply " a fortiori" to the southern half of the. island'of Saghalien. .. . . The experience of tho Japanese: in colonising Formosa has not been fa.'orable. . . . These considerations arc so patent to any intelligent observer' that it would bo idle to suppose that' tho Japanese Government and its expert' advisers have been blind to them. Taken: m connection with the rapid increase: of. population in Japan, they constitute the current problem of that country. Japan must restrict its rate of increase, must: find an outlet, must greatly develop the; manufacturing industry, or must permit its population to sink, through incrcas-. ing subdivision of the cultivable land, into tho hopeless poverty of the Chinese. If they migrate, where- are the Japanese to go? Not northwards, for we have reenthe obstacles which lie in the way; not into the tropics ; not westwards, for China, is already full to overflowing. Must they not migrate- across the oceans of _ the world, eastwards on their own latitude, or southwards beyond the Equator to the 6outh temperate zone? At present the problem is not acute, for Japan wants soldiers, and taxpayers to pay them, in order that sire may maintain her military position and her national independence, which would be challenged at once either by Russia or China., or by both, if occasion arise. I he Government of Japan has therefore shown itself to be quite disposed at present to limit- emigration to regions other than those selected, on grounds of policy. Biit, sooner or Liter, in the absence of a sufficient gradual stream of emigration, the mere growth of numbers is bound to bring the problem to an acute stage.