ARMY REFORM.

Evening Star, Issue 11512, 1 April 1901, Page 2

ARMY REFORM.

'•DEBATE IN THE lIOUSE OF LORDS. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WITHOUT AUTHORITY. LANSDOWNE DENOUNCES HIM AS A FAILURE. LONDON, March 4. The Duke of Bedford in the House of Lords to - day started a discussion of army matters by asking for information on the military administration and the War Office. Lord Wolseley arose after the Duke of Bedford had done speaking, and for two or three hours he attacked tho military system of Great Britain in a carefully written speech, which, it is understood, he" has long meditated and praised in consultation with his friends.

"My arguments," he said, "are not directed against the individuals, but against tho military system, which I have honestly tried for five years and have found wanting, and which entails many great dangers not realised by the people of this realm." Lord Wolseley said he had worked with the Marquis of Lansdowne, and there had not been a single disagreeable incident. His complaint was that the professional Com-mander-in-Chief was robbed of his chief usefulness. He had to hand over the command and tho entire management of the army to a civilian Secretary of State, assisted by subordinates, with whom he dealt direct. The responsibility for everything rested with the Secretary of State alone. The Com-mander-in-Cnief could only bring strongly the wants of the army' to the attention of the Secretary. He had often done so. After that ho could do no more.

He added : " Although the various needs are undisputed, not only are no steps taken to meet them, but no one outside of the Government is aware that their urgency has been raised. The Government have thought it advisable, for economic reasons, to postpone their provision, but yet they will not take the nation into their confidence. That such important demands for men and stores have been put forward by experts and nevertheless refused I cannot assert too emphatically. It behoves Parliament to devise a plan by which strong representations made and still refused should be laid before the nation for it to decide between the experts and the economists?" In no other way can we safeguard the Empire from great and unknown perils. Many an evening at the end of a day's work I have felt sick at heart when I contemplated the great national risks deliberately accepted by the Government who happened to be in office. Why were they so accepted? Because it was not then politically expedient to ask Parliament for money."

Lord Wolseley outlined the present system, which he said was entirely unsuited for the army, under which it would never lw efficient, and he doubted much if they would ever have a contented army. When hr. accepted the office of Commander-in-Chief he had been told it w.u proposed to introduce regulations greatly altering the position of future Commandcrs-in-Cbiof. When }fe learned the nature • f ti.esc they were not to his liking, but he L;id honestly givsn th)e.m five years' tr:.il. and was convinced they would never n:nkc, ;>n effective army. Up to 1895 he (the Com-mander-in-Chief) was responsible to the Secretory of State that the army was thoroughly trained for war. Since 1895 the responsibility had been with the UnderSecretary of State, with subdivisions, each under a. military head and each advising '.Jic Secretary of State without reference to the Commander-in-Chief. He pointed cut in detail how the distribution of responsibility disorganised and impaired the war machine. It was an unworkable and impossible system. The Commander-in-Chief had no effective control, neither had the heads of departments, and the work and cross references in all branches had been largely increased. " My lords, I need, scarcely tell you," said Lord Wolseley, impressively, " that our soldiers do not love the War Office, nor its civilian rulers. You cannot flout the sentiment of the arm}- without injuring its morale."

In conclusion, Lord Wolseley said:—"lt might -reasonably be asked if the army system is so bad, how it was that such a large army was despatched to South Africa in so satisfactory a manner. The answer is simple. No army system, however bad, would be allowed to stand in the way at such a time by officials like those composing the headquarters staff in 1899. I have known the War Office for twenty-eight years, and I unhesitatingly say it could not have been composed of better men than those serving when President Kruger declared war. They were effectively helped by the generals and other officers at the ports of embarkation, all of whom were determined that the army should be despatched, system or no system. But in so doing they were not helped by the new army system. If ever the history of what was then done is fully written, the country will then realise how much it owes to those officials, and how little to the new-fangled experimental and unmilitary system under which they were supposed to work."

