SUPREME COURT.

Evening Star, Issue 4203, 16 August 1876, Page 3

SUPREME COURT.

IN BANCO.

WEDNESDAY, ACOUSSC 16. (Before His Honor Mr Justice Williams.)

Douglas v. Reid. — His Honor delivered judgment herein as follows:—In this case I think that the appeal must be allowed, as the facts stated do not show that the appellant is liable. The respondent, a director and shareholder of a mining company, accepts a bill when asked to -do so by the appellant, who is manager of the company, for the purpose of clearing off the debt of the company to their bankers and preventing them being pressed for payment. Out of a transaction of this kind there could hot arise any implied agreement of the appellant who drew the bill to indemnify the who accepted it, as in the case of an ordinary accommodation bill. In the present case, however, it appears that the appellant told the respondent that if he would, accept the bill he (the appellaht) would get'plenty of calls in before the bill came due and would pay the bill. Ido not see that this amounts to an undertaking by the appellant ,to become personally responsible for Hie bill, but merely to-a representation that Hie Company would be m funds to meet it. This representation is made not to a stranger but to one who as a director of the Company had opportunities of judging how far it was likely to prove correct. The position of the parties and the. nature of the transaction completely negative any presumption that the appellant was to incur any personal liability.. Appeal allowedwith coats. . Williah Jenkins.; v. Elizabeth Jenkins and Another. —Defendants herein were.called upon to show cause why the: finding of the jury upon the issue directed i to be tried in this cause at the April' sittings of. tins Court should not be set 1 aside, or instead thereof a verdict entered for . plaintiff, on the following: grounds 1. For misdirection, the. learned; judge having directed the jury that there' was not sufficient evidence to justify a find-1 ing in favor of the plaintiff. 2. That the finding of the jury was against the weight of evidence. 3. That the question of the credibility of the witnesses and the intent of the pat-ties was not submi tk.d to the jury by the learned judge at the trial. ’ Mr Chapman and Mr Mouat moved the' rule absolute; Mr Haggitt appeared to show cause. After hearing considerable argument on both sides, his Honor reserved judgment.

Re the Land Transfer Act. —ln the matter of the Land Transfer Act, 1870, and in the matter of an application of Robert Marine. His Honor delivered judgment herein, argument in which was taken on Monday. He said that the voluntary settlement being registered could not be defeated by the subsequent- mortgage for valuable consideration, nor would the fact that Mrs Miller was a party to the mortgage divest her of her interest under the settlement if her interest was of such a nature that by the terms of settlement she could not dispose of it by anticipation. The settlement vests the land in question in the trustees on trust in the first place for Mr Miller during his life, but only till he should become insolvent or bankrupt. It is quite clear that a person could not settle his own property so as to take under the settlement an interest defeasable in bankruptcy, nor could he in general settle it so as to take an interest defeasable on alienation, The effeet of the settlement was to give Mr Miller an absolute interest for his life, and the trust for Mrs Miller could not take effect till after his decease. That being so, he (the learned Judge) did not see what was to prevent her, with her husband’s concurrence, from now disposing of her reversionary interest. In conclusion, his Honor said the case was sufficiently doubtful to fully justify the District Land Registrar in raising the objections, but he (his Honor) considered, notwithstanding them, that the application should be proceeded with. Order accordingly.