THE WAR IN THE PAR EAST.

Evening Star, Issue 12399, 12 January 1905, Page 6

THE WAR IN THE PAR EAST.

THE HERO OF PORT ARTHUR HIS SORRY PLIGHT CRITICISED AT HOME AUD ABROAD A BASIS OF PEACE THE JAPANESE “SAVAGES.” Press Association—By Telegraph—Copyright, KOROP ATKIN’S PLEA. HIS. NEXT BATTLE. LONDON, January 11. (Received January 12, at 7.36 a.m.) General Knropatkin urges that prompt reinforcements be sent him, pleading that he -expects a general attack in February. CORRESPONDENTS’ VIEWS. LONDON, January 11, There is a complete deadlock on the Sh»-ho owing to tho strength of the defences. THE GARRISON FEE AND WELL. LONDON, January 1L Tho ‘ Daffy Telegraph’s ’ Port Arthur correspondent says that the Russian prisoners show no sign of starvation. They are in the best of health and condition. The officers keenly feel the humiliation of the surrender. Tho hospitals at Kiao-chau (German) are ready' to receive some of the Port Arthur Russian wounded. The Hamburg-Ameri - can lane is bearing tho cost of transport. NEARLY 400 MINES. RUSSIA’S HUMILIATION. LONDON, January 11. The Japanese destroyed 395 mines within a radius of forty males of Port Arthur. General Nogi reports that Generals Nikitin and Bail! and Admiral Winin are prisoners. Generals Bcis, Nadien, and Kostinkoff and Admirals Uchtomsky, Qrigoviviteh, and Roshtihski were paroled. STOESSEL CONDEMNED. THE CUSTOMARY REACTION. LONDON, January 11. (Received January 12, at 7.35 a.m.) The ‘Daily Telegraph’ says that General Stoeasel is sharply criticised in St. Petersburg for sending heme inaccurate reports, and for not mentioning General Smirnoff, to whom Port Arthur owes its strength and the soldiers their enthusiasm.

‘The TimesV Tokib correspondent says that the Press, while applauding the bravery of Stoessd’s defence, are unanimous in condemning his nnsoldierllke taking of the oath and returning home without his army. AN EXPLOSION. THE IRREPRESSIBLE KAISER. LONDON, January 11. The explosion of a mine at Port Arthur killed twenty Japanese. The Kaiser has conferred the German Order of Merit on General Stoessel and General Nogi.

'FUAT INVINCIBLE NAVY.

MORE GUSHING PREDICTIONS.

LONDON, January 11. (Received January 12, at 8.48 a.m.)

Admiral Dubassoff, interviewed, stated that Admiral Rozhdestvensky cannot hope to sneefed.

He believed peace -was approaching on the basis of Japan retaining Port Arthur and all she occupied of Manchuria. Later, ■when the Russians had organised an invincible navy, then the war would be resumed. '

A SILLY EFFUSION. <

A RUSSIAN TALKS MORALITY,

ST. PETERSBURG, January 11. (Received January 1?, at 8.48 a.m.)

Tolstoi's son Leo, writing to the ‘Novoo Vremya,’ says that Britain, that model afly, is spying on. Admiral Rozhdestvensky. He adds that. Britain’s affiance with the yellow skins will ensure her downfall, since contact with savages is always demoralising. THE SIBERIAN RAILWAY. LONDON, January 11. (Received January 12, at 8.48 a.m.) The entire duplication of the Siberian Railway has been abandoned, experts stating that, it will occupy three years and a-half. Only those stretches erf country where there is exceptional congestion will he duplicated. AN ARMY OF DESERTERS. January 11. (Received January 12/ at 8.58 a.m.) There are 12,000 Russian deserters at Lemberg, mostly destitute Poles and Jews. A collection was made to enable them to proceed to America. NOTES ON THE WAR. [Bt Kastojl] —Admiral Dubassofi’s Opinion.— The port admiral at Libau seems to be a sensible fellow. Interviewed, he stated “ that Admiral Rozhdestvensky cannot hope to succeed. He believed peace was approaching on the basis of Japan retaining Port Arthur and all she occupies of Manchuria. Later, the Russians had organised an invincible navy, then the war would be resumed.” This opinion of Admiral DubassofFs really touches bed-rock. There is, of course, no necessity to take the question of overtures for peace into consideration, because the Russian Administration seem to lack that oneness of purpose and aim which we are accustomed to associate with the term “government,” anil consequently it is impossible to foresee what Czardom is likely to do. There must be many highly-placed persons in Russia who can see well enough that, in a naval and military way, Russia occupies a handicapped position, and . it is conceivable—in fact, likely—that these persons would be willing to see peace concluded on the very basis which Admiral Dubassoff mentions. On the other hand, it can be plainly seen that the party now dominant.in Russia is all for the continuance of hostilities. Now, what js such a contra nation of hostilities likely to lead to? I am quite sure that the mere accumulation of Russian troops on the theatre of war will never suffice to retake Port Arthur, however great that accumulation of troops may he. The fact, about Port Arthur is that it can never be taken or retaken ter a purely land enterprise. The strategic rule which determines the possession of a coastal fortress is always the same when that fortress occupies a salient position. The possession of every marine salient depends solely on the command of the sea. Supposing that our own Otago Peninsula, instead of being merely .separated from the mainland hy a shallow harbor, everywhere easily passable, jutted straight out into the Pacific Ocean, no land force in _ New Zealand could defend it or any fwtificivtions that wn might phfcce oipon

