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THE DEFECE REPORT.

i:y.y < Major-g^ral says i—"'Since I arrived in Mardh last I have had opporfamitiest >of visiting most of the works 01 defenceoeenstructed or in progress at the utMelßjal harbors, and, with the aid of the platiraid the very full information supplied wmsfyy Major-general Sir' G.' Whitmore ami'An staff r l have been able to form to the number of troops "now as to, a suitable organisation fpr ? tonn. The comparatively hasty inspections ..of the works, of jdefenqe which I, have hMexto made have not. enabled me to state absolute confidence 'what Is hecessiryTbr completing them, but judging from wpn I have seen and from the plans and estimates shown to me I have reason to believe tiiafc if the 1 designs of the works -remam&bj to be executed are sliglitiy mooted it i*3B&ftt be found necessary to exceed, rtiieße Estimates. The Permanent Jorce I jhave reoommended is absolutely needed' for the due care and proper use of the guns and wairmateriai provided aß4>rdere«ii but mjtU the whole of the A further saving in the portion of by allowing capitatJoa to onlytwo-durds of the numbers given in the. annexed estimaie. This will Suffice foirthft ; «isuhTg l^[ and possibly, the full ownben regnmnna^ot are needed, ,mpi» ejipeoMtrjif WeJltDgtoa, where I B Tp*2*^JJStBSt» .numerous asss lie three ftlnsVDdi.'ftP^HHihS^ahtfeoin:o™iSS*ap*^w |n prAWdujg the war mateqal, is Aokibejag embrawd of m cxguSabig-its idefeneeibuoesias t»< aafceijfnß vte-ojhtta piovided.>/ «atisfactory to note that ail the newguus wfibb are already of beingjeft usekssly In store.'- 1& TOM mWMjKmi'ticular *<»f Wmil^^feAißT^qtoiilOTwr and resources ct-tne Uolony in ns «otn-

