What is the Hare System?

Evening Star, Issue 7188, 16 April 1887, Page 2 (Supplement)

What is the Hare System?

[By Alfred Saunders, in the ‘Press.’] “ What is the Hare system of election! ’ and “ What would be the effect of its adoption ?” are two questions that have been asked mo by more than one neighbor since the telegraph notice appeared stating that, when Parliament meets, Mr Fergus would propose some modification of the Hare system. The former question may be completely, and, I think, very advantageously, answered. The latter is far beyond all human foresight, but it is quite safe to say that it would be the most important reform that New Zealand has ever seen or attempted, as it would enable us at once to plant a political tree, sound in roots, trunk, and branches, that could not fail to bear wholesome fruit. It would give every elector an opportunity to support some candidate that he really believed in, instead of being restricted, as he now so often is, to a mere choice of evils. It would transfer all those social reforms, sectarian, party, trade, professional, or political combinations which now work so mischievously, in a political sense, into blessings instead of curses; as they would then work by building up instead of by pulling down. They would successfully combine to put in the best men of their own party, instead of only keeping out the best men opposed to them; and would take care that every elector, who held the society’s views, should have an opportunity to vote for candidates who could ably advocate and worthily represent them. Thus every great public interest—religious, moral, social, commercial, or political—would be ably represented in our Parliament; and we should hear no more of that parliamentary pest who now neither knows nor cares about any great question, who stands by no principle, is neither a protectionist nor a freetrader, a provincialist nor a centralist, a denominationalist nor a secularist, an economist nor a spendthrift, who is Not a Tory, not a Whig, But Just a candidate. If you will allow me to answer the first question, I will try to do so as briefly and clearly as I can, leaving the greater questions to future communications, What is the Hare system of election ? It is a method of voting proposed in 1859 by Mr Thomas Hare, a barrister-at-law, residing at Gosbury Hill, Kingston on Thames. In that year it was laid before the public by him, in a treatise that was able and eloquent to a fault. Too refined for his readers, he went on refining, and thought of convincing when they thought of dining. His proposals, put into mere simple language, were brought into the British Parliament by Messrs Fawcett, Morrison, Herbert, and Hughes, in February, 1872, and the motion for the second reading was lost on the 10th of July of that year. The distinguishing features of the system are: First, that no elector is restricted to voting for local candidates, but may, if ho pleases, give bis vote to any candidate that has been proposed to form one of the great representative body. Secondly, a system of recording his vote is provided, which secures that no vote shall be wasted on a favorite candidate in consequence of his friends not knowing, at the time of recording their votes, whether he would need them or not. Thirdly, it gives any party or society, of any considerable number, a means by which they can make quite sure of the return of the men whose public services they most value, or of such a number of them as will correspond with the numerical strength of their votes. And fourthly, it gives any individual, or any party, an opportunity to offer the compliment of their vote, as an expression of sympathy or approval to any prominent public man, without losing it for the return of some less prominent friend who may need it, not merely as a compliment, but also as a security. This is done as follows:—The voter, on entering the polling booth, receives, as he does now, a voting paper, duly numbered and stamped, but without any candidates’ names upon it. It contains a blankrlined space fqr any agreed number of candidates—say ten or twenty. He 1 finds an alphabetical list of all the candidates before him, from whicli ho can proceed to select his favorites, and to arrange them on the paper exactly in the order in which he values them. This might be done by writing the names, or the numbers, or by taking the names of the candidates, printed on adhesive paper, from boxes duly arranged before him. He may either fillup his paper or be contented with a single name, according to the extent of his sympathies or knowledge. In any case he can only vote for one candidate, but the object of putting more votes on the paper is this : —lf the first candidate named on his paper has enough votes to elect him without this voting paper, the paper will then be passed on to the second candidate named on it; if the second does not want it it goes to the third, and so on down to the end of his list. But as soon as a candidate is reached who does want the vote to complete his election, and has enough other votes to make the vote useful to him, the vote is taken for him, and the paper is then set aside as having done its work. If, on the other hand, the first candidate named stands in need of the vote, the vote goes to him, and the paper can be used no further. This is all that the elector would need to understand in order to perform his public duty in a manner most sure to secure his vote being really serviceable to some candidate who decidedly represents his views. The question of whether he should bp allowed to put on his voting paper ten, twenty, or a hundred names is only a qupsition of detail and convenience, that would not much affect the principle. It is, perhaps, desirable that as many as twenty names should be allowed, so that any strong party or society such as the Protectionists, Freetraders, licensed teetotallers, Catholics, etc.—could pick out and vote for what they consider their best representative men and for as many of them as the votes they can command would enable them to return. In this way they would not only ensure the return of men of whom they could be justly proud, but their united votes would effectually prevent the return of such a swarm of road scramblers as now demoralise the House. It is of course most undesirable that men should be either elected to or kept out of the House for no better reason than because they happen to be teetotallers) Presbyterians, or Catholics. But when any these societies feel that they can cer. tainly elect men who will ably represent them on their pet question, and who will be recognised in the House as their representatives, they will take care to send men who will not disgrace them by possessing no other useful qualities. I am not sure that there is any good reason why autih societies, or any political

