COLONIAL DEFENCE.

Evening Star, Issue 6038, 19 July 1882, Page 1

COLONIAL DEFENCE.

The Defence Minister has announced to the House of Representatives that it is the intention of the Government forthwith to carry out the scheme of defence for the four principal ports of the Colony which was recommended by Colonel Sgratchley, and that they are in communication with that officer, who is at present in Australia, with the view of ascertaining whether any alterations have suggested themselves to him since his visit of inspection. It may prove interesting under these circumstances to refer to the report, which is dated March 1, 1880, and set forth briefly the character of the recommendations made, especially as regards Otago. Colonel Scratchley premises that the fact of New Zealand possessing a seaboard of over 2,200 miles, and the principal harbors bdTng situated great distances apart, effectually disposes of the idea of attempting to defend the Colony by naval means alone. It is obvious, he says, that "the principle upon which the defence "of New Zealand at the present " time should be based is to place each "of the principal harbors in a positiun "to repel attack from one or two " cruisers, and at the same afford " points of support, and, in case of " disaster, of refuge to such of Her " Majesty's ships as would in time of " war be detached to co-operate in the " general defence of Australia and New "Zealand." Proceeding to consider the measures necessary to effect this object, the Colonel expresses the opinion that the defences should consist of land batteries rendered selfdefensible and independent of external support, in combination with offensive and defensive torpedoes. He adds that " the best mode of providing " against attacks made by bodies of " men landed for the purpose of turn- " ing the batteries will be to maintain "local troops capable of meetiDg the " enemy in the field." Sir "W. Jervois, fortheharborsof the Australian colonies, has recommended batteries armed with heavy rifled ordnance, together with submarine mines in the channels, and torpedo boats for attacking the enemy's vessels. For the protection of the principal cities near the seaboard from attacks of men landed from the enemy's ships, he has proposed the maintenance of local forces. This plan of defence Colonel Scratchley considers " well adapted for the harbors of " New Zealand, provided it is designed "so as to be carried out by degrees." A system of submarine mines he does not, however, think is applicable under present circumstances, since efficient and reliable torpedo defences could not be established without the most careful preparation, and would require the services of a large body of men thoroughly trained to the work. As guns alone will not prevent hostile vessels from forcing their way into a port, in the absence of submarine defences, it becomes necessary, he says, to fall back on offensive torpedoes to support the batteries on shore. He proposes, therefore, that three torpedo-boats should be supplied to each of the principal harbors. The advantages to be gained from the employment of such boats, he states, are many. " They are admitted " to be most formidable weapons in the " hands of daring and determined men. "They could be procured almost at " once, and are not very costly either to " purchase or maintain. They do not "require specially trained mes v for "working them, beyond the. seainen " and engineers who are to be found "in every port." Having discussed the principles on which the defences of New Zealand should be established, and detailed generally tho means which are available, Colonel Scratchley proceeds to consider the specific requirements of each place. DunediD, he says, is exposed to two modes of attack by sea. An enemy might pass in through the Heads and appear before Port Chalmers, in order to destroy the shipping; or he might take up a position off the Ocean Beach within easy range of the City. In regard to the defence of the entrance of the harbor, Point Harrington affords, he thinks, an admirable site for a battery, and he proposes that the work should be designed for five guns, but only be armed at present with two 7-inch and one 64-pounder rifled guns. Two field pieces should be added to protect the rear of the work and to fire on the adjacent beaches. "This bat- " tery with three guns, and three tor- " pedo boats will suffice for present "requirements, In the future, two " more guns and submarine mines can "be added. A ship steaming at ten " knots would be exposed to fifty "shots from the three guns during "the time she took to come within "and pass beyond their maximum " range." The-bombardment ofDunedin from the open sea the Colonel evidently considersadanger sufficiently imminent. The range into the heart of the Qitj would be about 4,000 yards. " Every " shell therefore thrown would doubt"less do some damage, but beyond " creating considerable consternation {!) " I do not think there need be -any " serious apprekension as to the result "of a bombardment." The most effectual -way, he says, of keeping the enemy's ships at such a distance from V.d shore as to render a bombardment impracticable, would be the erection of two batteries—one for three guns on Lawyer Head to the east, and the other for two guns on the west of the beach. Reliance, however, might to .some extent, he thinks, be placed on light field guns, the sandhills affording excellent positions for them, and in

favorable weather the torpedo launches from Poit Chalmers might be made available. . For the purpose or working tho batteries and manning the torpedo boats, Colonel SCKATCiirJSV recommends tim establishment of naval brigades, organised on a system to the naval reserve maintained m Aa everything will depend eliiciencv of the proposed batte. -it "isimperative that the dinners should "be carefully-trained men, who would "be avail."hie when required." With respect to the crews of the torpedo boats, at least three men would, he sayf, be required for each boat—one to command, an engineer for the engines, and one man to work the spar torpedo. The sections of tho naval brigades entrusted with the torpedo boats might number, in peace time, ten men, "In time of war the crews would " have to be permanently enrolled, and " so increased as to have men in re- " aetvo to till up vacancies and ready " for duty day and night." Tho strength in timo of war of tho il per- " manent and auxiliary detachment of <! coast artillery " should be, he recommends, at each principal port: Armed Constabulary specially trained as artillery men, 25 ; naval brigade, 120, 20 being for torpedo boat service. Tho batteries at the Ocean Beach, it is suggested, might be manned entirely by Volunteers. A large proportion of the men for the naval brigades should, he says, be taken from the seafaring population; all should ba able-bodied, and the majority accustomed to manual labor.