A PILL FOR PESSIMISTS.

Evening Star, Issue 11168, 17 February 1900, Page 8

A PILL FOR PESSIMISTS.

TO TUB EDITOR.

Sir, —K ; n Ty print the extract beneath fn in an ardclo by Colonel Maurice in iho ‘ Forlnieht’y,’ written not a week or two ago, but in 18S8 or twelve years back. Colonel Maurice ii a military writer ol note, a man whom Lord Wolaeloy is not above quoting, and the author of an article on war in the ‘ Encyclopedia Dritannica,’ which may be seen in Ihe reference library in our local Athenoum. To anyone iuteretted it will well repay perusal at the present juncture :

“The general of every army in the field, no matter to what country he belongs, has of neccisityto employes a part of hia art. whal are oidint.r.ly known es ‘ ruses de guerre.’ The very essence of these is that operations which l:e undertakes shall he of a deceptive cl'aniatcr. Mow, in our days you cannot impose upon an enemy without leaving a false impress’Vi of your intentions on your friends. For a German general, acting under the immediate orders of his Emperor, himself present in the field, such delicate work is at least unhampered by any other considerations hut those of warlike expediency. How different is lbs case of an En"liih general ! Every skilfully planned attempt to 1 keep his enemy alarmed,’ without unnecessarily exposing his own troops, leads immediately to reports sent not only Home, hut to every capital in Europe, of the ‘futile enterprises he has undertaken.’ Such comments are at once discounted at their proper value by the experienced soldiers of Europe, whether in Paris, Vienna, or Berlin. But at Home the E-.g'.ish public, who, as Sir Arthur Wellesley long since said of them, ‘ never form an accurate estimate of the d.fficulties of any military enterprise which they undertake,’ are invariably and always imposed upon. Distrust spreads through the country. The House of Commons, as a body, is effected by it. Ministers begin to feel the pressure. The general at the very moment* that ho most needs support begins to find it fail him. . . . The consequence is—l appeal to the records of ‘ Hansard ’ to verify the exact accuracy of my statement—that in each of these campaigns, during all the period of preparation which is essential to rapid action, the Government continuously, more and more, lose the support of the majority. Ministers themselves, who in England never go through that training for understanding the work of armies in the field which on the Continent it is the duty alike

of statesmen and princes to undergo, become alarmed. Imploring letters from men whose entreaty is very nearly a command reach the general: ‘We have the greatest possible confidence in you ; but you see how we arc placed. Do, for heaven’s sake, do something. Let us have something to show you are not idle.’ All this comes just at the time when the work is at its very hardest—when to ‘do ’ anything of the kind that is required means at the very beat most serious delay in the achievement of the final result. It takes a very strong man, and a man with very great prestige, to resist such pressure. Every year the danger becomes greater. Telegraphic communication becomes more perfect. Larger armies than we have yet employed will, after they are landed, need longer preparation before results can be shown. . . .” These extracts are by no means inapt in February, 1900.—lam, etc,, „ , Britisher. February 16.