maintenance of good order'throughout these Islands has become practically a matter for. magistrate and thepplice. Th|s beiigthe casq.ifc is evidently.advisable to reconsider the military situation, and to reorganise the defence system of the Colony in accordance with its altered circumstances. Briefly, these altered circumstances are as follow :—Peace within its own'.borders; prosperity .vastly increased uptfn the Mole, notwithstanding the depression whioh New Zealand (like the rest of the civilised world) is feeling at the present time; the country opened up by roads, railways, and telegraphs; communication established both in the Colony and with other parts oLthe-world, chiefly through the aid of a magnificent fleet of steamers and tailing vessels; the population and wealth concentrated;mainly on the shores of the principal harbors—Auckland, Wellington, LytteUon for Christchurch, and Port Chalmers for-Dunedin. Concomitantly, however, with this material progress, a new danger has inevitably appeared to be guarded against, which those responsible for the safety ana well-being of the Colony have felt it necessary to make preparations for the cupidity of foreign nations and their possible hostility to the British Empire. New Zealand is liable at very short notice to an attack by hostile vessels, with the double object of obtaining money, coals, and stores of all kinds by force, and of inflicting injury and humiliation on a portion of the British Empire. It is. well known that a fully equipped naval force was prepared and on the eve of starting on its tour oi spoliation and destruction throughout the ports of; Australia and New Zealand a few years ago,- when war with a powerful European nation was imminent, and when the porta in these islands were independent. Since that time, recognising the serious danger to which they, are exposed, the Australian colonies have all earnestly taken up the question of defence against external aggression, both by naval means and also by the local defence of their principal harbors. New Zealand has not been behindhand in these necessary precautions; and when the whole scheme of defence now in hand is completed, it will be so very dangerous for any enemy's vessel to attack any of the principal harbors of the Colony, or to levy - contributions oh the towns connected with these harbors by the threat of bombardment, that it may be confidently asserted that no such attempt would he made. The completion of the defence so well begun is, however, of urgent importance, lest the large sum already spent should prove useless, like an insurance policy which has been allowed to lapse, so that when the catastrophe occurs previous expenditure haß been thrown away. When' once the four principal harbors and towns are made safe, there will be no temptation for any enemy's squadron to make any serious attempt on New Zealand. The prize to be obtained, or the injury which could be inflicted at any of the minor towns, would be too insignificant to make it worth an enemy's while to come into these waters for such a purpose. To give, however, some means of self-defence to these smaller towns, and that they may not be at the mercy of any cruisers that might send a boat's crew ashore to demand a subsidy is but reasonable; and this may well be supplied by issuing arms and ammunition to a small body of volunteer riflemen at each of these coast towns—supplemented, it may be in some cases, by a field gun sufficient to cope with the naval guns carried by steam launches. Any threat of bombardment in such cases must be met by defence. The women and children being removed to a place of safety, the fire brigades, assisted by the householders, will be able at little real risk to prevent any serious damage to property by such a barbarous mode of warfare if it be adopted. It has long been recognised in England, as in other countries with an extensive sea-board and numerous seaport towns, that no nation can afford to Srovide for all such towns with effective efences against a strong naval attack. The national defences must in all cases be concentrated at the vital points. Probably the patriotic feelings of the inhabitants of these minor seaport towns will bad them to organise honorary volunteer corps for selfdefence. If this be done, the revenue derived from the taxation of the whole Colony will not have to meet any further charge on account of these local defences beyond;the issue of arms and the cost of annual inspection. Rifle clubs would not alone suffice, as in civilised warfare armed men having no military organisation under the Government would not be considered as soldiers, but would be dealt with like the " Francs-Tireurs " in the last war between France and Germany, and would be shot if taken.prisoners ' Having thus briefly summarised the military situation as it now exists, it will be evident that to maintain military forces in the interior of the country is now useless and a needless expense to the Colony. What is required to meet the present danger is a sufficient garrison at each of the four principal harbors to man the defences at those places. The garrisons should consist in each case of a small body of permanent troops to keep the guns, torpedoes, mines, and other warlike stores in effective order at all times; to perfect themselves in their use by constant practice; and to assist also in training the main, body of defenders,, who would be Volunteers residing in the vicinity of the harbors to be defended. In addition to these Volunteers some organisation is needed for expanding and replenishing the garrisons in case of war; and further, the small bodies of Volunteers before referred to are needed at each of the minor ports for their protection against insult. It iB, however, unquestionably of great importance that every encouragement should be given to the young men of New Zealand to practise rifle-shoot-ing—the most essential and by far tbe most rilffwwilfc part of the training of the infantry soldier. With a large body of young men so trained, past experience shows that in times of emergency the military forces of New Zealand might be rapidly increased to any extent that might be reunited. The formation of rifle clubs throughout the Colony should therefore be encouraged by the supply of rifles and ammunition, and by prizes for shooting, Which latter should be mainly for squadfiring rather than for individual shooting, as the former is of far greater military value than the latter. The existing military organisation .of 'New Zealand has grown up by degrees under the stress of former military necessities—it is nnsuited to the present needs of- the Colony, and this absolute necessity for retrenchment of expenditure in all Departments of the Government which has been unanimously expressed makes it imperative, that the required military reorganisation should be at once undertaken, with the double object of making the defence effective and of reducing the expenditure to the lowest possible point. A large proportion of these Volunteers are country .corps, far removed from the harbors to jibe defended, and who therefore are not now required, except under the remote contingency of an invasion above referred to. Under the present financial condition of the Colony it is out of the question, that these corps should be maintained. After studying carefully the system of defence which has been decided upon at each of the four principal harbors, and having had the advantage of consulting with the officer commanding the forces and his staff, I have come to the conclusion that the existing permanent force cannot advantageously be reduced in numbers at the present. When all the guns and other war material now ordered shall have been mounted and placed in position, as will now very shortly be the case, a permanent force consisting of 252 non-commissioned officers and men will be required to keep them in good order, and to form the nucleus of the defence force. I should propose to unite them in one body called the Coast Brigade, and embracing within its ranks a due proportion of artillerymen, torpedomen, submarine miners, signalmen, testers, electricians, engineers, and other artificers, sod that they should be divided into four detachments localised at the four points in about the following proportion, exclusive of officers :•*— ,