parties, should not be allowed to supply voters with printed lists of their candidates, in the order they value them, all ready for the elector to attach to his voting paper. But perhaps this permission might be abused by candidates, and I have very little sympathy with any attempt to supply brains to those who have none of their own for voting purposes. As soon as all the voting papers have been received, the returning officer would proceed to count and arrange them. In doing this he would place to the credit of each candidate all the papers upon which his name was placed first, and then he would sort each candidate’s papers in such order that those with the smallest number of names on them would be at the top, and those with the largest number at the bottom, In this state they would all be forwarded to the Registrar-General for the Colony, who, with a large staff of assistants, would again arrange the whole of the voting papers, so as to give each candidate the whole of the papers upon which his name stands first, and place them in the same order as before, as to number of names upon them; t.e., those with the fewest names are placed at the top, and those with the largest number of names at the bottom.

Before the whole of the papers are received, the Registrar will have received from each returning officer a telegraphic statement of the number of votes polled. As soon as that is complete the Registrar will divide the the total number of electors who have voted by the number of members to be elected, which will give him what is called the quota—that is, the number sure to bo sufficient to secure the election of any candidate.

Supposing that 100 members are to be elected, and that 50,000 electors have voted, then the quota would be 500. Thus each candidate whose name had been placed first on 500 voting papers could at once be declared duly elected. As soon as this was ascertained 500 papers would be taken from the top of each elected condidate’s packet and put aside as having done their work, and such candidates’ names erased from all remaining papers. All the papers so treated are then placed to the credit of the candidates whose uncancelled names remain at the top, and for each candidate so elected 600 voting papers ape set aside as exhausted in las service, and the elected names again struck off of all the remaining papers, bringing other names to the top. This process could be repeated more or less frequently, according to the number of names placed, on the papers, but after a few repetitions it will be found better to count all the votes given on any part of the remaining papers for each candidate, and then strike off the lowest candidate until only the required number of candidates are left, and these, whether they reach the quota or not, are declared duly elected. A list of those who come nearest election might be kept and used to till up vacancies that occur between the general elections ; or such vacancies might be allowed to accumulate until a certain number could be filled at once, or might be left unfilled at all, Mr Fergus, of course, knows that his proposals will not be adopted by the present Parliament. As Mr Turnbull tells us, members of Parliament do not often commit suicide. Such a system would be certain and permanent exclusion to the small local magnates that now throng the House. It would no longer be sufficient to kiss the local babies, to swear by the local line or sludge channel, nor even to promise a rise in every stipend. Powers would arise that knew not Joseph, and a sudden demand would spring up for men who were fit for Sublic work, who had principles and could efend them. But if Mr Fergus can got a distinct division of the House upon this vital question he will ear-mark the men who fear the result of a wider verdict, The electors will soon have an opportunity to leave such meu in their proper place, and to vote for no man at the next general election who is afraid to give them the chance to choose men more fit for their work. No greater, no more important, no more elevating object could form the watch cry of any party, or constitute a more worthy shibboleth to be demanded of every candidate.