it. against an attack comingraoH/THa; ska. .The fact that land forts must generally prove too much for ships , does; not ’ enter into the question, for the very good reason' that the ships would steer clear of the fortifications, and seek e merely to cover the landward communications of the. place by placing troops upon the Musselburgh isthmus. With the nomenclature changed—that is, with; Kin-chow- substituted for Musselbnigh-rthis was just what the Japanese did at Port Arthur. . When in the early morning of February 9 the Japanese hit _ t.be Retvrsan and the 'lhaxovitch with their torpedoes Port Arthur was' practically lost, for, by that occurrence, a temporary command of the sea had been established which nothing hut the timely arrival of the Baltic fleet was likely to upset. Li writing ,this I am not squeezing into the category of those who are wise after the event, because the fact that Port Arthur was a dead loss and the additional fact that the Japanese would surely come on it via the .Kinchow Isthmus were clearly set out in these notes as soon as the temporary disablement of the two best. Russian ships was announced in/February. The geometry of the Kwan-tung Peninsula is a subject. worthy of all emphasis, because it ensures the permanent possession of Port Arthur by Japan, always provided that that Power keeps the command of - the sea. It is said that in the, spring Kuropatkin will have 450,000 men in his three armies, and possibly there may. be some expectation that, with this force, he will endeavor to retake Port Arthur. His chance of doing so cannot be summed up too clearly or too emphatically. He has no chance whatever. To retake Port Arthur he must come by the same isthmus, and, no matter how great his armies may be, be cannot crowd them in cm a two-mile front, perfectly open, and shellswept with a cross and converging naval fire coming from Ta-lien-wan on one side of the neck and Ban-chow Bay on .the other. This point is worthy of all the more emphasis because we have such correspondents as Mr A. G. Hales constantly obscuring the issue. A cable message recently stated that Stoessel was led to believe that Kuropatkin had advanced to within a short distance of the beleaguered town—a sheer impossibility, as Stoessel must have known very wed. Mr Hales is also said to “ have staked his reputation” on the fact that Port Arthur would not fall It seemsthat this opinion was founded on seme bqjief in the transcendent strength of the Port Arthur forts, and not on any consideration of possible fluctuations of the balance of sea power. In making this statement Mr Hales pleads guilty to a want of knowledge of the ABC of war, because no matter how strong the fortifications were, the issue was ccrtaifi to be decided by considerations other than those of mere attack and defence. The landward communications of the place were completely severed, and though there never appears to have been any blockade on the seaward side worth speaking of, the besiegers were bound, sooner or later, to work into positions whence blockade-runners entering the harbor could lie sunk. In short, the place was a dead loss whichever way it was looked at. Tlie same thing would happen to Gibraltar if we ever lost the command of the sea, or to any other fortress occupying a salient position. In the Home papers just now several writers, touching on the general question of the reduction of fortresses, have contrived to lump fortresses such as Kronstadt and Gibraltar into the same category. Here again we have the same fundamental misconception which underlies all these cheap opinions. Gibraltar and Kronstadt do not come into the same category at all, for the simple reason that while - the position of the former is salient the position of the latter is decidedly re-entrant. In the first case possession is determined by sea power. In the latter case sea power does not come into the question at all. In our last war with Russia we had complete possession of the command of the sea, but that did not prove sufficient to give us Kronstadt, although we would dearly have liked to have taken it. We took Sebastopol, however. Why! Just because jt was a salient, and therefore bound to fall to a Power or Powers possessing the command of the sea. The rule is universal, and it seems to underlie the opinion of Admiral Dubassoff, cabled to-day. Without the command of the sea Russia can never retake Port Arthur, and with the command of the sea, added to a skilful use of field fortification, Japan is not likely to be driven from the Liao-tung Peninsula. It will be remembered that the opinion of the German General Staff, recently cabled, was to the effect that Russia cannot now achieve an absolute win. That opinion and Admiral DubassofFs, though varying in. form, are almost identical in meaning. This, perhaps, will be better seen by ruling off a line from the Yalu to Niu-chwang. Everything south of that line belongs to Japan, and will belong to her as long as she is predominant at sea. Should she ever cease to be mistress on the blue water she loses -everything, Port Arthur included. The idea of sea power underlies the whole war, and Admiral Dubassoff quite grasps that point. His meaning as to organising an “ invincible naw ” is not very clear, because one is naturally inclined to wonder what Japan would be doing while Russia was making her “invincible” naval preparations. Probably the Admiral means that in an extensive shipbuilding competition the financial resources of Russia would outlast those of Japan; but if it is true, as we were informed yesterday, that Berlin has had to underwrite the last Russian loan, even this part of the outlook is not at all promising. Looking at the whole situation as it appears to be at present, I am inclined to think that all that Russia can now hope for is the preservation of yiadivostock.’and it is even doubtful whether she will manage that. It is possible, also, that continued defeats may bring in another factor, quite apart from military and naval ones, that may exercise a great influence on the course of the war. This factor, of course, is internal ferment. The Russian people may not have understood that Port Arthur was as good as lost when the squadron inside it was. disposed of, and they may not yet understand that the loss of the fortress is less important than the loss of the fleet, but the actual fall of Port Arthur will, nevertheless, bring a heavy sense of defeat home to the dullest intelligence -in Russia. In this connection one of to-day’s cables is significant. It states that “ delegates from all the Zemstvos adhering to the common Zemstvos’ organisation meet in Moscow in February.” This is an extraordinary measure, because normally the district Zemstvos meet in September and the provincial Zemstvos in December. iKoother meeting, either of the Zemstvos themselves or of delegations from the Zemstvos can take place without the special permission of the Minister of the Interior. A meeting in February is a sensational proceeding, whatever it may mean.