. iWikvupto form Mhia coaat brigade may be obtained. chiefly by. transfers from, the exWm ?ermftnent Militia. I should advise a simple blue uniform for all the brigade, distinguishing men trained ,fo jOEm aunts in the Permanent Corps, 'badges in the Volunteer Corps. A* the men should be trained to seWfe as well as on shore. It U to do away .with the mainly of mar- ymo formerly diet good service in tße> Armed Constabulary, but to reduce

it (by transfers to the Coast Brigade or by not Ming the vacancies as they ocourred) to eighty non-commissioned officers and men; this body is still useful in many ways, but it will be for future consideration whether It will bo permanently kept up or affiliated to the permanent Coast Brigade. There should be a Volunteer Goaßt Brigade Corps to work with the Permanent Brigade and assist them in their several duties. Like the Permanent Corps, the Volunteer Co»Bt ■ Brigade would consist in due proportions of submarine miners, and torpedo arid boatmen, and would be drawn from Volunteers residing at the different ports in the following proportions, including officers:

In addition to these, thore should be a field force at each of the ports consisting of a battalion cf infantry, a troop of mounted infantry, and a battery of position artillery to guard against the landing of parties who might otherwise attempt to storm the batteries, destroy submarine mine defences, or march into the towns. A part of these might be country corps, hn ing easy access by railway to the ports to be defended. The total strength of the field force required I for each place, including all three arms, [ would be about—f Auckland .. .. ..600 , ' Wellington 610 Lyttehon 610 Dunedin .. .. .. 610 Total 2,620 In addition to the above, about 560 Volunteers—infantry and artillery—would be needed for tho mißor ports—viz., Nelson, yfestport, Grcymouth, Bluff, Oamaru, Timartij Napier, Gisborno, New Plymouth, and Wanganui. These, it is hoped, will be honorary corps. The whole defence force now recommended would therefore be as follows: PERMANENT (EXCLUSIVE OF OFFICERS). Coast Brigade .. .. •• 252 Rifles .. „ .. ..80 Total .. 832 VOLUNTEERS (INCLUDING OFFICERS). Coist Brigade 90 Field Force „ - ..2,520 Honorary Volunteers.. „ ..560 Total .. 8,982 Grand total ..4,314 The adoption of this revised establishment would result in the reduction of about 4,980 paid Volunteers, in addition to cadets. The reduction of 4,980 paid Volunteers, with all expenses connected with them, implies a very material saving in the annual expenditure. It mußt be observed, however, that the Coast Brigade Volunteers will be called upon to give more of their time for training than ordinary Volunteers. On the Coast Brigade would fall the chief responsibility for the defence of the four principal harbors. And so essential is it that they should be thoroughly trained and practised in their duties, and that all their appliances should be in good working order, that I would recommend that the permanent part of the force should nominally be employed solely in their special duties, and that all guards, orderly duties, etc., should be taken by the Permanent Rifles. In considering the estimates for current year I have noticed that there is a store establishment at Auckland which may be reduced. The bulk of the military stores may be kept at Wellington. A number of other items evidently admit of reduction to meet the revised organisation I have proposed. This organisation, with its probable cost, is given in the annexed approximate estimate, from which it will be seen that the normal annual expenditure may safely be reduced from its present amount, L.99,748, to about L 72,331, showing a saving of about L 27.417. I would observe that it is very important that the four officers in command of the Coast Brigade at the principal ports should be thoroughly instructed technically; and I would recommend that eventually they should be Imperial officers, selected either from the Artillery, Engineers, or tho Navy, and in any case trained both in artillery, submarine mining, and torpedo service. Probably it would be necessary to give higher salaries to secure the services of really competent and thoroughly trained men; but on their knowledge and energy will depend the safety of the ports. I have already adverted to the great advantage which would result from the appointment when vacancies occur of thoroughly trained Imperial officers to nil the appointments of the four majors commanding the Coast Brigade at the four points, and I would extend this gradually also to the commander of tho forces and his two staff officers. By this means, if the appointments be for five years only, the knowledge and efficiency of tho technical corps will always bo kept up to date, and these appointments will be open to officers born in this Colony, who, under tho existing regulations, have obtained commissions in the Imperial Army. Similarly it will be important to obtain from time to timo the services of well-trained non-commissioned officers of tho Royal Artilleiy and Royal Engineers and Submarine Miners to assist in the training of the Coast Brigade. At ithe present moment the most urgent need is four trained non-commissioned officers of Artillery to take