TRAMWAY PARES TO CAVERSHAM.

Evening Star, Issue 8116, 16 January 1890, Page 2

TRAMWAY PARES TO CAVERSHAM.

THE DOUBLE FARE AFTER 9 p.m, DECLARED LAWFUL.

Sitting at the City Police Court this morning, Mr Carew, Resident Magistrate, delivered judgment as follows in the previously-heard case of Williams v. Cole, an information laid on behalf of the Tramway Company against the Mayor of Caversham for refusing to pay double fare on the Caversham line after 9 p.m. : The question is whether the Tramway Company act within their legal rights so far as travellers are concerned in charging the sum of 2d a section, being double fare, after nine o'clock at night. Section 10, Tramways Act, 1872, provides that the Order-in-Oounod authorising the construction of a tramway "shall specify the nature of the traffic for which such tramway shall be used, and the tolls and charges which may be demanded and taken by the promoters in respect of the same ’’; and section 46 provides that "the promoters or lessees of a tramway authorised by Order may demand and take in respect of such tramway tolls and charges not exceeding the sums specified in such Order, subject and according to the regulations therein specified.” The tolls and charges fixed by the Caversham Order are for ordinary trams between the hours of 7 a.m. and 9 p.m, for each passenger a fare not exceeding 4d each way, and after the hour of 9 p.m. double fares may be charged The full double fare authorised by the Order is therefore 8d twice the sum the company charge from Dunedin to the Caversham terminus. The defendant, however, rests his case upon a clause in the agreement between the Borough of Caversham and the promoter of the tramway, that whenever the tolls, rates, and charges shall be lowered, the promoter shall have no power to raise or increase such charges without the consent in writing of the Corporation, and that as for soma time no more than the fare of Id a secdon—that is, single fare—was charged after nine o’clock, the company cannot raise it to 2d without the written consent of the Corporation. Tho question thed is whether, if the company is bcund under the agreement to chage now only single fares, that agreement will override tho Oider-in- Council. Ido not think the statute will bear that construction. Local bodies have the power,_under section 5 of the Act, to make it a condition of their consent to an order beins made, that the promoter shall give security for the due performance of his agreement, abd a clause is contained in the Caversham agreement which provides for the payment to the Corporation of L2 a day as liquidated damages for the breach by the promoter of certain terms and conditions of tho agreement. This appears not to include the agreement in respept to tho fares. Why not I do not know, unless it be that it was acknowledged that it was not a subject for agr. ement, but one to be provided for solely by Order-in-Council. I feel satisfied the company can fix and demand any rate of fare not exceeding the maximum set out in the Order inCouncil, The demand of 2d was therefore in my opinion lawful, and the defendant must he convicted. Defendant is fined 10s ; costs of Couit, 9s ; witness, 4a lOd ; professional, 21-’.