TRUTH ON JAVA

Evening Post, Volume CXL, Issue 150, 22 December 1945, Page 9

TRUTH ON JAVA

NO SIMPLE PROBLEM

PROTECTING THE INTERNEES

(By Wing Commander Charles Gardner).

LONDON, December 8.

Recently David Low, the \vell-knc-.vn cartoonist, drew a cartoon on the Java situation. In it he showed a British soldier tied by one leg to Indonesia and trying, to defend himself, from brickbats thrown from several directions. Sheltered behind him, politicians arguing—apparently content to let the Tommy take knocks while they indulged In non-stop talk. It was a striking and powerful cartoon but unfortunately only half the truth and if anything even a little less than that. There is no mention in it of armed Japanese war criminals still at large in Java. There is no mention either of the 80,000 internees and prisoners whose rescue from conditions of horror and degradation is still unaccomplished. There is no mention of the murderous excesses of Indonesian extremists or -the wholesale massacres of Dutch men, •women, and children which would folJow the withdrawal of Allied protection.

The truth of course is that it is not possible to simplify the Java problem into the clear black and white of a single drawing. It has history dating back to before the Second World War, when the Nationalist aspirations of the ■Indonesians first became vocal, and which has been hideously complicated by over four years of malicious Japanese administration. The Japanese originally promised the Indonesians independence, whipped them to a frenzy.of Nationalism, then .fobbed them off with • excuses, laying all the blame for delay '■upon the war, and the Allies and European races generally. The result has Ibeen to foment nearly the whole of 'Java into a state of and hatred of the outside world which is blind, unreasoning and quite often beyond the control of its leaders. In such conditions armed thuggery,, violence frobbery, and pillage flourish, gang leaders taking advantage of. the confusion While paying lap service to the national cause.

ADDED RESPONSIBILITY. In August of this year Java, which ■was then in the American theatre, was transferred to the _ South-east Asia Command and the British. It was at Potsdam that Admiral Mountbatten was first told to plan for the liberation of Java and also to plan the machinery for solution of its tangled affairs. Admiral Mountbatten had ■hardly had time to send a signal from Potsdam ty Kandy telling, his staff of the new responsibilities when the Japanese surrendered. In all, three days elapsed between Java first being handed into the British •theatre as a future objective, and the physical necessity for occupying it. The new responsibility for 55,000 square miles, 43,000,000 people, and 100,000 •Japanese had to be taken with no corresponding increase of Allied troops or shipping, which already^had to cope suddenly with the occupation of Malaya, Sumatra, Siam, and French IndoThere was delay in getting troops to Java. This was partly due to the late date at which the South-east Asia Command was given responsibility for the island, -and partly because of General Mac Arthur's overall policy that no occupational operations were to be carried out until after the general Japanese surrender at Tokio Bay. It was not until mid-September that the first Allied troops landed in Java, and the Japanese had had a month to "set the stage." Weapons W . been iriven to the extremists and the independence" of the Indonesians proclaimed. Until the surrender terms the Japanese had been made responsible for law and order until the Allies arrJved, but British troops found a situation of disorder and mob violence beyond the control of even the Indonesian leaders. The Allies arrived with two simple objectives—the round-up _of Japanese troops and the release of internees and prisoners of war. Their duties were so obviously necessary that I do not think anyone has yet argued that they should not be performed. Those two' objectives still stand and are the only reason for the continued presence of>ll|ed troops The^question of- thefutureCfOrm. of the'Gwernment of Java is not involved. , That.is a matter between the Dutch and the Indonesians. But as long as. the Indonesians persist in attacking Allied troops arid preventing them from capturing and releasing-prisoners, then the troops must and will defend themselves'internee problems.

The following figures give some idea of internee problems in South-east Asia: there are 130,000 Dutch in the area; 50,000 in camps at Rangoon, Singapore, Borneo, and other places impatiently awaiting return-to Java, which is their only home; another 80 000, together with 40,000 Asiatics and Eurasians, are appealing for protection inside Java itself; these 120,000 being concentrated into four areas—Ba^avia, Buitenzorg, Bandoeng, and Semarang. This is the task which is being seriously hampered by lawless conditions and there is no prospect of this mercy work being completed until order is restored.

Meanwhile there are still Japanese troops to be rounded up, disarmed, and deported. Their numbers are not firmly known, but reliable correspondents stated that 20,000 of them are actively fighting with the Indonesians against the Allies. Other Japanese forces made available to the Indonesians some tanks and armoured vehicles, about 200 artillery pieces, 16,000 machineguns, 25,000 rifles, 1300 tommy-guns, and large Quantities of ammunition. This forms the basis of tfhe Indonesians' armaments* for its half-trained "army" of 100,000.

It has been suggested that Dutch troops should now take over Allied tasks, in Java. No really adequate Dutch forces are, however, yet, in sight, for they have available all told only a few "security" battalions. There is also the additional fact that Dutch troops would meet with fanatical resistance, not only from 100,000 armed Indonesians, but also from most of the remaining 43,000,000 inhabitants. In th?,t conflict the internees would most probably be massacred. Fortunately, there are signs that the responsible Indonesian leaders realise all this and wish to avoid it. The Dutch made offers of many concessions and there is a note of optimism in the latest dispatches from the island.