DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.

Evening Star, Issue 7355, 29 October 1887, Page 1

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE.

Speaking on the question of Supply last session, and in relation to the establishment of a permanent militia, Sir George Grey asked : “ Do honorable gentlemen believe “ that it becomes us to have drilled armies “ fit to cope in great fields and great actions “ such as are fought by the armies of Eng- “ land, Germany, or France, or do we not “ rather want an army of a nation like the “Swiss, the Boers, or other like countries “ of that kind, like the JJaoris themselves in “former days, who could defend their “ country against all invaders who might “ land here ? We do not want troops such “as the Great Powers bring into the field. “Our colonists make e icellent soldiers. All “ these paraphernalia and all this vast expenditure of money are beyond our pre“sent wants, and are a cruel incubus “ upon the mass of the inhabitants of this “country.” When It it Is considered that the insensate rage for fortifications and other emplusayes of defence have already cost the Colony upwards of half a million sterling, and that this extravagant expenditure is still going on, it must be admitted that Sir G. Grey’s denunciation was well spoken. It has been repeatedly pointed out in the columns of the Star that the present system of defence is not only costly, but ill-advised, and now we find a competent military authority giving voice to the fame opinion. A pamphlet addressed to the taxpayers of New Zealand, and entitled “ How we may save £50,000 a-year by the reorganisation of onr forces,” by Maitland Noake, has recently been circulated. People may reasonably ask who Maitland Noake is. He tells us that beginning in the ranks of a crack cavalry regiment at Home, he speedily won commissioned rank and served in Bulgaria, in the Crimea, and in India during the period of the Mutiny. He also relates how he served with and held a command in the Volunteer forces of New Zealand “ for “ very many years in quarters, in camp, and “against the enemy; and now,” he writes, “I am a Lieutenant-Colonel in the force, “ and occupy to me the proud position of “ commander of the first regiment of cavalry “of New Zealand.” Taking the words of Sir George Grey as his text, he proceeds to demonstrate the fallacies of the existing system of defence, which he declares to be “delusive and extravagant”; adding his opinion that there can be neadequate protection for the Colony until a radical change is made in the organisation of the forces. As a rule, he very truly says, the taxpayers are diffident in forming opinions upon subjects with which they are not familiar. In this instance, however, a profound knowledge of the business of war is not essential. Observation with a modicum of common sense should tend to fairly accurate conclusions. He confirms what we have repeatedly urged in the following passage: “ danger from without which New Zealand “ has to guard against, and that is a sudden “ surprise attack upon one of onr principal “ ports, and this contingency can only arise “in the event of war with a maritime “ Power, and even then the risk would be “ minimised if we are prepared to meet it. “But are we so prepared? My reply “to this question is* a very decided “ negative. We are told that we have forts, “ batteries, heavy ordnance, machine-guns, “ torpedo boats; Whitehead, ground, and “ dropping torpedoes; electric lights, imple- “ ments, appliances, test-rooms, tauts for “ cables, and gun-cotton. It is, however, “an open question if these elaborate de“fences, even when fully garrisoned and “manned, could successfully resist a direct “ attack made by a heavily-armed man-of-“war, fitted with all the appliances of “ modern warfare, for it must be remem- “ bered that weapons and implements of “war which may be considered the best one “year may be obsolete the next, in these “ days of rapid changes and improvements. “ It is also believed by many that the whole “ position might be turned, and the forts and “ batteries rendered worthless by a flank “attack.” For those who are acquainted with the position of the forts at Taiaroa Head and at the entrance to Wellington Harbor—not to mention other equally instructive examples—this last observation of Colonel Noake will possess remarkable significance. Then there are the tmgarrisoned works and defences, of which he writes that there can be no possibility of a divergence of opinion as to their being a source of weakness rather than of strength. With regard to the remarks of the handling of the Volunteer Force by Sir George Whitmore, we do not profess to be able to offer judgment. The questions involved are altogether "technical and professional; but it . may be stated that Colonel Noake’s argument is in the direction of showing that neither Volunteers nor Militia are properly trained and taught; that General Whitmore’s report on Jhe subject is unreliable and “ eminently calculated to lead the country “into the blissful realities of the fools’ “paradise, to be rudely awakened by the “ first shock of warfare.” This is a pretty strong condemnation of the General’s system, and is tantamount to an impeachment of his capacity. We do not know jwhat rules of discipline prevail in our colonial army; bat it is noticeable that the writer of the pamphlet does not sign lieutenant-colonel of any regiment, but as “ Maitland Noake, of the electorate of New Zealand,” from which it may be presumed that he shelters himself and bis criticism beneath the protecting wing of his electoral privileges, fie that as it may, he has rendered good service to the country by his trenchant exposure of the hollow and expensive sham imposed on the country under the pretence of defence. He advocates dispensing with the guard of the Permanent Militia set over Government House, costing directly and indirectly £I,SOO a-year; and would abolish as unnecessary the Council of Military Education, the establishment of which involves an expense of £1,500 a-year. As to our little standing army, he says: “ With “ our limited means, I fail to see the advan- “ tage of keeping up a corps of Permanent “Militia, at an annual cost of £11,500, “in order to support the law within the ‘ ‘ Colony. This expense may go on for years “and the contingeny for which it is insured “never arise in our time; then why not “ dispense with it ? and should the law *• rpnmrA Rnnnnrf.. to ntviKlnmoftnel

