CAN FRANCE INVADE ENGLAND?

Evening Star, Issue 11451, 19 January 1901, Page 8

CAN FRANCE INVADE ENGLAND?

[By Sir JohnColumb, in the Newcastle , -, ‘ Chronicle.’] This theme is attractive to very many writers. It offers a. wide field for the exercise of imagination. But my object is simply to call attention to madders within the region of ascertained or ascertainable facts. I am prepared to accept without question anything and everything anybody chooses to declare would happen after the landing of a vast army on our coast. This absolutely apathetic attjtnde will no doubt appear very shocking, so it may be as well to explain it. It is the result of long and careful survey of the conditions under which the British people live, and move, and- have their being. This has produced a fixed belief that if the day ever dawns when a vast foreign army can leave its ports, cross the water, rendezvous within sound of the surf rippling along British sands to disembark horse, foot, and artillery, there will be nothing left for England worth the shedding of blood, except perhaps to trp and secure the preservation of Westminster Abbey, or to extort the stipulation that the graves of Nelson and Wellington shall not be disturbed at St. Paul’s. Whether this .be a true or false view of the British position is open to dispute. It is deeply to he regretted that the economic aspects of the question are not more examined and discussed. We are saturated with quasi military literature about invasion, but there is a sad lack of popular information of the social and economic conditions which must prevail before any attempt at a great invasion becomes possible. The total disruption of British social, commercial, and financial systems, produced by the suspension of all ordinary operations resulting from loss of out control of our own waters, is the preliminary stage through which wo must pass before our enemy can venture a vast army in a multitudinous flotilla ou the sea. When and if such a state of things prevails, it is quite open to question whether the hostile Power need make and direct military attack at all to bring us on our knees as a suppliant for mercy. Wo remember the effect on the single comity of Lancashire produced by the limitation put by naval force on the export of cotton from a few ports thousands of miles away. We teo well know and dread the consequences of a single strike or lock-out in any one branch of our innumerable industries. Now, the penultimate stage of operations of war leading up to the possibility of a vast army, iu a concrete organised mass, attempting to cross the water is simply this : our waters are free to the enemy, not to us. The consequence of this must bo inability on onr part to import and export at a price that would pay for manufacture. The operation of the natural law of risk enhancing price, wculd extinguish profit, the margin of which, in the fierce competition of the world’s markets, is now very narrow indeed. Mills and factories cannot be kept running without raw material, and when profit ceases tliev are shut. The economic state of this country under conditions rendering it possible for a vast army to pass in one great hulk over the sea would apparently be this—v;z,, production and business, other than inat concerning munitions of war'and the drill.ng of men, would be suspended, and ;hc puw ment of wages to millions of operatives and employes cease. This would be inevitably coupled with a terrific rise in the cost i,’f the necessaries of life. Now, the general cessation of weekly wages to the masses could not continue, under popular government, for an indefinite number of Saturdays without influencing national policy rather in the direction of negotiations than of blind and hopeless resistance. The assumption that such a state of things does not spell capitulation requires another to be made to justify it. It must be assumed it would bs in our power to recover control of our own waters in a very short space of time. Under such circumstances alone could any attempt at a great military descent be necessarv to complete our subjugation. In that case* the nsk would be too great, while without reasonable hope of onr recovering maritime control such a military effort would be superfluous. _ In either event the element of time in relation to economic conditions must rule the whole problem then presented to England and her foes. °

can be but the mflrtaiy finish of a naval drama. It is too often forgotten that it is not primarily a military question at all. Soldiers can only a Plf lr “ the la ?t act just before the curtain falls. This military climax can only be readied through a sequence of naval events lo one or two of these I will now turn attention, in the hope of assisting my readers to tonn their own opinion on the broad features of our military bugbear. For the necessary purpose of illustration I wffl assume Prance the would-be invader. I do so simply on the ground of gcooraphical proximity, and on no other. The position of her northern shore in relation to our coast presents the most favorable geographical opportunities for the operation mder review. It is my desire to avoid the remotest suspicion of harborirm M-wid to France, or a belief that the mass of the great French people nurture ill-will towards us. It is the geographical fact stated which compels me to take Prance as an example, which is all the stronger bv reason of the greatness of her armaments and the gallantly and chivalry of her sailors and troops.