charge of the new guns and stores at eash port to assist in training the Coast Brigade. With the view of avoiding surprise and obtaining as early notice as possible of the approach of the enemy, and also for the protection of the mine-fields, and to avoid danger to friendly vessels in war | time, it will be necessary to adopt and 'enforce certain regulations and to make certain arrangements, without which the i defence system would be dangerous to friends, and would lose a great part of its value as a protection to the ports. After consulting with Captain Johnson, Nautical Adviser to the Marine Department, and Lieutenant Douglas, R.N., I should recom- ' mend the adoption ol the following system:— (1) Those points on the coast where an enemy would probably be first sighted should be placed in telegraphic communication with headquartow, and signalmen should there be on the watch to give notioo ,of suspicious vessels passing. There are somo twenty of theße points, ol wbioh about half are now in telo gnphlo communication with the general telegraph system, and most of the others should really be connected. These points are as follows:—North Island : Cape Maria, Van Dieman, Cape Egmont, Penourow Lighthouse, Cape Palliser, Portland Island Lighrbouie, East Oape, Tiiitirl Lighthouse, B»y of Islands, and Mokohino Lighthouse. Bouth Island: Cape Farewell Lighthou e. Capo Foulwind Lighthouse, Puysegur Point Lighthouse, Bluff Signal Station, Waipapa Point, Nugget Point, Nugget Lighthouse, Akaroa Lighthouse, Talaroa Head Lighthouse, Godly Head Lighthouse, and Cape Campbell Lighthouse. (2) At each of the four principal ports there Bhould always be a pilot on duty.to conduct vessels through the "friendly channel," and no vessel shou'd bo allowed to come in or go out without a pilot, under any oircumstances, between sunset and sunrise, under penalty of being fired at or blown up. While waiting for a pilot, vessels should anohor at Wellington inside the Btoeplo Rook, within a radius of four cables from the rock; at Auckland they should anchor under Rangitoto Beef; at Lyttelton they should anchor or Uy-to (aooordiog to the weather) outside a lino drawn between the extremities of Oodloyand Tolna Heads; at Port Chalmers they should lay outside the bar, or if at their own risk thoy prefer to cross the bar, they must anohor, as soon as they cross it outside of a line between Howlett Point and tho fltst red buoy. (3) Guard vessels will be required at each of tho four ports to control tho traffic and protect the minefields. Tho submariuo mining vessels must be Bupplomented in war time by small local steamers tf from 30 to 100 tons, temporarily commissioned, armed with a machine gun and fitted with a musketproof breastwork of iron or steel. These guard vessels would bo commanded by tho Coast Brigade offloon (Permanent or Volunteer), with a crow of fifteen to twenty Coaet Brigade men, one engineer, and one stoker. One guard vessel, with a pilot on board, would be required by day. All must be on duty at night. The officer commanding the day-guard vessel should board every ship arriving at the port, if he has satisfied himself as to ber friendly charaotor. He should put a pilot on board, and signal to the commanding offioer on sboro that she is permitted to enter; or bo would lead her in himself. Should two or more ships arrive together, it would only be neoessary to lead in or put a pilot on board of one, dlreoting the others to follow accurately her wake. (4) In addition to the submarine mining steamers at each station it wbuld be neoessary to have at least two-hired steamers at Wellington, two at Auokland, One at Lyttelton. and one at Port Chalmers. These might be supplemented largely, it is presumed, in war time by local steamers if necessary. It would be of advantage to Wellington and Auokland if a swift steamer oould bo employed as a soout to cruise off the port and to run in and give notice of the approaoh of the enemy, but unless these steamers are so swift as to be secure against capture they might be injurious to the detenoe by affording an enemy an opportunity of information he could not otherwise gain. (5) A system of signals must be established to give notice of the approach of an enomy. and also to notify at night when all the guard vessels have retired witciin the) defenoes and the guns and mines are free to act. ,'■■■': (0) When war regulations are In force it should be notified ateaoh of the four porta by hoisting a red flag at the signal station and lighthouses by day, and at night by extinguishing the leading lights. At Lyttelton, where there.are- no leading lights, a red light should be shown In the fixed lighthouse of Godley Had. The Information should also be more widely diffused by hoisting red flags durlog the day at all the points named in paragraph one, and at night by showing a red light at Mokohino, Farewell Spit, Akaroa Head, Cape Saunders, and Puysegur Point. , C 7) FuUnOtloeof war regulations should be published at bnbe in the ordinary way as " notices to mariners," in order that vessels arriving from distant parts might be. aware of them in oaso of war. (8) The guard boats and' torpedo boats should bo under tho orders of tho office* commanding the coast brigade ateaoh port.