The Marquis of Lansdowne (former War Minister) replied to Lord Wolseley immediately. He said he was constrained to say that Lord Wolseley, during his term of office, had failed to understand his duties. He might at least have warned the Government that one Army Corps was not sufficient to crush the Boers. Lord Wolseley might have cnahled the Government to "turn to better use the auxiliary forces of the country. He might have told tho Government before the South African War that Ladysmith was not a suitable military station. He might have prepared schemes for defensive and offensive operations. Lord Wolseley had restricted his duties ; he had not taken advantage of the opportunities at hand. The War Office system might have been changed to advantage in details; but the main principle of enabling the Secretary of State to get advice from his experts at first hand ho'was not willing to give up. The mistakes and failures in South. Africa were not due to the system, but to the fact that it was not carried out as faithfully as it might have been.

The noble Lord had failed to appreciate the immense importance of the special duties assigned to him. The Marquis of Lansdowne, upon the eve of his departure from the War Office, had considered a military note Lord Wolsetey had addressed, he believed, to Lord Salisbury upon this subject. He found, to his intense surprise, that Lord Wolseley, in enumerating his duties, had omitted altogether that he was responsible for the mobilisation of the army, that the Intelligence Department was under his special control, or that he was charged with the preparation of plans of offence and defence.

The debate will be resumed to-morrow. Lord Wilseley had a notable audience including Chamberlain, Sir William Vernon Harcourt, Sir Charles Dilke, Asquith, Brodnck. Wyndham, and other prominont men while Lord Rosebery. who is credited with being in the strongest sympathy with him, was especially prominent during the sitting and constantly flitting about, speaking to the chief actors in the scene. He will probably speak himself to-morrow, when, judging from Lord Lansdowne's unexpected personal attack on Lord Wolseley, the debate will be still more dramatic.

Lord Wolseley read his speech so quicklv and carelessly that, although it was well put together, it proved quite ineffective from an oratorical point of vtow, and aroused no excitement in the usually listless House The sensation of the debate was Lord Lansdowries attack, revealing the strongest friction existing between the two men. Very few papers approve Lord Wolseley's proposal to appeal to the country. Lord Lansdowne's assertion that Wd Wolselev rogarded one Army Corps as sufficient to cope with the Boers was generaUv discussed in the lobbies of Parliament in tie evening It wa* regarded as so remarkable that the general feeling is .that there must have been a misunderstanding, because it was reported a year ago that Lord Wolseley thought two Aimy Corps would be inadequate. In anticipation of further interesting disclosures, the House of Lords was crowded to-day, when the debate on the War Office administration was resumed. v The Duke of Cornwall and York and many peeresses were present.

The Earl of Northbrook (Liberal) took up the defence 1 of Lord Wolseley. He deprecated Lord Lansdowne's personal attack on

the former Commander-hvChief yesterday and' the disclosure of a confidential' communTc'ation to Lord Salisbury.

The Duke of Devonshire, Lord President of the Council, defended the War Office system.

Lord Rosebery described Lord Wolseley's speech as a public-spirited effort to call attention to some of tie defects he had found in the practical working of the army administration. He said Lord Laasdowne's reply was a censure of Lord Wolselcy which toad no reference to the subject. He suggested a parliamentary inquiry into the deficiencies of the War Office.

Lord Salisbury said the discipliniste had not realised that the army was under Parliament, and that the Minister who controlled the army did it. as one responsible to Parliament, and represented all the authority "with which Parliament invested him. The CommandeT-in-ChKjf must be subordinate to the Secretary of State. The system had worked well in the past, and must be made to work well in the future. Success would not be attained alone I y the machine, however'perfect, but, as attested by every page of history, simply oy the strength, brilliancy, and vigor of the mem employed. The debate was wound up by Lord Wolseley asking the House to reserve judgment, regarding the reflections cast on him, as probably later he would again refer to the allegations. Commenting upon the debate in the House of Lords, the ' Morning ( Post' (Conservative) calls Lord Salisbury "a Premier in despair," 'and proceeds to tell the Government plainly that " the country cares nothing.about constitutiohal difficulties, but cares a deal about having a properly organised and efficient armv."

"In Lord Roberta " (says the ' Morning Post') "the country has a, Commander-in-Chief whom it can trust, and whose being sent to South Africa last year saved the political existence of the Government. If the Government are wise, therefore, they will consult Lord Roberts as to the necessary revision of the present system."