Now, let my reader suppose he is the supreme ruler of France, the master of her great sea and land forces, with all the in finite resources of that great nation at command. There is war with England, and the ■whole war power of France is to be applied for the specific purpose of invading this cotmhy. What are the conditions "to be satisfied, 'vrhat the order of proceeding br which the object is to be achieved? “in a few hours the whole French armv can be mobilised, in a few days it can be concentrated in and around French channel ports / ro ™ D “ a | drk inclusive, while the battle fleets and war vessels crowd the war ports of Brest and Cherbourg. This is the obvious preliminary parade,“presenting no difficulties whatever. Preparations for it coaid be secretly made, but its execution could not be kept secret. Any such change in the distribution in the French fleet be known to onr Admiralty while hj was "n progress, whether it took place befire ,“ r after the declaration of war. Onr ficei would be mobilised, its distribution be;, I ruled by that of the French fleet. There would be a panic on the Stock Exchan-Y the money market “ tight,” and marine Insurance and freight would rise. The naval aspects of the situation would be — the superior battle power would be in fons on one side of the Channel, the inferior in ports on the other. Every square mile of the water area lying between us would be under close observation day and nig’y- bv a. multitude of our scouts, mostly “drawn from the mercantile marine. Anv'rttempt by tie French fleet to leave their ports would be known to ours in an hour -w two and its movements followed until 0.j.overtook*. Now, until our superior power is disposed of by the inferior force, the French. Army, so far as purposes of attack are concerned, would be like the fly in amber. It could only practice embarkin'* and disembarking m such of its own harbors as were secured from shell fire from the sea. Not a ship or even, a boat could sums e conflagration in ports open to shell ure our smaller cruisers and armed scouts. In effect, therefore, the possible por s of rime of the army to invade us would be limit.--! to Brest, Cherbourg, and possitfly Havre* My readers will now, I hope, begin to see that the nature and strength of the military force which can simultaneously move on the water to the attack is ruled, no ‘„ bv -,] le will of the master of legions, but hmodation in the ports of issue—the .trot the depth of water, the influence of tide's’ the berthing capacity, extent of nuavs’ wharfage and shipping facilities at such ports to fix the limits and determine ihe strength of the force intended to marcu'on London.

I pass by other interesting and most im--portant considerations, such as the collection of the means for the water transport of the troops at the ports, and the maritime operation of concentration in the Channel of the flotillas after clearing from their different ports. About these things our young men see visions and onr old men dream dreams. My remarks must he brief, and so I confine myself chiefly to the qud,saniigettbg to

With our practice, experience, and preeminence in this business it is pure folly to imagine any other nation could do whab we cannot in matters of embarkation and despatch to sea. In affording facilities for this operation London} Southampton, and Liverpool stand supreme. Is it to be supposed that a greater force could be shipped and sent to sea from Brest, Cherbourg, and Havre to invade England, and in less time than wo have found possible in the case of despatch to South Africa from London, Southampton, and Liverpool? It is only an aggravation of egregious necromancy to allege, in justification ot such a supposition, the difference between a long voyage and a short passage. It is much simpler and quicker to embark a force of, say, 1,000 or 2.000 men with guns, horses, and stores in one ocean steamer alongside one wharf than to sort them*out among half a dozen vessels of all sorts and sizes from different wharfs, or riding at anchor away from them. To gob one steamer to sea carrying 1,000 or 2.000 troops is an easier and quicker process than to get half a dozen vessels, with 1,000 or 2,000 troops distributed among them, clear of harbor.

But the real difference between our dcspatch of troops to Mouth Africa and tue arrangement of the would-be, invader lies in the totally opposite circumstances of the disembarkation at the end of the sea transit.. In the one case, we could wholly disregard preservation of the organisation of an army to lake the field in our method of shipping our force. V.’e were sending it to ports in our own territories. Thus, wc could and did embark troops, guns, horses, and stores without reference to formation or organised groups. Wo shipped and despatched them at different times and from different ports at home and abroad, according to departmental convenience. The task of the would-be invaders would bo entirely different, and infinitely more complex. The embarkation and despatch of the entire and complete army must be simultaneous. As the disembarkation is to bo in a hostile country, the various arms must be distributed in the flotilla according to the military necessities of an opposed landing in boats on an open beach-. This is but one of a whole series of perplexing puzzles the would-be invader must solve before he can begin even to think how (he heterogeneous swarm of vessels can be got out of port, ovea by driblets, in a burn-, and “all on a summer’s day.” or how order and punctuality of transit can be secured with captains wholly unaccustomed to concerted action, while their vessels would he crowded with troops, guns, horses, stores, and supplies, and encumbered with countless rafts and boats for landing. I have presumed to invite my reader to fancy himself the supreme ruler of France, and intent upon “ The Invasion of England.” I leave him to think out the matter from the points of view I venture to so rudely suggest. He will doubtless be aware of the facts of our own most recent experience. I need hardly remind him that with our unrivalled experience and matchless facilities for the flotation of military force we did not get the equivalent of a single army corps to sea in a week—the difficulty being, not the getting of organised military forces to the edge of the water, but of getting them on to it and off to sea, llhe- believers in a sudden descent on our coast of a great army are therefore bound to explicitly explain how it is possible that France or any other Power could embark and send to sea simultaneously five or six comolctc army corps, when our experience shows that we could not send off, even in detachments, the equivalent of one in a week.