In conclusion, I would advert to the paramount importance of frequent practice in the use of each of the elements of coast defence, both separately and in combination; and

that the practices should take place both by day and by night, so that the men and officers may be accustomed to work the guns, mines,, electric lights, guard vessels, and torpedo boats together, under all conditions of weather and light. Tho approximate estimate of the defence forces is as follows :-Btaff, L 3.069; Coast Brigade, L 28,790; Rifle*, L 7.506;' other charges, L 5.625; total staff and permanent forces, L 44.991. Volunteer force: Auckland, L 631; Wellington, L 942; Canterbury, L 65 1; Dunedin, L 65 1; capitation, L 10.646; other charges, L 10.150; total, L 24.055. SUMMARY. Permanont Force £41,991 Volunteers .. .. .. ~ 24,055 Stores and magazines «. •• 3,286 £72,382 Note—Pending also the completion of tho works, it will not be necessary to make up the defence forces to their full strength, and tho following reduction in the foregoing establishment may be in force during the years 1888-89. Reduoiion in the Permanent Forces :—2 subalterns at L280.L500: 2 sorgeant-majors at 8s Od per day, LBIO ss; 8 corporals at 7s per day, L 1.022; 8 secondclass corporals at 6s per day, L 919 ; 4 artificers at 6s (5d per day,'L474 10s; 4 first-class privatis at 6s per day, L 438; 20 privates at 5s per day, 1,2,871 103. IWflos: 12 privates, at 4s 6d per day, L 1,642 10s. Reduction in tho Volunteers: One-third of tho capitation, L 4.450. Total temporary reduction, L 12.158 16s; reduction, LB.OOO, charged to the voto for defonco works; total, L 20.168168. The normal cost —L71.332 Is 6d-would thus be reduced during tho year 1888-89 to L 621 7s 6d.

AooUud.. Wellington Artillery. 68 .. . 68 Torpedo. 19 81 Total. 87 70 Lyttelfim- .. 32 a 88 18 spy Dnoedla ... .. 40 8 if'...

Artillery. Torpedo. Total. Auckland .. .. 270 315 Wellington .. Lyttelton ,. .. 280 45 — 276 .. 124 11 - 135 Danedin _ ... 160 17 - 177 Totals .. 784 118 002

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/ESD18871223.2.3

Bibliographic details

Evening Star, Issue 7402, 23 December 1887, Page 1

Word Count
3,734

THE DEFECE REPORT. Evening Star, Issue 7402, 23 December 1887, Page 1

THE DEFECE REPORT. Evening Star, Issue 7402, 23 December 1887, Page 1