‘•require support, which is problematical, “then do as was done so effectually at “ Paiihaka : call out a sufficient number of " Volunteers, and the thing is 'stamped out “at a comparatively- trifling, dost. Again, “ of what earthly use' is an' organisation of “permanent field artillery in onr forces? “It is never likely to be needed, and it “costs between £5,000 and£6,ooo a year.” But his most direct thrust is delivered at the Commander of the Forces,, the abolition of whose office would, he declares, be an absolute gain. If there is an attack on Auckland, Dunedin, or elsewhere, how, he asks, could the Commander be there in time to superintend defence operations, supposing him to be in Wellington ? and If Wellington were attacked whilst he was in Auckland, how could he possibly lead the forces at the former place ? Clearly, then, we cannot afford to keep up so expensive an appoint* ment for so shadowy a contingency. Neither does Colonel Noabe think that the Colony is justified in retaining the appointment merely as an ornamental head to our Volnn* teer force. The cost, we are told, is much greater than the public think, amounting (directly and indirectly) to £1,500 a-year. In conclusion, this experienced military critic declares that the New Zealand Volun* teers are quite capable of defending the country against invasion,- and therefore he would dispense with our mock army and its fussy commander altogether. He tells ns that when General Cam ebon was conducting operations on the West Coast he always used the Wanganui Cavalry whenever there was any work of importance to be done, in preference to the Imperial trained cavalry. In the following paragraph he triumphantly points to experience, and Btuwup the whole question “ During the early Taranaki “ war many of the Imperial troops were employed, and with them Were two companies of what were called bushrangers. “ They were composed bf settlers, and com-

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TTkv Maior Atkinson and other “ m^ d ! d nffic y erf \vho bore the brunt of the tot time* Major Atkinson’s .. T&naii bushrangers. Who put the fear “of God into the enemy? Major Atkin- « "on's Taranaki bushrangers. Who, when “the Imperial troops went out, covered “their advance in the bush and promoted their return but Major At“kinson’s Taranaki bushrangers? Were “ not these bushrangers, officers or “ men, far and away superior to their “ Imperial confreres for the work required “ofthem? Surely they were. Yet they “ were of the same race and the same blood. “ How then can the superiority of the less- “ disciplined force be accounted for but by • ‘ the training ?’’ The answer which Colonel Noake suggests rather than makes to his own questions is that a well organised and properly disciplined Volunteer force is all that is needed for the defence of New Zealand, and that an expensive military establishment, consisting of a few score of halftrained artillerists and torpedo men, will not be of any avail in an emergency.